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INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER TO  
A CUMULATIVE DISSERTATION 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The last years have seen a significantly fast development of financial services, 
the expansion of service volumes and the entry of innovative service providers 
in the market of financial services. Retail lending is an important part of 
financial services. In the euro-area the total volume of loans to households in 
August 2010 was 5106,1 bn EUR with retail loans amounting to 643,1 bn EUR 
(~12,5%).1 Although the recent financial turmoil has influenced the growth 
trend of consumer credit everywhere in the European Union (EU), retail lending 
has become an important element of financial services also in the new member 
states from Central and Eastern Europe with younger credit markets2. In 
Estonia, the portfolio of retail lending by commercial banks was around 8,7 bn 
EEK as at 31.12.2010.3 The overview of the market of financial services in 
Estonia prepared by the Estonian Financial Supervision Authority (EFSA)4 
indicates that at the end of 2010 the number of loan agreements concluded 
between commercial banks and private individuals was as follows: 158 000 
mortgage loan agreements, 107 400 study loan agreements, 246 100 retail loan 
agreements, 142 500 overdraft agreements, 436 400 credit card agreements and 
43 300 other types of loan agreements. Although in most loan categories 
lending to private individuals has somewhat decreased due to the impacts of 
economic recession, it is interesting to note an increase in the number of 
agreements concluded between commercial banks and private individuals in the 
categories of retail loans and consumer overdraft agreements in 2010: 
respectively by 7% and 12%. The development of innovativeness in the 
financial services market of Estonia has among others been marked by the 
                                                                          




2  European Commission, Directorate-General Health and Consumer Protection. Study on 
the Calculation of the Annual Percentage Rate of Charge for Consumer Credit Agreements, 
Final Report 2009, 85. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/rights/fin_serv_en.htm 
(13.06.2011). 
3  Rahandusministri määruse “Tarbijakrediidi kulukuse määra arvutamise kord” eelnõu 
seletuskiri (Explanatory note to the regulation of the Minister of Finance “Procedure for 
Calculation of the Rate of the Cost of Consumer Credit“), June 2010, 5. Available at 
http://eoigus.just.ee/?act=6&subact=1&OTSIDOC_ W=292658 (01.06.2010) (in Estonian). 
4  The data are based on the Estonian Financial Supervision Authority (EFSA) overview of 
the market of financial services in Estonia as at 31.12.2010. See Finantsinspektsioon, Eesti 
finantsteenuste turg seisuga 31.12.2010 (The market of financial services in Estonia at 
31.12.2010). Available at http://www.fi.ee/failid/Ylevaade_turg_seisuga_2010_12_eesti.pdf 
(12.06.2011) (in Estonian). 
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increasing importance of electronic retail loans (also hereinafter referred to as 
’SMS loans’). Today, the estimated market share of electronic retail lenders is 
below 5% of the whole retail lending market.5 Thus, next to regulated 
commercial banks, part of consumer lending is today carried out by electronic 
retail lenders.  
No authorization is required for the granting of credit in Estonia. Prudential 
supervision is exercised only with regard to those credit-granting entities which 
have gained an authorization from the EFSA (and respectively provide other 
regulated services too). Electronic retail loans granted by non-bank institutions 
are financial services which are not under the supervision of the EFSA. 
Therefore there is no actual overview of the total market of retail loans and the 
volumes of different credit products in Estonia; the total market volume is an 
estimate.6 Although no official data exist about the whole market of retail loans 
in Estonia (including electronic retail loans), the above figures would indicate 
that retail lending is an important component of Estonian credit market. 
The major purpose of innovative financial services is the increased practical 
comfort of consumers. Retail loans, especially electronic loans, often serve as a 
source for funding to cover ordinary daily expenditures or some extraordinary 
costs. The financing of ordinary daily expenses presents the biggest share of 
retail loans provided by commercial banks in Estonia, amounting to 37% of 
total retail loans.7 The field of electronic retail lending, which provides 
consumers with fast and flexible access to loans, has proved to be an efficient 
financing solution. However, innovation and comfort often comprise legally 
complex and costly situations, and the use of legal gaps or taking higher legal 
risks for the sake of innovation on behalf of service providers. Electronic retail 
lending has led to several problems such as deficient information of consumers, 
the real cost of borrowing, and malpractices. All of these problems have 
received greater or lesser attention by legislators, resulting in the respective 
amendment of laws8. For example, in the beginning of 2008 Estonia tackled the 
lack of necessary customer identification through the rules in the new Money 
Laundering and Terrorist Financing Prevention Act9, requiring face to face 
                                                                          
5  The Bank of Estonia, Lending Review, November 2010, 19. Available at 
www.eestipank.info/pub/en/ 
dokumendid/publikatsioonid/seeriad/rahast_2010/_2010_10/mra_1010.pdf (14.06.2011). 
6  Rahandusministri määruse “Tarbijakrediidi kulukuse määra arvutamise kord” eelnõu 
seletuskiri, op.cit. note 3, 4. 
7  Rahandusministri määruse “Tarbijakrediidi kulukuse määra arvutamise kord” eelnõu 
seletuskiri, op.cit. note 3, 4. 
8  In Latvia, for example, the activity license for non-bank electronic retail lenders has been 
under consideration. In Estonia no separate licensing attempts are under way but there are 
several other mechanisms such as these discussed in this dissertation to respond to the 
problems of electronic retail lending. 
9  Rahapesu ja terrorismi rahastamise tõkestamise seadus, signed 19 December 2007, Riigi 
Teataja (RT) I (2008) No. 3, 21; (2010) No. 26, 129 (in Estonian) (hereinafter “Money 
Laundering and Terrorist Financing Prevention Act“). 
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identification of all first-time customers by all financial service providers. 
Although designed to increase consumer protection, this change itsself has 
created additional problems and even facilitated some law-suits. Also, as a 
response to the rapidly expanding and sometimes aggressive business of retail 
lending in Estonia, the marketing rules of electronic retail loans became stricter 
under the new Advertising Act10 effective from November 2008, requiring 
better consumer information especially in terms of the disclosure of interest rate 
information in marketing activities. In the context of this research, the 
amendments of 2002 General Part of Estonian Civil Code Act11 which became 
effective on 1st May 2009 are important because they brought some 
fundamental change into the legal fabric of Estonia in terms of wider grounds 
for void transactions and the “soft” upper limit to the cost of credit. All these 
issues have been addressed in more detail in the articles which form the basis 
for this dissertation. 
Innovativeness consists of both possibilities and risks which are important to 
be addressed in legal writing. My key challenges in designing and carrying out 
this research were to understand the innovativeness and future perspectives of 
electronic lending products, to find out the bottlenecks in balancing the 
consumer protection and the freedom of contract, and to suggest the solutions to 
overcome some of the interpretation gaps in order to contribute to better 
business and legal environment regarding electronic retail lending. I have 
chosen this research area because it is a modern and fastly developing field 
which comprises significant inter-disciplinary element. I have taken interest in 
the questions of financial services law ever since the finalization of my 
baccalaureate studies in summer 2000 and continued researching this area 
throughout my following master studies at the Institute for Law and Finance, 
J.W.Goethe-Universität in Frankfurt am Main. Thanks to my combined 
background in law, finance and business administration I much appreciate the 
challenge available in relation to this research field. I find it important to 
contribute to legal writing in Estonia in the field which has been so far subject 
to limited academic research but which facilitates, due to its evolving and 
complex character, certainly crucial and very interesting discussion points. First 
and foremost, the evaluation of legal issues in relation to electronic retail loans 
is topical from the perspective of harmonization of the new Consumer Credit 
Directive12 and the related recent amendments of 2002 General Part of Estonian 
                                                                          
10  Reklaamiseadus, signed 12 March 2008, Riigi Teataja (RT) I (2008) No.15, 108; 
06.01.2011, No. 1 (in Estonian) (hereinafter ”Advertising Act“).  
11  Tsiviilseadustiku üldosa seadus, signed 27 March 2002, Riigi Teataja (RT) I (2002) 
No.35, 216; 06.12.2010, No. 1 (in Estonian) (hereinafter “General Part of Civil Code Act” or 
“GPCCA”). 
12 Directive 2008/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2008 
on credit agreements for consumers and repealing Council Directive 87/102/EEC, Official 
Journal (OJ) L 133 (2008), 66–92 (hereinafter “Consumer Credit Directive”). The directive 
aims at maximum harmonization, i.e. member states are not allowed to maintain or impose 
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Civil Code Act (GPCCA) and 2001 Law of Obligations Act13 (LOA). Among 
others, the adoption of the 2008 Consumer Credit Directive has been triggered 
by remarkable expansion of the types of consumer credit and new retail 
financing solutions in the credit market in recent years.14 The rapid development 
of the field and its regulation is one of the reasons for choosing to complete this 
dissertation as the series of articles rather than a monograph. 
The main statement of this thesis is that from the perspective of balancing 
the protection of consumers and commercial freedom in the regulation of 
electronic retail lending in Estonia, the major bottlenecks related to the 
applicable consumer protection measures are the requirements for client 
identification and limiting the annual percentage rate of charge (APRC), 
whereby the latter would disproportionately restrict the constitutional rights of 
service providers. The research at hand has been designed as the collection of 
three internationally published articles which address the issues of financial 
services innovation and consumer protection in one of the niche fields of 
financial services – the offering of electronic retail loans. The innovation of 
financial services and the protection of consumers are the keywords of this 
research, surrounded by the relevant more specific research questions addressed 
in separate articles. Respectively, the research at hand has 2 sub-statements. The 
main statement on the basis of the first article contained in this thesis is that the 
increasing innovativeness of electronic retail loans through their combination 
with prepaid cards involves additional risks for consumers but it also entails 
additional restrictions in public law towards service providers; hence, there is 
balance in the protection of consumers and commercial freedom in such cases. 
The main statement on the basis of the second and third article contained in this 
thesis is that the requirements for client identification and limiting the APRC 
excessively restrict the freedom of service providers in electronic retail lending 
and the current provisions of the APRC limit disproportionately restrict the 
constitutionally protected right of entrepreneurship freedom of service 
providers. 
Should the thesis statement be verified in the course of the research, the 
thesis would result in the conclusion that from the perspective of balancing the 
protection of consumers and commercial freedom the consumer protection 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
other national provisions besides the provisions of the directive. Such complete 
harmonization is necessary in order to ensure equally good protection of the interests of 
consumers within the European Community. Yet, there are a few issues in which the 
directive allows the discretion of member states. First and foremost this relates to the right of 
member states to broaden the scope of application of the rules. Ideally the directive should 
streamline the EU market of retail credit as a whole with total value of more than 800 bn 
euro. 
13 Võlaõigusseadus, signed 26 September 2001, Riigi Teataja (RT) I (2001) No.81, 487; 
04.04.2011, No. 1 (in Estonian) (hereinafter “Law of Obligations Act” or “LOA”). 
14  Rahandusministri määruse “Tarbijakrediidi kulukuse määra arvutamise kord” eelnõu 
seletuskiri, op.cit. note 3, 4.  
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measures applicable to electronic retail lending in Estonia constitute excess 
burden for service providers and need to be changed in terms of client 
identification rules and the limiting of the APRC. The face-to-face identification 
requirement should not be applied to electronic retail lenders because electronic 
retail loans do not involve the risk of money laundering and the existing 
requirement to identify all first-time clients through direct face-to-face contact 
excessively restricts the freedom of transaction of the electronic lenders. The 
existing legal provisions in Estonia regarding the APRC limit and the related 
extensive but unclear burden of proof of service providers are not in accordance 
with the Constitution of Estonia and therefore need amending or annulment. 
The major content of this compilation is contained in Chapters 2 and 3, and 
in the respective articles attached to this compilation. Chapter 2 aims at presen-
ting a summary of the main features and conclusions of the articles attached to 
this compilation. This chapter aims at introducing the core topics, discussion 
and conclusions deriving from the articles without an intention to provide 
additional analyses or in-depth explanations in respect of the topics addressed in 
the articles. The chapter provides an overview of the issues and my viewpoints 
as at the time of publishing the articles. All the developments and changes which 
have taken place after the publishing of the articles are presented in Chapter 3 
together with additional analysis, explanations and conclusions, especially in 
respect of evaluating the constitutional compliance of the APRC limit. 
The first article “Connecting Prepaid Cards and Retail Loans: Innovative 
Practical Solution or Confusing Legal Combination? Implications of the EU 
Financial Services Law from an Estonian Perspective“ has a service-related 
focus. It addresses the legal problems of regulating electronic retail lending as 
an innovative product solution and increasing its innovation by combining 
electronic loans with prepaid cards. Since the combination of loans with prepaid 
cards is one of the most logical innovation possibilities for developing 
electronic retail loans further, it would be necessary to discuss whether and how 
this can be done and which legal problems might arise. The second article 
“Legal Problems with Electronic Retail Loans: Balancing the Freedom of 
Contract and the Protection of Consumers – The Case of Estonia” has a 
consumer-related focus. It analyses the risks deriving from the innovation of 
financial services for consumers and discusses whether and to what extent the 
rights of consumers and the freedom of transactions are balanced when trying to 
mitigate the risks by regulative means. The third article “Electronic Retail 
Lending in Estonia: Legal Limits on the Cost of Credit” focuses on service 
providers. It addresses the impact of limiting the APRC as one of the major 
legal limits on electronic retail lending established for the protection of con-
sumers. The article analyses the possibilities for sharing the burden of proof and 
suggests how service providers could exercise the obligation of reasonable care. 
In the completion of this thesis I have used comparative, systematic and 
teleological methods of jurisprudence, with most focus on comparative and 
teleological methodology. Comparative method serves as a central tool for this 
13 
thesis because in the situation of somewhat limited original legal writing in 
Estonian language this method is the only considerable option for well-
established legal research. Additionally, this method would allow participating 
in the legal debate involving other countries, given that the research area of this 
thesis is of relevance for other EU countries too. The use of comparative 
method is topical both in science as well as the practical implementation of law, 
having increased its importance as an acknowledged method both in the process 
of legislation as well as in justice15. When it comes to teleological approach in 
the research, it can be said that in principle law always seeks for purpose as the 
provisions of law always have the value of a tool16. Teleological method has 
been used in my research for identifying the meaning of a respective research 
aspect such as a legal act through the objective of its adoption and the intentions 
of its authors. Within the frames of this methodology, I have used several 
explanatory notes of legal acts as important research sources.  
On one hand, the research field enables combining legal issues with 
economic considerations, explaining the legal problems on the basis of actual 
cases arisen in the daily electronic retail lending business and analyzing the 
respective views of the Supreme Court of Estonia. On the other hand, a 
comparative methodology has been used in compiling this research, drawing 
parallels between Estonian laws and the laws of some other member states and 
the EU. For example, the legal framework of other countries is examined in 
such issues as consumer information in credit contracts and requirements for the 
marketing of electronic retail loans. One of the sample countries used in this 
research is Finland because similarly to Estonia the offering of electronic retail 
loans is a significant business in Finland too. Also, German law is examined in 
some aspects such as the definition of usurious practice and the related aspects 
of the voidance of transactions. A comparative view to the EU regulation of 
financial services is taken in terms of defining loan-related prepaid cards as e-
money and identifying the legal status of card issuers. Also, some aspects of the 
new 2008 Consumer Credit Directive are addressed in the context of the recent 
amendments to the GPCCA and the LOA.  
In addition to the EU directives (such as the 2008 Consumer Credit 
Directive, Money Laundering Prevention Directive17, 2005 Unfair Commercial 
                                                                          
15 Irene Kull, ”Eesti tsiviilõiguse allikatetugev ja nõrk kohustuslikkus” (Strong and Weak 
Binding Nature of Sources of Estonian Civil Law as a Basis for the System of Sources), 
Juridica No 7 (2010), 463–472 (in Estonian). 
16 Aulis Aarnio, Õiguse tõlgendamise teooria (A Theory on Interpretation of Law), 
(Õigusteabe AS Juura, Tallinn, 1996), 188 (in Estonian). 
17 Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 2005 
on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering and 
terrorist financing, Official Journal (OJ) L309 (2005), 15–36 (hereinafter “Money 
Laundering Prevention Directive”).  
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Practices Directive18 and so on), legal acts and explanatory notes, the articles 
contained in this compilation are based on the information gained from the 
editions and journals of the fields of law, economics and finance (e.g. Banking 
Law Journal; Journal of International Banking Law and Regulation; Computer 
and Telecommunications Law Review; etc). Also, recommendations, working 
documents and guidelines of international institutions and national professional 
associations (e.g. Consumer Agency and Ombudsman of Finland, Association 
of E-Money Institutions in the Netherlands, the Bank of Estonia, etc) have been 
used. The practical aspects of the research are supported by the cases of the 
Supreme Court of Estonia, and the statistics and data available on the 
homepages of different service providers and banks. In some issues19, the 
positions of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) are analysed, seeking to 
support the theoretical concepts with some principles of the EU case-law. 
As indicated earlier, the research field of electronic lending as such is novel 
and has been subject to somewhat limited research. When it comes to similar 
earlier legal writing by Estonian researchers, the specialised topic of electronic 
retail loans has been addressed by only a few authors. Among Estonian authors, 
Kalev Saare, Karin Sein and Mari Ann Simovart are the major researchers in 
this field. Their recent publications include a thorough joint article published in 
the European Review of Private Law, covering certain legal issues of consumer 
protection and electronic retail loans (SMS-loans). There have also been 
occasionally a few short articles in local law journals (Juridica) and specialized 
issues, including my own publication in the journal MaksuMaksja of October 
2008.  
The research of the authors from other countries which I have come across 
regarding the particular topic of electronic retail loans is mostly related to the 
discussion of usurious practice, responsible lending and the effect of interest 
rate ceilings in consumer lending, involving and often highlighting economic 
considerations and consumer survey aspect rather than thorough legal case 
analysis. Although not only of purely legal nature and often containing also 
quantitative aspects as their research methodology, such research certainly adds 
value to the concept of any research of this field because the particularity of the 
field is that economic and legal aspects are strongly inter-related. In the course 
                                                                          
18 Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 
concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market and 
amending Council Directive 84/450/EEC, Directives 97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC of 
the European Parliament of and of the Council and Regulation (EC) No.2006/2004 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council, Official Journal (OJ) L 149 (2005), 22–39 
(hereinafter “Unfair Commercial Practices Directive”). 
19 One of such issues is interpreting the extent of the burden of proof which is supported by 
the analysis of the ECJ case-law as the principle of effectiveness is regarded. See, e.g., case 
106/77 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato vs. Simmenthal SpA, ECR (1978) 629; and 
case C-213/89 The Queen vs. Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte: Factortame Ltd and 
others, ECR (1990) I-2433. 
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of preparing this compilation (although after the publication of the three 
articles) I have come across a few interesting pieces of such research, e.g. a 
study completed by the Institut für Finanzdienstleistungen e.V. and Zentrum für 
Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung GmbH on interest rate restrictions in the 
EU20 (2010); the UK Office of Fair Trading Review of high-cost credit21 (2010); 
the survey of the usurious lending practice on consumers with moderate means 
in Germany22 (2009) and the survey on the use of instant small loans by Finnish 
consumers23 (2009). Additionally it is important to point out that a number of 
reports on interest rate ceilings have been produced over the past years in 
different EU countries, reflecting the fact that interest rate restrictions have a 
strong cultural and traditional foundation. These reports examine the problems 
related to exorbitant prices of consumer credit. The reports are available on the 
webpage of the European Coalition for Responsible Credit24. However, since 
most of them are available only in their original non-English languages 
(covering the situation in such countries as the Czech Republic, Slovakia, 
Belgium, the Netherlands), I have not been able to use these reports in 
complementing this research. 
In the course of the research I have also come across some articles in 
international journals of information technology law, explaining the nature and 
characteristics of e-money and prepaid cards (e.g. Janson (2003), Lanskoy 
(2000), etc). As the research field in more general terms is considered, the broad 
issues of lending and the means of electronic payments have been addressed 
both in Estonian legal writing (e.g. Ligi (2006)) and in international journals 
(e.g. Batalla (2001)). Additionally, there is sufficient theoretical information 
about usurious practice and the voidance of transactions both in Estonian law 
                                                                          
20 Udo Reifner et al, Study on interest rate restrictions in the EU. Final Report for the EU 
Commission DG Internal Market and Services, Project No. ETD/2009/IM/H3/87, 2010. 
Available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finservices-retail/docs/credit/irr_report_ 
en.pdf (25.05.2011). 
21 UK Office of Fair Trading, Review of high-cost credit. Final report, June 2010. 
Available at http://www.responsible-credit.net/media.php?t=media&f=file&id=3819 
(26.05.2011). 
22 Udo Reifner & Michael Knobloch, Access to Credit for Poor People in Germany. Expert 
Opinion for DOOD, August 2009. Available at http://www.responsible-credit.net/ 
media.php?t=media&f=file&id=3837 (25.05.2011). 
23 Minna Autio et al, “The use of small instant loans among young adults – a gateway to a 
consumer insolvency?”, International Journal of Consumer Studies No 33 (2009), 407–415. 
Available at http://www.responsible-credit.net/media.php?t=media&f=file&id=3475 
(26.05.2011). 
24 The European Coalition for Responsible Credit (ECRC) is a networking and policy 
influencing association of consumer agencies, academics, and other non governmental 
organisations. The ECRC contributes to the development of the principles for responsible 
financial services provision, including the promotion of access to credit for low income 
households within the EU; the sharing of expertise on regulatory systems; and the promotion 
of ethics in financial services provision. Available at http://www.responsible-
credit.net/index.php?id=2040 (20.05.2011). 
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journals and literature, including the official comments of the LOA and the 
GPCCA.25 
In addition to legal knowledge this research field requires the understanding 
of the functioning of financial services and markets. I believe that from 
academic perspective the results of this research are original because certain 
questions addressed in this research have been discussed by other authors only 
to limited extent. The research at hand also has a practical value because the 
analysis of some of the problems addressed herein is based on the actual issues 
arisen in the daily provision of electronic retail lending services. Therefore the 
results of this research may well serve as a basis for market participants and 
supervisory agencies for better understanding of practical aspects of this field. 
Understanding the legal solutions and outlook is also important for other 
disciplines in order to assess the attractiveness of certain financial services and 

























                                                                          
25 See Paul Varul et al, Tsiviilseadustiku üldosa seadus. Kommenteeritud väljaanne 
(General Part of Civil Code Act. Commented Edition) (Kirjastus Juura, Tallinn, 2010) (in 
Estonian) and Paul Varul et al, Võlaõigusseadus II. Kommenteeritud väljaanne (Law of 
Obligations Act II. Commented Edition) (Kirjastus Juura, Tallinn, 2007) (in Estonian). 
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2. SUMMARY OF THE MAIN CONCLUSIONS  
OF THE PUBLICATIONS INCLUDED  
IN THIS COMPILATION 
2.1. Connecting Prepaid Cards and Retail Loans:  
Innovative Practical Solution or Confusing Legal 
Combination? Implications of the EU Financial Services 
Law from an Estonian Perspective 
In the article “Connecting Prepaid Cards and Retail Loans: Innovative Practical 
Solution or Confusing Legal Combination? Implications of the EU Financial 
Services Law from an Estonian Perspective” the positioning of a prepaid card, 
which is combined with a retail loan, and the status of the issuer within the 
existing legal framework in Estonia are examined. The article discusses the 
treatment of a loan-linked prepaid card as an instrument of electronic money or 
some other form of payment, and examines the functions and licensing of an 
issuer. The clear legal positioning of a prepaid card within the existing legal 
framework and interpretation of the rules governing card issuers are the major 
legal challenges from the perspective of Estonia. This is due to the fact that a 
prepaid card that is loaded with loan funds represents a complex set of 
arrangements and such increased innovativeness of an electronic retail loan 
involves additional risks for consumers. Therefore a thorough examination of 
the product structure and involved legal relationships are required. It is also 
necessary to understand that the card issuer is to be treated as a regulated entity; 
therefore, a complete set of schemes for EU passporting and services provision 
applies. The article briefly explains the framework rules applicable to the EU 
and third-country issuers of cross-border prepaid card products. This reveals 
that additional restrictions in public law are applicable to related service 
providers, indicating respective balance between the protection of consumers 
and commercial freedom in the provision of electronic retail lending services in 
combination with prepaid cards. 
As the above referred article explains, a prepaid card is a means of payment 
that can be loaded with money by the customer or another person. It is not a 
credit card, because the client prepays the card value.26 In the case of combining 
prepaid cards and retail loans the funds used to load the card come from a loan, 
and it is the lender who takes care of topping up the card. The primary network 
of agreements for such transaction structure involves three parties: the card 
holder, issuing institution and non-bank financing company. There is no 
specialized regulation in Estonia that specifically covers prepaid cards and their 
combination with loans because the legal provisions in Estonia are normally 
                                                                          
26 Gregory E. Maggs, “New Payment Devices and General Principles of Payment Law”, 72 
Notre Dame Law Review (1997), 753–798, at 758. 
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designed for wider product types (e.g. for electronic payment instruments or 
loans as such). From the contract law perspective, there is no such specialized 
regulation at the EU level either27 and therefore such combined products 
normally are regulated by domestic legislation.  
The above referred article explains that the identification of whether prepaid 
cards are to be treated as ordinary payment instruments or e-money is important 
because it determines the respective interpretation of issuer status. Legal 
treatment of the card issuer raises the question of whether the issuer of a loan-
linked prepaid card is subject to the rules applicable to e-money institutions or 
whether the features and legal treatment of the prepaid card allow assuming the 
collection and command of funds. If the latter were to be the case, the issuer 
would be subject to stricter rules governing credit institutions. 
The above referred article discusses the issue of positioning a prepaid card 
that is loaded via the funds of a loan as e-money. The 2000 E-Money 
Directive28 which sets forth the base rules for the legal treatment of prepaid 
cards in the EU, defines e-money as cash in digital form.29 In Estonia, the 
definition and contractual functionalities of remote access payment instruments 
and electronic money are covered by the provisions of the 2001 LOA, while the 
principles of the 2000 E-Money Directive regarding the nature and limits of e-
money business and institutions have been transformed into Estonian law 
through the 2005 E-Money Institutions Act.30 In the light of the implementation 
of Payment Services Directive31 the LOA has recently been amended and the  
E-Money Institutions Act has been repealed with the adoption of the new 
Payment Institutions and E-Money Institutions Act in 200932. Some of these 
amendments, relevant in the context of this dissertation, will be explained in 
more detail below in Chapter 3.  
The above referred article suggests that if the product scheme is such that the 
financing company opens a bank account in the issuer bank and, based on a loan 
                                                                          
27 Due to an acknowledged need for consumer protection in retail lending, however, there 
are certain separate EU rules for consumer credit as such, deriving from 2008 Consumer 
Credit Directive. The principles of the Directive are reflected in the Estonian LOA. 
28  Directive 2000/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 September 
2000 on the taking up, pursuit of and prudential supervision of the business of electronic 
money institutions, Official Journal (OJ) L 275 (2000), 39–43. 
29  Enrique J. Batalla, “Electronic Commerce: Online Payments”, 7(4) Computer and 
Telecommunications Law Review (2001), 80–84, at 83. 
30  Art. 3(1), E-raha asutuste seadus, signed 19 October 2005, Riigi Teataja (RT) I (2005) 
No.61, 473; (2007) No.65, 405 (repealed) (in Estonian).  
31  Directive 2007/64/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 
2007 on payment services in the internal market amending Directives 97/7/EC, 2002/65/EC, 
2005/60/EC and 2006/48/EC and repealing Directive 97/5/EC, Official Journal (OJ) L 319 
(2007), 0001 – 0036 (hereinafter “Payment Services Directive”). 
32  Makseasutuste ja e-raha asutuste seadus, signed 17 December 2009, Riigi Teataja (RT) I 
(2010) No.2, 3; (2010) No.34, 182 (in Estonian) (hereinafter ”Payment Institutions and E-
Money Institutions Act”). 
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agreement, allows to load the card issued to the card holder with money from 
the company’s account, such an electronic payment product does not appear to 
be linked to the accounts of the card holder and should be treated as an e-money 
product. The issuer only provides the medium on which the cash is held, but it 
does not collect or manage any of the funds of the card holder; rather, it 
distributes the loan amount on behalf of the lender by topping up the card. 
Consequently, the amount loaded onto the card is equal to the loan amount 
agreed between the lender and the card holder and should thus meet the 
respective criterion of e-money.  
Another important legal issue is the determination of the card issuer status. 
The issuance of electronic money implies the creation of liabilities on the 
balance sheet of the issuer that are generally payable (or redeemable) at face 
value to those entities accepting electronic money as payment. The issuer must 
guarantee that the card holder can use the funds loaded onto the card.33 E-money 
may only be issued by an electronic money institution or a credit institution. 
The above referred article explains that depending on how the prepaid card is 
legally positioned, the issuer can be defined either as a credit institution or an e-
money institution. When the prepaid card is related to the administration of the 
client’s own funds and where the issuer commands such funds, the issuer would 
be treated as a credit institution subject to all of the rules and licensing 
applicable to credit institutions under the Credit Institutions Act (CIA).34 The 
article reveals that the definition of an e-money institution in different EU 
countries has 2 core approaches which may result in regulatory arbitrage. The 
first approach holds that an e-money institution is a subcategory of credit 
institution while the second regards an e-money institution as a separate 
financial institution that is duly authorized to issue e-money.  
Estonia has chosen the second approach. Estonian law does not contain 
straightforward provisions in order to classify the issuer of a loan-related 
prepaid card. In the case of a loan-related prepaid card, there is no link to the 
bank account of the card holder. The loadable funds come from the lender. 
Cards holders or third parties do not have the ability to load money onto the 
card, and the issuer has no access to command the funds loaded onto the card. 
The article suggests that such an issuer is not involved in deposit collection and 
should be treated as an e-money institution rather than a credit institution. This 
is particularly important both from the perspective of an issuer and of 
supervision, because if the issuer qualifies as an e-money institution rather than 
a credit institution, its prudential obligations are somewhat reduced in 
comparison to those of a credit institution, while its activities allowed by the 
law are also reduced in comparison to a credit institution. On the other hand, 
                                                                          
33  The characteristics of e-money are introduced on the homepage of the Bank of Estonia. 
Available at http://www.eestipank.info/pub/et/yldine/pank/finantskeskkond/maksesysteem/ 
1ERaha.html?ok=1(13.06.2011) (in Estonian). 
34  Krediidiasutuste seadus, signed 9 February 1999, Riigi Teataja (RT) I (1999) No.23, 349; 
24.03.2011, No. 1 (in Estonian) (hereinafter “Credit Institutions Act”). 
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however, the prudential obligations of an e-money institution exceed the regular 
obligations of a non-regulated entity, including an unregulated electronic retail 
lending company, thereby balancing the interests of service providers and the 
interests of consumers. 
Finally, the above referred article explains the relation of ‘European 
passporting’ system for the provision of financial services in the EU to the 
offering of prepaid cards across borders. Any issuer needs to be licensed either 
as a bank or an e-money institution. Both an issuer from a member state or an 
EEA country and an issuer from a non-EU or non-EEA country can provide 
services in the EU based on the authorization of their home countries, but the 
former may act via branches or cross-border services, while the latter are 
restricted only to branches.35 From a practical point of view, the article suggests 
that a third country issuer outside the EU/EEA could also consider issuing cards 
in its home country to the citizens of any country, without a separate license in 
other countries, assuming that it has made the necessary arrangements for the 
use of such cards in other countries and that there is the necessary financial 
infrastructure for delivering such cards and loans to customers in other 
countries.36 On the other hand, as already mentioned with regard to ‘European 
passporting’, the issuers may choose to establish a branch in an EU member 
state for the rendering of services, using the license from their home country but 
acting in accordance with the product rules of that member state. The third 
alternative would be to establish a subsidiary in an EU member state, subject to 




2.2. Legal Problems with Electronic Retail Loans:  
Balancing the Freedom of Contract and the Protection  
of Consumers – The Case of Estonia 
The article “Legal Problems with Electronic Retail Loans: Balancing the 
Freedom of Contract and the Protection of Consumers – The Case of Estonia“ 
aims at analyzing the regulatory balance in Estonia between consumer 
protection and the freedom to provide services. For this reason, six most 
important elements of electronic retail loans are examined. The article analyses 
the major legal problems related to the requirements for client identification; the 
                                                                          
35  The adoption of the 2009 Payment Institutions and E-Money Institutions Act has 
somewhat altered the rules regarding the provision of services by third-country service 
providers in the EU. These changes are addressed more detailed in Chapter 3.1. of this 
dissertation. 
36  Prudential rules may nevertheless apply to the scheme of such products as a result of 
linkages with other EU-based institutions (e.g., in ensuring the financial infrastructure for 
delivering the cards). Also, attention needs to be paid to the issues of consumer protection 
because of different product rules, restrictions with regard to the choice of law and so on. 
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application of legal minimum thresholds37, allowed by the Consumer Credit 
Directive; the presentation of interest rate information; the upper limit to the 
APRC and related voidance of transactions; the legal treatment of penalties; and 
information obligations in the marketing of SMS loans. These six elements are 
the most important ones in terms of evaluating the level of freedom to provide 
efficient and flexible electronic retail lending services. The article questions 
whether the recent amendments of Estonian laws concerning some of the 
abovementioned elements have been stretched too far with regard to consumer 
protection purposes, decreasing the freedom of contract in return.  
The application of “know-your-customer” rules has already for some time 
been one of the basic prudential requirements for all regulated financial sector 
entities. In electronic retail lending, client identification is an important element 
mainly for the reason of preventing malpractice. Until the beginning of 2008, 
electronic retail lenders in Estonia were allowed to identify their customers 
without direct contact with them (for example, through a bank link). Since the 
concerns for malpractice were serious, the situation was changed in early 2008 
by the provisions of the new Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing 
Prevention Act38, requiring also electronic retail lenders to identify face to face 
all persons with whom they have had no earlier business relations39. This legal 
amendment was a first step towards more responsible practice of electronic 
retail lending and after its adoption most lenders implemented some changes in 
their procedures, usually arranging it so that the first-time identification is done 
either in the office of the lender or using the courier service. However, the 
above referred article explains that the major legal problems with regard to 
customer identification derive from the fact that within the meaning of the new 
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Prevention Act the identification is 
first and foremost mandatory from the perspective of combating money 
laundering and terrorist financing.40 Hence, in the light of such somewhat 
questionable justification, the application of these identification rules to 
electronic retail lenders has already been brought to the attention of courts by 
some electronic retail lenders opposing the precepts of the Money Laundering 
Data Bureau and claiming that these rules, without any grounded justification, 
pose unreasonable obstacles to their normal business because lending in small 
amounts to private individuals has almost no potential for money laundering or 
terrorist financing.  
The requirement of face to face identification of all first-time customers 
certainly makes the business of electronic retail lending less flexible for service 
                                                                          
37  Credit agreements involving a total amount of credit less than EUR 200 (or more than 
EUR 75 000) as well as those under the terms of which the credit has to be repaid within 
three months and only insignificant charges are payable are exempted from the scope of the 
Directive (Art. 2). 
38  Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Prevention Act, op.cit. note 9.  
39  Art. 15 (1), Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Prevention Act.  
40  Art. 13(1) 2, Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Prevention Act. 
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providers. The above referred article suggests that although fighting malpractice 
is an important issue for the protection of consumers, such face to face 
identification requirement remains indeed legally problematic since its primary 
purpose within the meaning of the law is the combating of money laundering. In 
the light of the mentioned court action the article also recognizes another 
problem: since the electronic lenders are not regulated institutions, no such 
supervisory authorities41 can manage or put moral pressure on them to apply the 
identification rules as part of regular banking standards applicable to regulated 
entities. The article concludes that Estonian identification rules may somewhat 
hinder the freedom to provide services, given that these rules first and foremost 
aim at the combating of money laundering while small-scale retail loans hardly 
contain any such potential. However, this issue will be further elaborated and 
some interesting interpretations to contest this view will be briefly introduced in 
the follow-up research results presented in Chapter 3.3. of this dissertation. 
The above referred article explains that the thorough set of rules on borrower 
information which initially did not cover small-scale retail loans with short 
maturities became applicable to all consumer credit agreements as at 1st May 
2009, aiming at enhanced consumer protection. Consumers are assumed to be 
the weaker party and thus, in need of protection in contractual relations. 
Moreover, some level of consumer protection is also necessary due to the need 
for overall economic, social, and political stability. However, overriding the 
freedom of contract for the purposes of consumer protection may on one hand 
lead to difficulties in normal business environment, hinder innovation, and 
result in the insecure functioning of the market for this service. On the other 
hand, too much protection for the less sophisticated private individuals may 
override the private autonomy of more educated individuals, hindering their 
access to electronic lending services. Thus, achieving regulatory balance is a 
difficult but necessary task. The article agrees that the wider scope of consumer 
information rules would certainly contribute to more responsible lending 
practice. However, the article also suggests that in return such wider scope of 
rules is likely to decrease the flexibility of SMS loans and make them more 
expensive. Additionally, it should be noted that the neighboring countries of 
Estonia (e.g. Finland) have chosen to have more flexibility, allowing the 
exclusion of certain small retail loans from the stricter procedural requirements 
which aim at consumer protection. 
When it comes to the expression of interest rates, the above referred article 
discusses that some electronic retail lenders have developed a specialized 
practice for expressing the compensation for the use of loan as a fixed “loan 
fee”. The article suggests that any such compensation should be seen as interest 
                                                                          
41  The activities of electronic retail lenders are to some extent monitored by the Consumer 
Protection Board which is the main authority to handle and solve consumer claims with 
regard to electronic retail lending business. However, this authority does not have similar 
supervisory functions towards electronic retail lenders as the Financial Supervision 
Authority has towards regulated entities. 
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in its essence, although not expressed as a percentage rate but as a fixed fee, 
because the traditional essence of interest is the cost of or gain from the use of 
resources. Given that electronic retail lenders usually gain their lending 
resources through a loan from some third party, the article seriously questions 
that the lenders who do not calculate interest on their borrowers could actually 
bear their own interest cost. The article also adds a behavioral misleading 
aspect. Because of the numeric value of a “loan fee”, consumers would not pay 
much attention to their real economic cost in terms of percentage rate, when 
comparing numeric values. Thus, the article takes the view that consumer 
protection would be further enhanced without much burden on service providers 
by requiring that any compensation for the use of funds should be expressed as 
a percentage rate. 
Another problematic issue which is also covered more thoroughly in the 
above referred article is the cost of borrowing. Before 1st May 2009, the 
regulation of the cost of credit (APRC) in Estonia did not contain any limits. 
Given the interest rates and APRC on electronic loans in Estonia which 
continue to be much higher than on regular bank loans42, and taking into 
account the related problem with the expression of interest rates, the above 
referred article analyses whether electronic retail lending can be considered 
contrary to good morals for such grounds. When looking at how the provisions 
of the 2002 GPCCA in relation to usurious practice have so far been interpreted 
by the Supreme Court of Estonia, the article reveals that usurious practice has 
not been evaluated only from the perspective of disproportionate rates but there 
should also exist the aspect of gross disparity.43 The Court has taken the 
position that a loan agreement could not be declared void on the grounds of 
contradiction to good morals only due to disproportionately high interest rates. 
However, the validity could de disputed on the grounds of conclusion under 
extremely unfavorable conditions, gross disparity and taking advantage of the 
situation of the other party. Also, short-term unsecured loans should not be 
compared with ordinary secured bank loans for considering a transaction 
concluded under extremely unfavorable conditions which would therefore give 
grounds for declaring it void.44  
                                                                          
42  On average, the annual cost rates on electronic retail loans in Estonia amount to some 
400%. Occasionally these cost rates can be even close to 1000% or higher. One of such 
cases with the annual cost rate of around 800% has been recently addressed by the Supreme 
Court of Estonia. See the Supreme Court 17 June 2011 ruling in civil case 3-2-1-49-11. 
Available at http://www.nc.ee/?id=11&tekst=RK/3-2-1-49-11 (28.06.2011) (in Estonian).  
43  Maris Kuurberg, “Head kommetega vastuolus olevad tehingud kui tühised tehingud” 
(Transactions Contrary to Good Morals as Void Transactions), Juridica No 3 (2005), 200–
208 (in Estonian); 
44  See the Supreme Court 16 October 2002 decision in civil case 3-2-1-80-02, RT III (2002) 
No. 27, 302 (in Estonian), Sec 9, 11–13 and the Supreme Court 22 October 2002 decision in 
civil case 3-2-1-108-02, RT III (2002) No. 27, 305 (in Estonian), Sec 11. See also the 
Supreme Court 24 April 2006 decision in civil case 3-2-1-21-06, RT III (2006) No. 16, 145 
(in Estonian), Sec.20.  
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The above referred article provides a detailed analysis of the major 
amendments of the GPCCA and the LOA which became effective on 1st May 
2009. The article reveals that by these amendments the lending environment in 
Estonia went through fundamental changes. The changes mainly comprise the 
widening of the grounds for void transactions and setting a “soft” upper limit to 
the APRC. In situations where mutual obligations are unreasonably out of 
balance and thus contrary to good morals, it is assumed that the gaining party 
knew or had to know about the difficult situation of the other party. To ensure 
the validity of a loan transaction, the lender has to prove that the agreement was 
not concluded using the difficult situation of the borrower and that all 
reasonable steps have been taken to identify the economic situation of the 
borrower.45 When electronic retail loans are regarded, the article considers 
fulfilling such obligation of proof problematic because it is difficult to assess 
the borrower’s active legal capacity, payment ability and other such circum-
stances from distance. The article points out an important aspect regarding this 
change: different from earlier legal situation, courts can now evaluate the 
validity of a loan agreement without the request from a party. This means that if 
the lender submits, for example, a claim for payments in arrears against the 
borrower and the loan has an unbalanced interest rate, the court can instead 
declare the agreement void and the lender would not be able to have its claim 
for payments in arrears approved.  
Next to all the previously explained aspects that the article has analysed, the 
preconditions for assuming the unbalanced value of mutual obligations seem to 
be the most questionable part. In case of consumer credit agreements, the 
unbalanced value of mutual obligations as contrary to good morals is assumed if 
the APRC exceeds 3 times the average cost of consumer credits as provided in 
the last commercial banking statistics of the Bank of Estonia. Thus, it means 
that there is certain upper limit for the cost that retail lenders can obtain from 
their borrowers without the shift in the burden of proof. Upon exceeding the 
limit, it is automatically the lender who would have to prove all the 
circumstances to avoid the invalidity of such lending transaction. The article 
does not favor the limiting of APRC because this affects the freedom of contract 
in an overly consumer-driven manner which is quite unusual in the legal 
environment in Estonia. In the same light, no ex ante analysis has been carried 
out to evaluate the actual economic impact and proportionality of such legal 
means. It is also worth mentioning that in the course of preparing the article the 
limiting of the APRC facilitated a discussion among market participants  
 
                                                                          
45  Tsiviilseadustiku üldosa seaduse ja võlaõigusseaduse muutmise seaduse eelnõu 
seletuskiri (Explanatory note to the amending act of the General Part of Civil Code Act and 
Law of Obligations Act), 365 SE, 14 October 2008, 8. Available at  
http://www.riigikogu.ee/?page=en_vaade&op=ems&eid=420369 (13.06.2011) (in Estonian). 
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regarding its possible contradiction to the Constitution46. It is interesting to note 
that there are no upper limits to the APRC or interest rates in most of the 
countries neighboring Estonia47. The article explains that from the practical 
perspective, most electronic retail lenders continuously seek to be free in their 
business, setting the APRC according to their business models and not 
according to the legal limit. This reflects their willingness to bear the burden of 
proof and enter into the respective court proceedings, if necessary. On the other 
hand, the lenders have started changing their procedures accordingly, making 
the collection of borrower information more detailed. 
Starting from the claim under a loan agreement falling due, the calculation of 
interest loses its legal grounds and thereafter it is only possible to calculate 
penalties or damages.48 When it comes to the rate of penalties, the above 
referred article concludes that different from the situation with interest rates, the 
usurious practice against good morals in relation to unreasonably high penalties 
can be solved through the decreasing of penalties. The Supreme Court of 
Estonia has taken the view that clearly disproportionate penalty in comparison 
to the amount due should be decreased down to at least the amount due.49 The 
article points out that together with legal treatment of penalties, the issue of a 
potential “closed circle” situation is also relevant. The most common way of 
debt collection of electronic retail lenders is refinancing – the merging of all 
amounts due (incl. interest and penalty amounts) into a new loan. Such 
refinancing, if done continuously, may result in the borrower having to pay back 
much more than was initially borrowed, using another high-rate SMS loan to 
cover the debts of previous ones.  
The article suggests that instead of limiting the freedom of contract and 
setting a limit to the APRC, it is more appropriate to influence the delivery 
channels of electronic retail lending because SMS loans rely heavily on 
advertising and more educated consumers can not be restricted to access the 
flexible lending instruments just because of inadequate decision-making of less 
educated consumers. The most common reasons for defaults include the strong 
supply of credit and the ease with which it is granted. Therefore, the marketing 
of electronic retail loans must take these aspects into consideration. 
                                                                          
46  This issue became topical in the final phase of preparing this article and therefore it has 
been addressed only briefly in the article. However, in the light of further developments and 
positions taken by the Chancellor of Justice and the Supreme Court, the possible 
contradiction of Art. 86 to the Constitution of Estonia has become subject to thorough 
research in this thesis and will follow below in Chapter 3.3. 
47  The only exemption is Lithuania which did not have APRC restrictions in the time of 
preparation of the articles contained in this compilation. However, on 1st April 2011 the first 
Consumer Law was adopted which limits the total annual APRC at 250%. See a brief 
introduction about the new act at http://www.rln.lt/index.php/pageid/411. 
48  See the Supreme Court 29 January 2007 decision in civil case 3-2-1-137-06, RT III 
(2007) No. 4, 33 (in Estonian), Sec 17 and the Supreme Court 12 December 2006 decision in 
civil case 3-2-2-5-06, RT III (2006) No. 47, 399 (in Estonian), Sec 12. 
49  The Supreme Court decision in civil case 3-2-1-137-06, op.cit. note 48, Sec 18.  
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Consequently, the article explains that an important improvement has been 
carried out with regard to the disclosure of interest rate information in 
marketing activities. The new 2008 Advertising Act broadened the scope of 
advertising limits, requiring that all the advertisements of small or short term 
loans contain information about the APRC. These advertising rules have 
become supportive to the consumer lending regulation in the LOA. 
 
 
2.3. Electronic Retail Lending in Estonia:  
Legal Limits on the Cost of Credit  
As I have explained in the above Chapter 2.2. of this dissertation, a legal limit 
to the APRC was established in Estonia in May 2009. The limit is ‘soft’ in its 
nature, allowing a lender to opt for exceeding it but simultaneously placing the 
burden of proof on the lender opposing the declaration of such lending 
transaction void on the ground that it was contrary to good morals. There is no 
doubt that a certain level of consumer protection needs to exist to support the 
functioning of markets and services. However, it is necessary to evaluate 
potential ‘bottlenecks’ with regard to any new legal solution, especially when it 
contains fundamental changes in the legal environment of a country, as has been 
the case in Estonia. The amendment of Estonian law has shifted the burden of 
proof with regard to the existence of the subjective composition of a transaction 
in cases where the value of the mutual obligations of the parties is noticeably 
out of balance. The article “Electronic Retail Lending in Estonia: Legal Limits 
on the Cost of Credit” aims at addressing the legal problems that may result 
from the limiting of the cost of credit in Estonia. The article examines the legal 
function of the APRC limit, analyses the legal problems with the extent of the 
burden of proof and makes suggestions as to how lenders would be able to 
comply with their obligation of proof in the daily practice of electronic retail 
lending. As the latter is regarded, the article looks at the possible alternatives of 
case law interpretations (such as the ECJ rulings defining the principle of 
effectiveness) and legal analogy which might be useful for developing the 
practice of electronic retail lenders. 
The APRC means the cost of the loan to the consumer expressed as an 
annual percentage calculated on the basis of the net amount50 or net price51 of 
                                                                          
50 The net amount of a loan is the loan amount which is to be disbursed to the borrower as 
agreed in the loan agreement. 
51 Net price is the price of the thing or service acquired for a loan, if payment is to be made 
immediately. This definition for the APRC calculation has been slightly revised in October 
2010 by the amendments of the LOA. Since the definition stipulated in the 2008 Consumer 
Credit Directive does not link the calculation of the APRC to net price, such linkage present 
in the regulation at the time of preparing the third article contained in this compilation has 
been abandoned also in Estonian laws. See more detailed explanation below in Chapter 3.2. 
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the loan, provided that the loan agreement is valid for the agreed term.52 The 
above referred article describes that under the current provisions of 2001 LOA 
some costs (e.g. insurance costs, the costs of means for obtaining the service, 
etc) are excluded from the APRC calculation. Respectively, upon the 
calculation of the APRC for an electronic retail loan the lender would not need 
to take into account the costs of the consumer with regard to SMS-service, 
internet connection or the use of other electronic means that are necessary for 
applying for/servicing of an SMS loan. The article also highlights the constant 
importance of consumer information and its relation to APRC, explaining that 
the 2008 Consumer Credit Directive sets forth a Standard European Consumer 
Credit Information form. By using this form the lenders are expected to provide 
the consumer with information necessary for the consumer to compare different 
lending products and make an informed decision regarding credit agreement. 
The information should, inter alia, specify the APRC and the total amount 
payable by the consumer, illustrated by means of a representative example 
mentioning all the assumptions used for calculating the rate.53 
As mentioned above, the article explains that the amendment of the 2002 
GPCCA does not directly prohibit the provision of consumer loans with 
disproportionately high rates. However, if the value of mutual obligations of the 
parties is unreasonably out of balance to an extent that is contrary to good 
morals, it is assumed that a party knew (or should have known) about the 
difficult circumstances of the other party. In the case of consumer credit 
agreements, the unbalanced value of mutual obligations as contrary to good 
morals is assumed if the APRC exceeds the multiple-of-three-figure of the 
average cost of consumer credits according to latest official commercial 
banking statistics.54  
To explain the legal function of the APRC limit, the article suggests that its 
key characteristics are ‘soft’ and dynamic. The above referred article explains 
that the upper limit can be called ‘soft’ or ‘optional’ because lenders may 
choose not to meet the legal limit; in doing so, the lender may have to face the 
consequences where the borrower argues that the transaction is void as being 
contrary to good morals and the lender is obliged to bear the burden of proof in 
determining that it is not. The article explains that the legal function of the 
APRC limit, which is linked to the market of consumer credit, is to prevent 
usurious practices and to disincentivize the conclusion of credit agreements in 
which the mutual obligations are unreasonably out of balance to an extent 
contrary to good morals. In case the parties have agreed on the payment of 
APRC under a loan agreement, exceeding the legal limit, the lender is assumed 
to be aware of the difficult circumstances of the borrower. Thus, the lender 
needs to be ready to prove that the loan agreement was not concluded dependent 
                                                                          
52 Art. 406(1), LOA. 
53 Arts. 5(1) and 10(2), 2008 Consumer Credit Directive. 
54 Art. 86 (3), GPCCA. 
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upon extraordinary circumstances and that the lender has taken all reasonable 
steps to identify those circumstances upon the conclusion of the agreement in 
order to prevent the transaction being declared void. The dynamic nature of the 
APRC limit is reflected in the fact that it is tied to the average cost of consumer 
credit provided by Estonian credit institutions. This means that the limit is 
flexible and can change over time, depending on the market situation in retail 
lending by commercial banks.  
The main risk of the lender exceeding the ‘soft’ APRC limit and facing the 
voidance of transaction is that the lender loses the possibility of collecting at 
least a rate equal to the average market rate and would have to accept only the 
legal minimum rate55. This may include the situations where the borrower has 
initially performed under a loan agreement but later – based on her lack of 
knowledge with regard to the invalidity of the transaction – submits a claim of 
unjust enrichment against the lender. Additionally, a borrower may find it 
appealing to claim the violation of good morals even in those cases where there 
were no actual extraordinary circumstances present which would have made the 
borrower agree on high rate. Also, we should not forget the following. A lender 
can submit a claim against a non-performing borrower regarding payments in 
arrears to be solved in expedited procedure in matters of payment order. If the 
borrower does not present objections in such expedited procedure, the lender’s 
claim will be approved without closer examination of its contents.56 However, I 
believe that the provisions of the GPCCA have established such strong potential 
for borrowers’ objections that the borrower is likely to object and the expedited 
procedure would become a regular court action upon the filing of an objection on 
behalf of the borrower. In regular action a court may evaluate the validity of a 
loan contract on its own initiative whenever there is a claim related to it 
(including the claim of a lender regarding payments in arrears) and therefore the 
lender claiming payments in arrears might risk losing the contractual interest 
instead. 
The above referred article suggests that identifying the extent of the lender’s 
burden of proof could be based on the principles of reasonableness and 
effectiveness. The principle of reasonableness refers to the perception of the 
reasonable man.57 Reasonableness with regard to an obligation is to be judged 
by what persons acting in good faith would ordinarily consider to be reasonable 
in the same situation. In assessing what is reasonable, the nature of the 
obligation, the purpose of the transaction and the practices in the fields of 
                                                                          
55  Art. 86 (4), GPCCA. 
56 Kalev Saare, Karin Sein & Mari-Ann Simovart, “Laenusaaja õiguste kaitse SMS-laenu 
lepingute puhul” (Protection of Consumer Rights in SMS Loan Agreements), Juridica No 1 
(2010), 41–50 (in Estonian), at 49. 
57 Derek William Elliott, Elliott and Phipson Manual of the Law of Evidence (Sweet & 
Maxwell, London, 1987), 61. 
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activity or professions involved need to be taken into account.58 Accordingly, 
the article suggests that the lender would be reasonably expected to ensure the 
understanding and willingness of the borrower with regard to the lending 
transaction, and be convinced about his/her repayment ability.  
The principle of effectiveness indicates that law needs to be applied in such 
manner as to ensure the efficient achievement of its goals.59 Of primary 
importance is the fact that the fulfillment of the obligation of proof must not be 
overly difficult or impossible for a party60. This means that the party – having 
followed the normal course of its activities and having acted in accordance with 
laws and good business practices – should be able to have an adequate set of 
data and material in hand to fulfill its burden of proof. The article concludes that 
anything that goes beyond normal and reasonable activities and procedures 
would fail to comply with the principle of effectiveness. Respectively, the 
principle of effectiveness implies that, at a minimum, the extent of the lender’s 
burden of proof should include the identification of a borrower profile and, 
furthermore, that necessary care should be exercised in such identification. As 
there are no legal directions about the meaning of ‘necessary care’ or the details 
of ‘profile identification’ in lending, the prime practical legal question for 
electronic retail lenders is: what are the minimum parameters regarding 
identification of a borrower profile which would successfully meet the burden 
of proof standards? The article suggests applying the analogy of law – the 
                                                                          
58 Art 7. (1) and (2), LOA. Reasonableness is an objective principle which assumes good 
faith. However, reasonable behaviour always assumes higher standards than behaviour in 
good faith: reasonableness as an objective requirement seeks to take into account the actual 
intention of parties and standards of ethical behaviour as well as the essence of a transaction, 
business practice and other such circumstances which limit the activity of parties. The 
assessment of a transaction is based on the model of a neutral person and the circumstances 
of a concrete transaction in order to ensure the economic efficiency of transactions. The 
reasonableness of a transaction is defined on the basis of objective circumstances and 
respectively a model for rational and balanced behaviour is constructed. Only such legal 
decision is applicable which is reasonable, given the circumstances. Reasonableness also 
includes the requirement of ethical behaviour as well as the realisation of the idea of 
fairness. See Paul Varul et al, Võlaõigusseadus I. Kommenteeritud väljaanne (Law of 
Obligations Act I. Commented Edition) (Kirjastus Juura, Tallinn, 2006) (in Estonian), 33–35. 
59 The ECJ refers to this principle in the context of the EU law about discarding by the 
national court of a law contrary to Community law. See, e.g. case 106/77, op.cit. note 19 and 
case C-213/89, op.cit. note 19. 
60  Such scope for interpreting the extent of the burden of proof can be derived from the 
explicitly stated principle of effectiveness which has been used in the practice of the ECJ as 
part of the general principles of law: the rules which make the exercise of rights and 
fulfilment of obligations overly difficult or impossible, may be found contradictory to law 
(depending on the case, either to the EU or constitutional law). See Kaarli Harry Eichhorn & 
Carri Ginter, Euroopa Liidu ja Eesti konkurentsiõigus (Competition Law of the European 
Union and Estonia) (Juura, Tallinn, 2007) (in Estonian), 172. 
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provisions of the 2001 Securities Market Act61 which govern the exercise of 
necessary care in identifying an investor profile. The business particularities of 
investment advice and lending activities are naturally somewhat different. Invest-
ment advice entails potential risk allocation with regard to the investor’s assets 
and the respective responsibility for appropriate investment decisions matching 
the investor’s experience, needs and other circumstances. Lending services, on 
the other hand, entail risk exposure of the lender’s assets and the respective 
responsibility for their acceptable risk level but also ensuring the appropriate and 
well-informed loan transactions on behalf of borrowers. The application of legal 
analogy for determining the contents of the lender’s obligation of care is 
appropriate62 because in its nature, investor profile identification is largely similar 
to the identification of borrower profile. They both involve risk-related services 
provision. More importantly, the objective of both is to identify the crucial 
circumstances related to the party receiving the risk-related services which would 
allow concluding informed and proper risk transactions, thereby exercising neces-
sary care in services provision. On the basis of analogous legal framework for 
exercising necessary care in the provision of investment advice, electronic retail 
lenders could exercise necessary care by identifying the purpose of a loan, earlier 
experience with loans, education, profession, income, assets and obligations, pay-
ment discipline and repayment sources of the borrower in order to design good 
practices which, in turn, should help them comply with the obligations deriving 
from the legal limit of the APRC. Based on the legal analogy and having examined 
the ways in which credit institutions normally collect data on retail borrowers,63 
the article suggests a checklist example for the use in electronic retail lending. 
                                                                          
61 Väärtpaberituru seadus, signed 17 October 2001, Riigi Teataja (RT) I (2001) No.89, 532; 
24.03.2011 No.1 (in Estonian) (hereinafter “Securities Market Act”). The requirements for 
the identification of investor profile and suitability of service are based on the 2004 Markets 
in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID). Therefore the solution offered might have even 
a broader scope of application than only in Estonia. 
62 The concept of analogy is based on the principle of universality. Normative analogy as a 
form of conclusion seeks to demonstrate the analogical aspects of the case categories covered 
by two or more legal norms, suggesting that in such cases different norms can support each 
other with interpretation. The core of normative analogy lies in the fact that the contents of 
certain legal norm X are open for interpretation but the object of the norm is analogous to the 
object of some other norm Y. The contents of Y are clearly defined. Thus, Y can be used to 
help determine the contents of X. The conclusion made on the basis of analogy is the most 
typical possibility for filling legal gaps. See Aulis Aarnio, op.cit. note 16, 190, 192, 201.  
63 In the preparation of the article the contents of retail loan application forms of the four 
biggest credit institutions in Estonia (Swedbank, SEB, Nordea and Danske Bank A/S) were 
examined in order to draw parallels with the potential use of these elements in the loan 
applications of non-bank electronic retail lenders. Clearly, the non-bank lenders are not 
expected to fully meet the same requirements and expectations as supervised regulated 
institutions. Also, their information collection does not necessarily have to consist of the 
same elements. However, balancing the nature of non-bank lenders, the purpose of such 
lending and the legal provisions in Estonia, the article provides for a checklist example as 
one which seems most suitable for use in non-bank electronic retail lending.  
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3. FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS RELATING  
TO SOME OF THE ANALYZED ISSUES 
3.1. The Regulation of Payment Instruments 
The research subject of the first article of this dissertation – “Connecting 
Prepaid Cards and Retail Loans: Innovative Practical Solution or Confusing 
Legal Combination? Implications of the EU Financial Services Law from an 
Estonian Perspective“ – is the combination of electronic retail loans with 
prepaid cards. We have seen that loan-linked prepaid cards should be positioned 
as e-money. As was assumed in the article, there are some developments and 
respective legal amendments which have been carried out after the publication 
of the article and which I therefore find important to be addressed hereto.  
The major development is the new Payment Institutions and E-Money 
Institutions Act64 which became effective in January 2010. The act reflects the 
harmonization of changes in the EU rules with regard to the regime of payment 
services and, among others, it also comprises some changes regarding e-money 
business and institutions. The new act is based on the principles of the 2007 
Payment Services Directive65 which in itself presents a completely new piece of 
regulation at the EU level. The 2009 Payment Institutions and E-Money 
Institutions Act has been designed on the basis of 2005 E-Money Institutions 
Act, consolidating the rules for both payment institutions and e-money 
institutions into one law66. The new act sets forth new rules for the operations, 
responsibilities and supervision of banks and other institutions that offer 
payment services. Respectively, these rules are accompanied by some changes 
in the LOA, first and foremost clarifying the requirements for the provision of 
payment services from the perspective of consumer protection. The changes in 
the LOA mostly cover the improved transaction requirements for payments (e.g. 
uniform dates for national and EU bank transfers) which do not relate to the 
topic of this dissertation. However, there are also some new provisions 
regarding the specialized treatment of “low-value” e-money products which I 
find interesting to explain in the context of following up the above referred 
article. 
With the adoption of the 2009 Payment Institutions and E-Money Insti-
tutions Act, the definition of e-money as an electronic payment instrument has 
not changed in its essence, continuously comprising three major components: (i) 
the possibility of storing electronic money on an electronic device, (ii) the 
requirement for equal amounts of stored electronic money and respective ‘real’ 
                                                                          
64  Payment Institutions and E-Money Institutions Act, op.cit. note 32. 
65  Payment Services Directive, op.cit. note 31. 
66  The consolidation of laws takes into account the similarity of requirements for both 
payment institutions and e-money institutions. The consolidation of laws seeks to follow the 
principle of efficiency of legislation. In the future it is also foreseen to consolidate the 
similar provisions in other legal acts regulating other financial sector entities. 
32 
money; (iii) and the acceptance of e-money as a means of payment by at least 
one third party. It is important to note that the third party must, upon the use of 
electronic money as a means of payment, have direct transactional relation with 
the client of e-money institution. In comparison to the earlier 2005 E-Money 
Institutions Act, the limitation on the total transaction amount has increased so 
that one electronic money device used in Estonia may be now used for the 
storage of electronic money to a maximum amount equal to 1000 euro (earlier 
the amount for one device was 300 euro).67 Thus, in the context of the above 
referred article, it must be noted that e-money solutions such as prepaid cards 
can now be linked to loan agreements of much bigger loan amounts. This 
certainly meets the changing needs of electronic retail lending, following the 
general trend of increased electronic retail loan amounts and longer maturities. 
Similar to earlier rules, the new 2009 Payment Institutions and E-Money 
Institutions Act maintains the requirement for licensing and supervision of e-
money institutions. Similar to other financial sector entities, the system of 
‘European passporting’ is continuously applicable in the establishment and 
supervision of e-money institutions: it is the home-country authority that is 
responsible for the supervision of the institution in the EU.68 In principle, the 
‘European passporting’ system between the EU/EEA countries has not changed 
under the new act. The payment and e-money institutions established and 
licensed in Estonia may offer payment and e-money services in other EU/EEA 
countries by establishing a branch or rendering cross-border services, including 
by the intermediation of an agent. The EFSA needs to be notified about both 
forms of activities. Thus, in the frames of ‘European passporting’ the insti-
tutions can continuously use their existing license issued in Estonia for cross-
border operations in other EU/EEA states. The same applies to the operations of 
payment and e-money institutions from other EU/EEA countries in Estonia.69 
However, the provision of cross-border services between third non-EU/EEA 
countries and Estonia has now somewhat different legal treatment. When 
Estonian service providers are regarded, the payment and e-money institutions 
established and licensed in Estonia may offer payment and e-money services in 
third non-EU/EEA countries by establishing a branch or rendering cross-border 
services, including by the intermediation of an agent. The establishment of a 
branch requires a license from the EFSA while the rendering of cross-border 
services requires notification. When it comes to payment and e-money 
institutions established and licensed in third non-EU/EEA countries, their 
service provision in Estonia has been narrowed down to stricter licensing rules 
under the new act. Such institutions may continuously offer payment and  
                                                                          
67  Art. 6(1) and (2), Payment Institutions and E-Money Institutions Act 
68  Makseasutuste ja e-raha asutuste seaduse eelnõu seletuskiri (Explanatory note to the 
Payment Institutions and E-Money Institutions Act, 610 SE, 26 October 2009, 3. Available 
at http://www.riigikogu.ee/index.php? page=en_vaade&op=ems&eid=802133 (13.06.2011) 
(in Estonian). 
69  Arts. 24(1), 29(1), and 35(1), Payment Institutions and E-Money Institutions Act. 
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e-money services in Estonia. However, different from earlier regulation which 
allowed the issuers to act based on the authorization of their home countries and 
respectively establish branches in Estonia, they can now provide services by 
establishing a branch or rendering cross-border services but need to obtain a 
license from the EFSA for any form of their activities.70 This indicates that, on 
one hand, the increasing interest in cross-border services provision has resulted 
in the broadening of the scope of activity forms for also third-country issuers. 
On the other hand, the prudential rules aiming at financial stability and 
consumer protection in financial sector seek to have better control over all non-
EU/EEA service providers, requiring now a local activity license for any form 
of activities. 
The 2009 Payment Institutions and E-Money Institutions Act contains some 
new provisions regarding the requirements for the provision of e-money 
services. Article 63 of the act sets forth a detailed information obligation 
towards consumers. This is necessary from the perspective of mitigating the 
risks of consumers regarding the lack of knowledge about the contents of the 
service.71 Upon the rendering of e-money services the issuer is obliged to (i) 
provide necessary information about all authorised e-money distributors; (ii) 
explain all the risks related to e-money services, taking into account the type 
and extent of services; and (iii) provide the client, upon his/her request, with 
information about the balance of e-money available on e-money device and 
other circumstances of e-money services provision. The terms of issuing and 
use of e-money must contain data about the effective period of e-money; the 
period for the withdrawal of expired e-money; and the minimum limit for the 
balance of e-money that can be withdrawn (not more than 10 euro).72 In the 
context of the above referred article it must be noted that the compliance with 
the information requirements on behalf of the issuer becomes certainly more 
complicated in the case of loan-linked prepaid cards. On one hand, the risk 
specter is much more varied. On the other hand, there is also a third transaction 
party (the lender) whose involvement needs to be taken into account, for 
example the balance and changes of funds on an e-money device depend a lot 
on that third party involvement. 
In relation to the above referred information obligation, the adoption of the 
2009 Payment Institutions and E-Money Institutions Act brought also the 
specialized legal treatment of payment instruments in small amounts and  
e-money products, respectively complementing the second part of Chapter 40 of 
the LOA. These provisions seek to harmonize Article 34 of the 2007 Payment 
Services Directive, regulating exceptions for the low-value payment instruments 
and electronic money as regards information obligation of payment services.73 
                                                                          
70  Arts. 25(1), 30(1) and 32(1), Payment Institutions and E-Money Institutions Act. 
71  Makseasutuste ja e-raha asutuste seaduse eelnõu seletuskiri, op.cit. note 68, 14. 
72  Art. 63(2) and (8), Payment Services Directive. 
73  Art. 73312, LOA. 
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According to 2007 Payment Services Directive74 the payment instruments for 
low-value payments in case of cheap products and services should be 
alternative, cheap and easy to use, and they should not be subject to too many 
extra requirements. Therefore the requirement for information provision as 
regards such payment instruments is limited and the information should only 
consist of relevant information, taking into account the technical functionalities 
of the instruments which one can normally expect.75 On the other hand, it needs 
to be pointed out that for consumer protection purposes there must be some sort 
of information provision always in place because e-money products such as 
loan-linked cards are mostly prepaid products and therefore consumers need to 
know their characteristics. 
Reduced information provision means that only the information regarding 
the main characteristics of a payment product is given and the location for 
obtaining additional information is indicated, given the payment instrument can 
be used according to a contract for single payment transactions of up to 30 euro 
or the payment instrument has a cost limit of 150 euro or the amount stored on 
the payment instrument does not exceed 150 euro at any time76. Additionally it 
is possible to agree between the parties to refrain from information provision, 
given that the payment instrument is used anonymously or the issuer is not 
technically able to provide the information. In any case, the client must be able 
to control the amount stored on the payment instrument. 77 In the context of the 
above referred article it must be noted that although prepaid cards can now be 
linked to loan amounts of up to 1000 euro, reduced information requirements 
which form an essential part of a flexible product solution would most likely 
contribute to more interest of service providers in linking the cards to electronic 
retail loans in smaller amounts. 
 
 
3.2. Amendments Relating to Consumer  
Credit Regulation 
The main research subject of the second article of this dissertation – “Legal 
Problems with Electronic Retail Loans: Balancing the Freedom of Contract and 
the Protection of Consumers – The Case of Estonia“– is consumer credit 
regulation, more precisely the selection of aspects of electronic retail loans 
which allow evaluating the level of freedom to provide efficient and flexible 
electronic retail lending services. We have seen that the abolishment of 
                                                                          
74  Art. 30, Payment Services Directive. 
75  Makseasutuste ja e-raha asutuste seaduse eelnõu seletuskiri, op.cit. note 68, 49. 
76  Member states have discretion to decrease or double these criteria for low-value payment 
instruments in case of national payment transactions. In case of prepaid instruments member 
states are not allowed to increase the criteria above 500 euro. In the implementation of 
Payment Services Directive, Estonia has chosen not to use this discretionary option. 
77  Makseasutuste ja e-raha asutuste seaduse eelnõu seletuskiri, op.cit. note 68, 49. 
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minimum thresholds allowed by 2008 Consumer Credit Directive has resulted 
in the application of thorough information requirements on all electronic retail 
loans, thereby distinguishing Estonian legal fabric from other neighboring 
countries. Among others, we have also seen that the presentation of interest rate 
information can be subject to interpretation differences and that the adoption of 
upper limit to the APRC may affect the freedom of contract in an overly 
consumer-driven manner which is quite unusual in the legal environment in 
Estonia. The main research subject of the third article of this dissertation – 
“Electronic Retail Lending in Estonia: Legal Limits on the Cost of Credit“ – is 
the APRC limit effective as at 1st May 2009, more precisely its legal functions 
and potential problems in relation to its application. Among others, we have 
seen that the calculation of APRC seeks to adequately capture all the cost 
elements that may incur in retail lending transactions although the limit itself is 
legally “soft” in its nature. There are some further developments and legal 
amendments shaping the consumer credit regulation in Estonia. As these 
developments are related to the research subjects of the above referred articles, 
indicating a few changes in the regulative environment of some of the examined 
issues in the future, I find it important to address these changes hereto.  
Before addressing the major new developments related to consumer 
protection rules in Estonia, I will briefly discuss one of the issues I raised in the 
above referred articles. As explained earlier, Estonia decided to abolish the 
minimum thresholds allowed by the 2008 Consumer Credit Directive. More 
precisely, the directive stipulates that its rules, including information 
obligations, do not apply to credit agreements involving a total amount of credit 
less than 200 euro or more than 75 000 euro and to credit agreements under the 
terms of which the credit has to be repaid within three months and only 
insignificant charges are payable.78 Until 1st May 2009 Estonian consumer credit 
regulation consisted of similar exemption and the general rules of consumer 
credit did not apply to credit contracts with a net amount of credit less than 200 
euro (or where the maturity of the credit facility was less than three months). 
From 1st May 2009 this exemption has been removed from the law and the 
Estonian information disclosure and other requirements in relation to consumer 
credit are applicable to all consumer credit agreements, irrespective of their 
amounts and maturities. Regular consumer loans in Estonia often start from 
10 000 kroons. The survey on the factors influencing the behavior of retail loan 
customers79 indicates that more than 65% of people that participated in the 
survey had retail loans with loan amounts exceeding 10 000 kroons while only 
                                                                          
78 Art. 2(2), Consumer Credit Directive. 
79  Maksim Melamed, Tarbimislaenu klientide käitumise mõjutegurite uuring – 2. osa 
(Survey on the factors influencing the behaviour of retail loan customers – part 2), February-
March 2009. Available at http://kiirlaen.info/blog/tarbimislaenu-klientide-kaitumise-
mojutegurite-uuring-2-osa (13.06.2011) (in Estonian). 
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20% of the people had retail loans with loan amounts up to 5000 kroons.80 
However, in case of electronic retail lending, loan amounts usually stay below 
10 000 kroons, often even below 5 000 kroons. Thus, the change aimed at 
enhanced consumer protection and mainly resulted from the fact that a big part 
of electronic retail loans was not captured by general consumer credit regulation 
and in some cases electronic retail lenders indeed took advantage of less 
restrictive legal environment.  
We have seen that the result of the change was that the thorough set of rules 
on borrower information became applicable to all electronic retail loans in 
Estonia, thus reducing the possibilities of legal arbitrage and seeking to 
contribute to more responsible lending practice. However, in the above referred 
articles I questioned whether the removing of the thresholds in Estonia 
contradicts the principles of the 2008 Consumer Credit Directive because the 
directive clearly sets forth the exemptions from its application. The answer to 
this concern which I also briefly discussed in the third article of this dissertation 
is that these thresholds are the exemptions deriving from the EU secondary law, 
allowing member states to apply certain degree of discretion in deciding the 
scope of application of the rules. Such conclusion can be drawn from the 
guidance in the preamble of the directive on the scope of its harmonization. The 
directive should be without prejudice to the application by member states, in 
accordance with Community law, of the provisions of the directive to areas not 
covered by its scope. Respectively, recital 10 in the Preamble to Consumer 
Credit Directive states that a member state may maintain or introduce domestic 
legislation corresponding to the 2008 Consumer Credit Directive outside its 
scope, for example on credit agreements involving amounts less than 200 euro. 
Thus, the abolishment of exemptions would not contradict the directive 
although Estonia has chosen less flexibility in retail lending. The removal of 
this exemption is continuously important at present; especially in the context of 
new legal amendments to consumer information requirements which will be 
explained below. 
The major new development regarding consumer credit regulation is the 
amendment of the 2001 LOA effective from 1 July 2011. The amendments, 
mostly included in Chapter 22 part 2 of the LOA, transpose the 2008 Consumer 
Credit Directive into Estonian law. Some changes are respectively also related 
to the Consumer Protection Act81 and Advertising Act82. The key issues 
addressed hereto to follow the above referred articles are the legal amendments 
relating to consumer information, responsible lending and the cost of credit 
(APRC). 
                                                                          
80  Rahandusministri määruse “Tarbijakrediidi kulukuse määra arvutamise kord” eelnõu 
seletuskiri, op.cit. note 3, 4. 
81  Tarbijakaitseseadus, signed 11 February 2004, Riigi Teataja (RT) I (2004) No.13, 86; 
(2010) No.31, 158 (in Estonian) (hereinafter ”Consumer Protection Act“).  
82  Advertising Act, op.cit. note 10. 
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First, the amendments of the LOA remarkably broaden the scope of 
information to be provided to the consumer before the conclusion of a loan 
agreement. The increased information requirement seeks to support the 
consumer in making a reasonable and well-founded decision with regard to the 
loan agreement. The scope of mandatory information to be provided in retail 
loan agreements has also become wider.83 The LOA has been complemented by 
some additional rules regarding the pre-contractual information provision to 
retail borrowers. Accordingly, the borrower must be given a possibility to 
compare different offerings so that he/she could make a decision to conclude a 
retail loan agreement, taking all circumstances into account. For this purpose 
the lender will provide the borrower with the list of pre-contractual information, 
including such information items as the total amount of payments to be made by 
the borrower to repay the loan and cover the total cost of credit; annual interest 
rate and the terms of its application; APRC and the borrower’s right to obtain 
information about the data used to assess his/her repayment ability. This 
information should be given to the borrower within a reasonable time before the 
conclusion of loan agreement or acceptance of offering.84  
APRC as the full cost of credit is naturally an important component of 
information obligation both in contractual relations and the marketing of 
lending products. Next to amending the LOA, the new Amending Act made 
changes into the 2008 Advertising Act, in particular the part concerning the 
advertisements of retail lending agreements. The change resulted in the 
provisions requiring each advertisement which is targeted at the possible 
conclusion of a retail loan agreement to indicate the APRC of such a loan 
agreement in the form of a typical example.85  
As mentioned, the lender is obliged to disclose the annual interest rate and 
the terms of its application. Deriving from Annex II of the 2008 Consumer 
Credit Directive, the lender is obliged to inform the consumer about interest rate 
as a percentage rate, and also to notify whether the rate is fixed or floating.86 I 
find the latter important especially from the perspective of the discussion raised 
in one of the above referred articles which, among others, covers the issue of 
interest rate presentation. Theoretically interest consists of three functions: (i) 
the inflation indicator of loan amount (i.e. its value in certain period of time); 
(ii) a fee for the period during which the lender could not himself use/invest the 
                                                                          
83  Võlaõigusseaduse ja teiste seaduste muutmise seaduse eelnõu seletuskiri (Explanatory 
note to the amending act of the Law of Obligations Act and other acts), 761 SE, 17 May 
2010, 2–3. Available at http://www.riigikogu.ee/ ?page=en_vaade&op=ems&eid=1033413 
(13.06.2011) (in Estonian); 
84  Võlaõigusseaduse ja teiste seaduste muutmise seadus, signed 30 September 2010, Riigi 
Teataja (RT) I (2010) No. 77, 590; 04.02.2011 No. 2 (in Estonian) (hereinafter “The 
Amending Act”). 
85  Art. 2(1), The Amending Act. 




loan amount; (iii) the risk of repayment inability87. The natural element of 
interest is its dependence on the length of the use of money. However, in loan 
agreements it is not always the case that the fee for the use of money is called 
interest. Sometimes it is “hidden” behind other definitions.88 Estonian legal 
theory suggests that any fee which can be treated as a fee for the use of money, 
even if the definition “interest” itself is not directly used, should be considered 
interest89. The new provisions would help avoiding the hidden pricing of credit 
products on behalf of electronic retail lenders, especially in the light of earlier 
practice of replacing credit interest as a percentage rate with loan fees. 
In this context, an important new provision which the amendments of the 
LOA establish is the requirement for submitting information to the consumer on 
a permanent information device, using the European consumer credit standard 
information sheet. The establishment of this standard sheet and its mandatory 
use results from the transposition of the 2008 Consumer Credit Directive into 
Estonia laws. The standard information sheet will not be required for such retail 
loan agreements which are concluded with a limited number of consumers 
based on laws and in public interests, given that the contractual terms are more 
advantageous than those of the market, and the interest rate is below the average 
market rate. In case of retail loan agreements concluded via electronic means 
the lenders are expected to provide the consumer with the standard information 
sheet, including additional required information about the distance marketing of 
financial services, and make the information available on a permanent 
information device. In addition to the above information items, the lenders are 
expected to use the standard information sheet also for the number of other 
cases, such as informing the borrower about the fees in relation to consumer 
credit (e.g. the fees for account maintenance, usage of payment devices and so 
on) and the obligation of the borrower to conclude a side-contract (such as 
insurance contract).90 The information about fees is an important issue for 
electronic retail lending, because this type of consumer lending is especially 
dependent on different account and payment solutions (e.g. loan-linked prepaid 
cards).  
The standard information sheet with its clear and simple structure would 
help avoiding the situation of over-information of the consumer, and ensure the 
easy monitoring and comparison of loan data of different lenders. Since the 
obligation of the use of standard information sheet is applicable to all lenders 
                                                                          
87  Irene Kull et al, “Riigikohtu tsiviilkolleegiumi praktika seadusandja mõjutajana (The 
Influence of Decisions of the Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court on Legislation), Juridica 
No 8 (2009), 555–569 (in Estonian), at 563. 
88  Paul Varul et al, Võlaõigusseadus II. Kommenteeritud väljaanne (Law of Obligations Act 
II. Commented Edition) (Kirjastus Juura, Tallinn, 2007) (in Estonian), 388. 
89  Paul Varul et al, Tsiviilseadustiku üldosa seadus. Kommenteeritud väljaanne (General 
Part of Civil Code Act. Commented Edition) (Kirjastus Juura, Tallinn, 2010) (in Estonian), 
281. 
90  Art. 1(33), The Amending Act. 
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operating in the EU, the consumer would be able to compare different credit 
products of both local and foreign service providers. This would ideally 
facilitate the use of retail lending services across borders and the establishment 
of consumer credit market within the EU. The breach of information obligations 
would result in the consumer’s right to bring an action to the court, in particular 
with the claims of performance and compensation for damage91. Respectively, 
the breach of information obligation may result also in public sanctions: the 
Consumer Protection Act has been supplemented by the provision (Article 411) 
which allows the Consumer Protection Board to issue a precept, requiring the 
lender to stop the breach and prevent from further breaches of law.92 
Furthermore, the lender may be required to pay a penalty payment in case of 
continuous non-compliance with the precept93. 
Another set of new rules which has been integrated into the LOA is related 
to the principle of responsible lending. The principle of responsible lending is 
directly linked to the principles of sustainable operation and the purpose of 
these provisions is to avoid over indebtedness. The principle of responsible 
lending means that credit solutions must meet the needs of the consumer and 
need to be adjusted to his/her repayment ability. In brief, any loan needs to be 
suitable for certain borrower.94 
According to the amendments of the LOA, the application of the principle of 
responsible lending requires 3 types of activities to be carried out by the lender 
before the conclusion of a retail loan agreement: (i) obtaining information, 
including from public databases, which would enable assessing the credit-
worthiness of the consumer (ii) assess the repayment ability and credit-
worthiness of the consumer (iii) give sufficient explanation to the consumer so 
that he/she could assess whether the potential retail loan agreement meets 
his/her expectations and financial circumstances.95 Thus, in addition to pre-
contractual information obligation the lenders will have the obligation of pre-
contractual counseling and explaining the main characteristics and impact of 
potential loan agreement.  
                                                                          
91  Since the information provision takes place in the course of pre-contractual negotiations, 
the breach of information obligations stipulated in Art. 403¹ of the LOA simultaneously 
means the breach of Art. 14 (2) of the LOA because the information obligation stipulated in 
Art. 14 (2) is directly derived from Art. 403¹. Thus, a consumer may use all reasonable 
protective legal means as stipulated in Art. 101 of the LOA against the lender in breach. First 
and foremost, the claims of performance (Art. 108 of the LOA) and compensation for 
damage (Art. 115 of the LOA) can be applicable. 
92  Art. 3(1), The Amending Act. 
93  Art. 40 (5), Consumer Protection Act. 
94  Võlaõigusseaduse ja teiste seaduste muutmise seaduse eelnõu seletuskiri, op.cit. note 83, 
25. 
95  Art. 1(33), The Amending Act. 
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Generally interest rates on loans depend on the estimation of credit-
worthiness.96 Based on my practical experience in commercial banking it can be 
said that the assessment of creditworthiness aims at reducing credit risks and 
should result in lower credit cost for consumers. Respectively, the assessment of 
creditworthiness is not a unilateral operation but also requires adequate input 
from the consumer. In the process of credit application the consumer must 
submit true, adequate and complete data about his/her financial state and 
confirm his/her ability to make informed and sustainable decisions regarding the 
loan agreement. Again, as was the case with the standard information sheet, the 
assessment of creditworthiness will not be required for such retail loan 
agreements which are concluded with a limited number of consumers based on 
laws and in public interests, given that the contractual terms are more 
advantageous than those of the market, and the interest rate is below the average 
market rate97.  
In the above referred articles I have highlighted that electronic retail lending 
as a flexible financing product usually entails less background checks and 
assessment of creditworthiness. This is one of the components which makes 
such lending more expensive for the consumers. Under the Amending Act 
electronic retail lenders, similar to any other lenders, also need to comply with 
the requirement of assessing the creditworthiness of borrowers. Yet, in practical 
terms the scope of such assessment would naturally be problematic. On one 
hand such assessment will continue to vary among service providers and 
electronic retail lenders are likely to prefer keeping the scope of assessment 
cost-efficient. Also, getting the adequate picture of creditworthiness would be 
particularly problematic because electronic retail loan agreements are normally 
concluded from distance and so is done the preliminary communication with the 
client, including the assessment of the client’s financial situation. As stated 
above, electronic lenders will be required to use public registers as their sources 
of information. On the other hand, one would assume that in order to mitigate 
their risks and handle the obligation of the burden of proof in relation to high 
APRC, the lenders are surely interested in gaining information necessary for 
sufficient assessment. Yet, I am of the opinion that the component of distant 
communication in this type of lending would not always ensure getting a true 
picture about the borrower. 
Third important change is the composition of the APRC. In the beginning of 
consumer credit regulation in the EU in 1987 most of the aspects in relation to 
the APRC calculation were left to be decided by member states. Later the base 
indicators and assumptions for APRC calculation were harmonized and a single 
base formula was stipulated. The calculation is carried out according to the 
method of present value calculation which is a common economic method, 
                                                                          
96  Ingrid Ulst & Rain Raa, “Basel II and Lending to SMEs: What Lies Ahead?”, EBS 
Review No 16 (2003), 62–74, at 72.  
97  Art. 1 (33), The Amending Act. 
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allowing to compare the cash flows of different periods converted into their 
present values.98 The rate is a synthetic indicator which takes into account credit 
amount and related costs during the whole credit period, reflecting the periodic 
obligations of the consumer to service the respective credit line99. First and 
foremost the APRC reflects an important element of transparency and compara-
bility of credit products in the EU. The 2008 Consumer Credit Directive does 
not provide for the possibility to leave the total amount of payments to be made 
for the repayment of credit and the covering of total cost of credit undisclosed. 
The rate aims at suggesting a numeric and comparable indicator which would 
enable consumers to understand the costs of certain credit product in 
comparison to credit amount and repayment period.100 Thus, one can assume 
that pre-contractual information about the APRC would ideally lead a consumer 
to choose more beneficial alternatives on credit market. On the other hand, if 
the consumer’s creditworthiness is low, this would in turn reduce the possibility 
for more beneficial alternatives, regardless the consumer’s knowledge about the 
actual cost of credit. 
Both the LOA and the Procedure for Calculation of the Rate of the Cost of 
Consumer Credit101 have been respectively amended, widening the scope of 
elements included in the APRC calculation. According to the amendment of the 
LOA, the APRC (annual percentage rate of charge) means all the costs that a 
consumer is obliged to pay in relation to consumer credit agreement, including 
interest and contractual fees, which the lender knows of upon the conclusion of 
the agreement. The APRC is expressed as annual percentage rate on the credit 
amount or maximum credit limit in use. The APRC needs to be presented in the 
form of a typical example, indicating all the relevant base data and assumptions 
used in the calculation of the APRC. A slight change has been provided with 
regard to the definition of the APRC. Earlier definition of the APRC was based 
on net amount or net price. The definition stipulated in the 2008 Consumer 
Credit Directive does not tie the calculation of the APRC to net price and 
therefore such reference was also abandoned in the Amending Act of Estonia. 
In comparison to the earlier procedure, the base indicators and formula for the 
APRC calculation have been somewhat revised in the Amending Act and the 
                                                                          
98  European Commission, op.cit. note 2, 52.  
99  The sample calculator of the APRC calculation is available on the homepage of the 
European Commission. However, it should be noted that this calculator is an example which 
is not updated. See Excel simulator for the calculation of the APRC available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/rights/fin_serv_en.htm (18.06.2011). 
100  Rahandusministri määruse “Tarbijakrediidi kulukuse määra arvutamise kord” eelnõu 
seletuskiri, op.cit. note 3, 1.  
101  Tarbijakrediidi kulukuse määra arvutamise kord, signed 31 October 2010, Riigi Teataja 
(RT) I (2010) No. 76, 584 (in Estonian) (hereinafter ”The APRC Procedure“). The adoption 
of this procedure was related to the adoption of the new Amending Act and it replaced the 
earlier procedure which had been effective from 2002. 
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APRC Procedure. Also, some additional assumptions102 have been set forth, 
making the calculation of the APRC possible when some of the base indicators 
are not known.103 This is a positive change which brings more clarity in 
practical terms. Under earlier regulation lenders did not have such guidance and 
they needed to invent the assumptions for the APRC calculation in case of 
missing parameters to be able to identify the APRC. Also, it goes without 
saying that the different assumptions used by different lenders could have 
created regulatory arbitrage. This is the gap which has been filled by the 
Amending Act. 
One of the important changes in comparison to the earlier definition is that 
the amendments of the LOA now include the costs of side-agreements into the 
calculation of the APRC. Accordingly, in case it is mandatory to conclude a 
side-agreement (such as an insurance agreement) for obtaining a loan, the costs 
of such a side-agreement, especially insurance payments, will be taken into 
account in the calculation of the APRC. Respectively, the costs of payment 
transactions, account maintenance and the use of payment devices in relation to 
the use of credit should be generally taken into account in the APRC 
calculation, unless the opening of an account is voluntary and the costs of 
account maintenance are clearly separately indicated in the retail loan 
agreement or some other agreement.104  
Side-agreements are a new issue in the APRC calculation. Respectively, the 
definition of a side-agreement is a new concept in the LOA. Side-agreement 
means an agreement which is linked to a retail loan agreement through the need 
for concluding such an agreement deriving directly from the retail loan 
agreement. In order to take the costs of a side-agreement into account in the 
APRC calculation, the conclusion of the side-agreement needs to be set as a pre-
condition for obtaining credit or obtaining credit on terms advertised/offered to 
the consumer.105 This means that the costs of a side-agreement should be taken 
into account in such cases where the consumer, without the conclusion of the 
side-agreement, would not get any loan or would get it on less favorable 
                                                                          
102  These assumptions are related to such aspects as credit period, difference between 
interest rate and fees, payment schedule and so on. For example, if a retail loan agreement 
enables to choose the start date for using the loan, the assumption in APRC calculation is 
that the loan is taken in use immediately and in full. If no repayment schedule is agreed by 
the parties, the assumptions in the ARPC calculation are that the loan is granted for 1 year 
and it will be paid back in twelve equal instalments after equal periods. If no maximum 
credit amount is determined in the loan agreement, the maximum in APRC calculation is set 
at 1500 euro. In case the consumer is offered different interest rates and fees during certain 
period of time, the assumption is to use the highest of agreed interest rates and fees in the 
APRC calculation. See Art. 1(45), The Amending Act.  
103  Võlaõigusseaduse ja teiste seaduste muutmise seaduse eelnõu seletuskiri, op.cit. note 83, 
34. 
104  Arts. 1(33) and 1(41), The Amending Act. 
105  Võlaõigusseaduse ja teiste seaduste muutmise seaduse eelnõu seletuskiri, op.cit. note 83, 
35. 
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conditions. All side-agreements which are concluded on voluntary basis without 
the clear requirement from the lender stay outside the scope of the APRC 
calculation.106  
This change of including the costs of side-agreements, particularly insurance 
agreements, in the APRC calculation, is probably triggered by the potential for 
the circumvention of rules which the earlier provisions regarding the APRC 
contained. We have seen that the current APRC limit assumes that electronic 
retail lenders grant credits with reasonable cost of credit rates or bear the burden 
of proof regarding transaction circumstances. We have also seen that the APRC 
of electronic retail loans is usually much above the market rates, reflecting both 
the high financing and administration costs but also the margin expectations of 
electronic retail lenders. Thus, the lenders would naturally seek legal ways to 
avoid exceeding the APRC limit. One of the possibilities to “decrease” the 
APRC under earlier regulation was to offer credit insurance services, switching 
part of financing and other costs or margin expectations into such insurance 
premiums. Since the inclusion of insurance costs in the APRC calculation was 
somewhat questionable under earlier rules, the service providers could use this 
scheme to maintain their cost and margin levels without exceeding the APRC 
limit. The amendment now includes any insurance agreements which the lender 
has made mandatory for the consumer to conclude before receiving a loan and 
also other type of side-agreements such as agreements for payment services. 
This solution should much decrease the possibilities for inventing different 
types of services to circumvent the APRC rules. It is interesting to note that the 
circumvention has been found problematic in other countries too. From the EU-
wide perspective, analyses have revealed that lenders may tend to offset the 
effect of interest rate restrictions by designing credit contracts or additional 
service contracts charging fees which are not captured by the interest rate 
regulation.107 Also, when looking at country specifics, a good example is 
Germany where a research was carried out in 2009. It revealed that the payment 
protection insurance fees introduced by American and English banks in the last 
years have become the main form of circumvention of the usury ceilings in 
Germany and have resulted in the surplus of nearly 80% of the fee paid back to 
the lender as a secret and undisclosed kick-back provision. Legally it has been 
argued that such payment protection insurance contracts are either linked 
contracts or that the kick-back provision is hidden interest which falls under the 
circumvention rule of the Consumer Credit Directive.108  
 
                                                                          
106  Also, in this light the knowledge of the lender about costs is of importance and this is 
something the borrower should consider. For example, given the lender requires the 
conclusion of an insurance agreement but the choice of insurance company is left to the 
borrower who would not inform the lender about the insurance agreement, the costs of such 
insurance agreement are not taken into account in the APRC calculation. 
107 Udo Reifner et al, op.cit. note 20, 328–329. 
108 Udo Reifner & Michael Knobloch, op.cit. note 22, 8.  
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3.3. The APRC Limit and Constitutional Rights 
3.3.1. Introduction to the Discussion 
In the articles contained in this dissertation I have explained that the unbalanced 
value of mutual obligations is the issue which might cause interpretation 
problems. When assessing performance from the perspective of good morals, 
one should look for the average sense of moral of the members of society. It is 
not important to take into account the assessment by a concrete person whose 
sense of moral can be higher or lower than the general value judgement of 
society as a whole.109 Respectively, the Supreme Court of Estonia has found 
that transactions can contradict good morals for different reasons which could 
be considered immoral and condemnable according to the common belief of the 
society. A transaction contradicts good morals if it is against the sense of justice 
and value judgement of a just and reasonable person as well as the general 
principles of law at the time of the transaction, and the contradiction to good 
morals may result from the objective of the transaction or immoral behavior of 
one of the parties with an objective to conclude the transaction.110 Both morale 
and values are such elements which change in the course of time. Respectively, 
the meaning of how we perceive contradiction to good morals is also changing. 
When it comes to disproportionate obligations, one of the ways to determine the 
contradiction to good morals is to examine whether the situation would be 
acceptable to a reasonable person.111  
The analysis provided in the articles of this compilation shows that as a rule 
the generally accepted view of Estonian courts is to evaluate the compliance of 
a transaction with good morals on case-by-case basis, taking into account the 
circumstances and values applicable at the time of the transaction. “A 
reasonable person” is an undefined legal concept. However, it is often put into a 
clearer framework by defining or indicating some parameters for non-
acceptable situations. For example, German legal writing suggests that mutual 
obligations are contrary to good morals if the difference between performance 
and counter-performance exceeds 100%. In the case of interest rates there is a 
generally accepted rule in German jurisprudence that the rates should not 
exceed twice the average market rate for a particular field of business. The 
average market rate is a monthly disclosed rate by the European Central 
Bank.112  
We have seen that in case of consumer credit agreements, the unbalanced 
value of mutual obligations as contrary to good morals is assumed if the APRC 
exceeds 3 times the average cost of consumer credits as provided in the last 
                                                                          
109  Paul Varul et al, op.cit. note 8, 276. 
110  The Supreme Court 21 November 2008 decision in civil case 3-2-1-111-08, RT III 
(2008) No. 47, 325 (in Estonian), Sec 23. 
111  Paul Varul et al, op.cit. note 89, 276. 
112 Udo Reifner & Michael Knobloch, op.cit. note 22, 8. 
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commercial banking statistics of the Bank of Estonia. In this context, the 
articles have indicated that there is a possibility that the setting of such upper 
limit to the APRC contradicts the Constitution of Estonia. After the limiting of 
the APRC took place in 2009, a procedure was initiated by a market participant 
and brought to the attention of the Chancellor of Justice (ombudsman)113. The 
aim of the procedure was to evaluate the compliance of the civil law provisions 
limiting the APRC with the Constitution of Estonia114. In the beginning of 2011 
the Chancellor of Justice of Estonia took an official stand in this question115. 
Drawing parallel to this official viewpoint, I will address the issue of the APRC 
limit and its possible contradiction to constitutional rights. Following I will seek 
to explain whether and why I think that the current provisions of the APRC 
limit disproportionately restrict the constitutional rights of service providers, 
more precisely their constitutionally protected right of entrepreneurship 
freedom. In the course of discussion I will also address contradiction between 
the right of entrerpreneurship freedom and the principle of social state deriving 
from Art. 10 of the Constitution. 
 
 
3.3.2. The Right of Entrepreneurship Freedom and  
its Restriction 
To start a discussion regarding the possible contradiction of certain legal 
provisions to constitutional freedom, it is necessary to commence with briefly 
looking at the particular freedom as such, thereafter explaining the core 
elements of the evaluation of constitutional compliance which are relevant in 
                                                                          
113 The institution of the Chancellor of Justice is established by the Constitution of the 
Republic of Estonia. The institution is not part of the legislative, executive or judicial 
powers; it is not a political or a law enforcement body. The institution combines the function 
of the general body of petition and the guardian of constitutionality. It is an official who is 
independent in his activities and who reviews the legislation of general application of the 
state’s legislative and executive powers and of local governments to verify its conformity 
with the Constitution and the laws. Another important constitutional task entrusted to the 
Chancellor of Justice is the function of the ombudsman which contains the monitoring of 
whether state agencies comply with people’s fundamental rights and freedoms and with the 
principles of good governance. The Chancellor of Justice also supervises local governments, 
legal persons in public law and private persons who exercise public functions. 
114  E-mail correspondence of 06 September 2010 with Ave Henberg, Adviser-Head of the 
Second Department, Office of the Chancellor of Justice of Estonia. 
115 Õiguskantsleri märgukiri nr. 6-1/091076/1100273 justiitsministrile “Tsiviilseadustiku 
üldosa seaduse § 86 põhiseaduspärasus” (The note No 6-1/091076/1100273 of the 
Chancellor of Justice to the Minister of Justice regarding the constitutional compliance of 
Art 86 of the General Part of Civil Code Act), 19 January 2011. Available at 
http://www.oiguskantsler.ee/public/resources/editor/File/NORMIKONTROLLI_MENETLU
SED/Margukirjad/2011/JuM_kiirlaenud_m_rgukiri.pdf (10.05.2011) (in Estonian). 
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our case. According to Art. 31 of the Constitution of Estonia116 everyone has the 
right to be engaged in entrepreneurship. The scope of protection of entre-
preneurship freedom contains any activity carried out with an objective to gain 
profit. Entrepreneurship freedom contains legal and factual freedom. On one 
hand, a person has entrepreneurship freedom if there are no legal obstacles, i.e. 
no legal prohibitions or directives which would restrict person’s ability of 
entrepreneurial decision making. On the other hand, a person is factually free to 
act as an entrepreneur if the person has enough skills, financial means and 
connections. The lack of skills, money or connections is a factual obstacle to the 
freedom and it is not related to legal environment.117  
In our case, Art. 31 of the Constitution aims at protecting the right of natural 
and legal persons to grant credit to other persons with an objective to gain 
profit. The freedom of an entrepreneur (i.e. electronic retail lender) to agree on 
fees related to the use of credit is protected by Art. 31 while the rights of a 
consumer are protected by Art. 19 of the Constitution. The contractual freedom 
is protected by the provisions of Art. 19 declaring that anyone has the right for 
free self-performance. This covers the right to conclude contracts both by 
service providers and consumers. Art. 31 of the Constitution is a specialised 
norm of the general norm contained in Art. 19 of the Constitution. The Supreme 
Court has stated that contractual freedom is part of free self-performance118. 
Also, the constitutionally protected right of ownership as stipulated in Art. 32 
(1) of the Constitution assumes the freedom of an entrepreneur to determine the 
fees for the use of credit. We have already noted that entrepreneurship freedom 
contains legal freedom as one of its elements: although free to do business, 
including the determination of the size of fees for the use of credit, an 
entrepreneur may be limited in his activities by the provisions of regular law. 
For example, the activity of a lender offering retail credits to consumers is 
limited by the consumer credit rules of the LOA.119 
Art 19 (2) expresses the idea that in exercising his/her rights and freedoms, 
everyone must respect and consider the rights and freedoms of others.120 The 
fundamental rights in private law are expressed by the obligation of the 
legislator to specify the contents of fundamental rights in a respective field of  
 
                                                                          
116 Eesti Vabariigi põhiseadus, signed 28 June 1992, Riigi Teataja (RT) I (1992) No.26, 349; 
27.04.2011 No. 1 (in Estonian) (hereinafter ”The Constitution“). 
117 Eesti Vabariigi põhiseaduse ekspertiisikomisjoni lõpparuanne (The final report of the 
Constitutional Expert Commission), 1998. Available at http://www.just.ee/10716 
(02.05.2011) (in Estonian). 
118 The Supreme Court 30 April 2004 decision in constitutional supervision case 3-4-1-3-04, 
RT III (2004) No. 13, 160 (in Estonian), Sec 21.  
119 Õiguskantsleri märgukiri, op.cit. note 115, 8. 
120 Robert Alexy, “Põhiõigused Eesti põhiseaduses“ (Fundamental Rights in the Estonian 
Constitution), Juridica Special Edition (2001), 5–96 (in Estonian), at 35. 
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law and balance the positions of persons against each other.121 The things that 
can be limited are constitutionally protected interests and prima facie positions 
protected by constitutional rights. A norm can only limit constitutional rights if 
it is itself constitutional.122 A constitutional right can be restricted by a legal act 
or a deed. A restrictive legal act includes normative obligations or prohibitions 
which require the subject of the constitutional right to do something or refrain 
from doing something. Obligations and prohibitions have a restrictive character 
by definition. Restriction within its wider meaning includes any hindrance, 
damage and elimination by the state. Only such activities, characteristics and 
statuses can be hindered, damaged or eliminated which are subject to the scope 
of protection of a respective right. Also, the requirement for wider interpretation 
applies in identifying a restriction: in case of doubt it is always necessary to 
assume that public means restrict the scope of protection of the respective 
right.123 The scope of protection of a certain right is considered restricted also in 
such cases where there is disadvantageous influence on the right.124 A 
restriction to entrepreneurship freedom may derive from the person relying on 
the freedom as well as from objective circumstances (e.g. limiting the opening 
times for certain types of stores). It is allowed to restrict entrepreneurship 
freedom on the grounds of the rights and freedom of other persons as well as 
public interests.125  
In our case the constitutionally protected entrepreneurship freedom of 
electronic retail lenders is restricted by Art. 86 of the GPCCA which provides 
for a limit to the cost of credit, thereby limiting the free choice of electronic 
retail lenders in setting the fees for the use of credit. The provisions of Art. 86 
(2) and (3) assume that if a consumer has taken a loan with the cost of credit 
rate which is higher than 3 times the average of consumer credits as provided in 
the last commercial banking statistics of the Bank of Estonia, such loan 
transaction is by assumption contrary to good morals and therefore void. 
Respectively, according to Art. 86 (4) of the GPCCA the lender is entitled to 
collect a fee of only in the amount of legal interest rate (Art. 94 (1) of the LOA) 
on such loan transaction and loses the possibility to collect the initially planned 
fees. Such restriction has impact on electronic lenders mainly for 2 reasons. On 
one hand, the restriction would force some lenders to adjust the fees so as to 
match the legal limit, entailing the risk that they would not be able to meet their 
                                                                          
121 Anneli Alekand, Proportsionaalsuse printsiip põhiõiguste riive mõõdupuuna täitemenet-
luses. Doktoritöö (The principle of Proportionality as a Measure for Restrictions of Funda-
mental Rights in Enforcement Proceeding. Doctorate Thesis) (Tartu Ülikooli Kirjastus, 
Tartu, 2009) (in Estonian), 24–26. 
122 Robert Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2010), 181–182. 
123 Eesti Vabariigi põhiseaduse ekspertiisikomisjoni lõpparuanne, op.cit. note 117. 
124 The Supreme Court 12 June 2002 decision in constitutional supervision case 3-4-1-6-02, 
RT III (2002) No. 18, 202 (in Estonian), Sec 9. 
125  Taavi Annus, Riigiõigus (State Law) (Kirjastus Juura, Tallinn, 2006) (in Estonian), 360. 
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commercial objectives and cover the costs of their business, eventually resulting 
in their exit from the market of electronic retail lending services. Making a 
lender to choose such alternative certainly restricts the entrepreneurship 
freedom stipulated in Art. 31 of the Constitution. Moreover, the decreased 
number of market participants would have negative effect on the 
competitiveness and efficiency of the market. On the other hand, some lenders 
certainly continue granting credit with the rates which exceed the legal limit. 
These lenders need to consider the following. If a consumer does not perform 
payment obligations under the loan agreement and a lender files a respective 
claim, the lender must prove that the loan transaction is not contrary to good 
morals and therefore void. The lender must prove that (i) the value of mutual 
obligations of parties was not contrary to good morals despite the fact that the 
cost of credit exceeds the legal limit; and (ii) the lender did not know or should 
not have known that the consumer concluded the transaction due to his/her 
extraordinary need, dependence, inexperience or other such state. The actual 
fulfillment of such obligation of proof is not an easy task in terms of time, 
complexity and resources. Also, the potential for collecting only legal interest 
instead of actually expected fees, should the lender fail to fulfill the obligation 
of proof, has additional negative impact on the lender. Thus, these measures in 
combination certainly restrict the entrepreneurship freedom (including the right 
to gain profit) as stipulated in Art. 31 of the Constitution. 
A restriction to a fundamental right does not automatically mean the 
violation of the right. A provision which restricts the scope of protection of a 
constitutional right does not violate the right when it is formally and materially 
in compliance with the Constitution. Formal compliance means that a legal act 
must meet the authorization, procedural and formal requirements. Formally, 
every restriction assumes the existence of a respective legal act. When it comes 
to the theoretical approach of assessing the compliance of a legally imposed 
restriction with the Constitution, the material compliance with the Constitution 
can be looked at from 2 different aspects. First, the restriction must have a 
legitimate reason and secondly, the restriction must be proportionate.126 Art. 11 
of the Constitution stipulates that the restrictions to rights and freedom must be 
necessary for the democratic society and should not distort the nature of the 
rights and freedom.127 This provision sets forth the principle of constitutional 
proportionality (also known as the principle of equality) which requires every 
restriction to a constitutional right to be appropriate, necessary and proportio-
nate within its narrower meaning.128  
According to the theoretical concept of constitutional assessment as 
explained above, the assessment of constitutional compliance of the APRC limit 
stipulated in Art. 86 of the GPCCA entails both formal compliance and material 
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compliance. The evaluation of material compliance includes 4 important cate-
gories: the achievement of the constitutionally allowed objective, appro-
priateness, necessity and proportionality. As also indicated earlier, the Chan-
cellor of Justice has taken an official stand in this issue. This official stand 
reveals an opinion that the provisions of Art. 86 (3) and (4) of the GPCCA 
disproportionately restrict the constitutional rights of the providers of electronic 
retail lending services129. Following I will provide my view as regards the 
material compliance of the APRC limit stipulated in Art 86 with the 
Constitution. I will analyse whether the restriction of entrepreneurship freedom 
through the setting of a legal limit on the cost of credit has been in accordance 
with the constitutionally allowed objective and whether the restriction has been 
appropriate, necessary and proportionate. Since constitutional assessment is not 
my core competence in law, I have gained support in formulating my following 
analysis both from the theoretical concepts as well as from the recent note of the 
Chancellor of Justice. I will only evaluate material compliance but I will not 
address formal compliance of the GPCCA. On one hand, there has been no 
indication of formal deficiencies on behalf of state authorities (including the 
Chancellor of Justice) or market participants as this act is regarded. On the other 
hand, such analysis of formal compliance would move much away from 
addressing the major statements and the planned scope of this research. 
 
 
3.3.3. Material Constitutional Compliance:  
Legitimacy of the Objective 
Legitimacy of the objective means that any restriction needs to have justi-
fication.130 Constitutional obligations, constitutional rights and other material 
principles of the Constitution are general legitimate reasons for the restriction. 
Such general reasons can form a basis for the restriction of a fundamental right 
with either the qualified reservation of law, regular reservation of law or 
without the reservation of law. The legitimacy of the objective of restriction is 
particularly important as regards the fundamental rights deriving from the 
qualified reservation of law as well as the rights without the reservation of law. 
In the case of fundamental rights without the reservation of law the legitimate 
objectives are directly limited only by the fundamental rights of other people or 
by constitutional values. In the case of fundamental rights deriving from the 
qualified reservation of law the objectives which justify the restrictions of 
fundamental rights are clearly stipulated in one of the legal provisions covering 
                                                                          
129 The Chancellor of Justice has defined electronic retail loans as unsecured loans generally 
granted via the means of distant communication in relatively small amounts with short 
maturities (less than 1 year). There is no fixed legal term for electronic retail loans in 
Estonia. 
130 Kalle Merusk & Raul Narits, Eesti konstitutsiooniõigusest (Constitutional Law of 
Estonia) (Juura Õigusteabe AS, Tallinn, 1998) (in Estonian),189. 
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the respective fundamental right. When it comes to the fundamental rights 
deriving from the regular reservation of law, it is important to examine whether 
the objective is in compliance with the Constitution – an objective which 
directly contradicts the Constitution cannot restrict a fundamental right.131  
Evaluation of the legitimacy of the objective is problematic mainly due to 
the fact that the objective is generally hidden. As a rule, legislators do not 
formulate the objectives directly in laws. If the objective is formulated but the 
law allows also other objectives (which have not been formulated expressis 
verbis), these other objectives too justify the restiction of fundamental rights.132 
A restriction to entrepreneurship freedom must not damage legally protected 
interests and rights more than is justifiable by the legitimate objective of a legal 
act. Applied means need to be proportionate to the expected objective.133  
In our case the objective of the restriction has been rooted in 2 major 
problems which became topical in the course of rapid growth of electronic retail 
lending market in 2007–2008 against the background of legal acts and case law 
at the time. On one hand, the legal framework at the time enabled to declare a 
loan transaction with disproportionately high interest rate void only on the 
grounds that a lender had taken advantage of the difficult situation of a 
borrower. On the other hand, the occurrence of taking advantage of the difficult 
situation of the borrower could be identified only on the basis of an application 
from the borrower (and not on the initiative of a court). To solve these problems 
the amending act of the General Part of Civil Code Act and Law of Obligations 
Act was initiated on 14 October 2008, aiming at imposing the measures which 
would ensure that the clients of electronic retail lenders (consumers) should not 
bear unreasonably high costs of credit.134 Here it is interesting to draw attention 
to the aspect which was also pointed out by the Chancellor of Justice: the 
measures proposed in this first version of the draft amending act were softer 
than those of the finally adopted version. In the first draft there were no 
provisions which would have assumed contradiction to good morals if the cost 
of credit rate exceeds 3 times the average of consumer credits as provided in the 
last commercial banking statistics of the Bank of Estonia. However, the 
following discussions over the draft amending act resulted in stronger consumer 
protection measures and the respective proposal on 16 February 2009 to 
supplement Art 86 (3) of the GPCCA by creating the limit to the APRC as is 
applicable today.135 These stricter provisions aim at better protection for 
                                                                          
131  Taavi Annus, op.cit. note 125, 244–245. 
132  Taavi Annus, op.cit. note 125, 245. 
133  Erik-Juhan Truuväli et al. (Eds.), Eesti Vabariigi põhiseadus. Kommenteeritud väljaanne 
(The Constitution of the Republic of Estonia. Commented Edition) (Kirjastus Juura, Tallinn, 
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seletuskiri, op.cit. note 45. 
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consumers, given the earlier background of various poorly-informed loan 
decisions on behalf of electronic retail borrowers as well as the cases of 
malpractice and fraud in SMS-lending in Estonia. In this light the objective of 
the legislator to impose certain protective measures in order to improve the 
situation of consumers is understandable. I believe that the protection of 
consumers as a weaker party in lending transactions would be well grounded in 
most legal systems. The protection of a party who is by the nature of certain 
activity designed to be a weaker party in a transaction is a legitimate goal. Thus, 
the consumer protection objective of the restriction established by the GPCCA 
is justified and the objective itself would not contradict the Constitution. 
However, on the basis of legal theory addressed earlier in this Chapter we have 
seen that the measures for achieving the consumer protection objective have to 
meet 3 more criteria accommodated under one common title “proportionality”: 
they need to be appropriate, necessary and proportionate. Following I will 
examine whether the restriction in question meets these criteria. 
 
 
3.3.4. Material Constitutional Compliance: Proportionality 
3.3.4.1. Appropriateness of the Restriction 
A measure is appropriate if it in some way facilitates the achievement of the 
objective of the restriction and it is certainly disproportionate if it does not 
contribute to the achievement of the objective.136 Such restrictions which do not 
support the achievement of the goals contradict the Constitution and are 
therefore prohibited.137 As indicated earlier the objective of the APRC limit is 
consumer protection. The legal consequences related to the APRC limit 
contribute to the protection of consumers mostly for 3 reasons. Given a loan 
agreement with the APRC exceeding the limit, the first important aspect for 
consumer protection is that consumers needn’t prove contradiction to good 
morals in case of objections to the validity of such loan agreement. While the 
general rule for the burden of proof in civil procedure is that in an action a party 
should prove the facts on which the claims and objections of that party are 
based138, this legally provided switch in the burden of proof and related 
potential for the loss of contractual interest by lenders certainly strengthens the 
position of consumers in lending transactions. Secondly, in case of such a loan 
agreement consumers gain the right to pay only legal interest instead of 
contractual rate and will be therefore financially better off. Last but not least, 
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137 Eesti Vabariigi põhiseaduse ekspertiisikomisjoni lõpparuanne, op.cit. note 117. 
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courts evaluate the validity of lending transactions on their own initative139, 
thereby enabling also inexperienced consumers to have their rights protected 
and avoid the payment of overly high costs. For these reasons we can conclude 
that the limit to the APRC facilitates the achievement of the consumer 
protection objective in question and can be therefore considered appropriate. 
 
 
3.3.4.2. Necessity of the Restriction 
A measure is necessary if its objective cannot be achieved by some other less 
restrictive but similarly efficient measure.140 If there is a less restrictive measure 
which is similarly efficient for the achievement of expected goals, then the more 
restrictive measure is considered contrary to the Constitution and it is therefore 
prohibited.141 The principle of necessity (similar to the principle of appro-
priateness) follows from the nature of principles as optimization requirements 
relative to what is factually possible142, thereby expressing the idea of Pareto-
efficiency143. The interpretation of the principle of necessity by the European 
Court of Human Rights has a broad meaning, establishing a stereotype 
expression “pressing social need“. This adds a value judgement to the simple 
relation between the objective and means of the principle of necessity, 
indicating that it is necessary to evaluate the significance of the objective for 
which the restriction is used. A pressing social need for the restriction exists if it 
is necessary for achieving or promoting an objective which is required 
according to the pressing social need.144 
To examine the principle of necessity in the light of the APRC limit in 
Estonia, it must be repeated that the first draft of amending act of the General 
Part of Civil Code Act and Law of Obligations Act inititated on 14 October 
2008 contained less restrictive measures towards the activity of service 
                                                                          
139 See the Supreme Court decision in civil case 3-2-1-111-08, op.cit. note 109, Sec 23 and 
the Supreme Court 8 May 2006 decision in civil case 3-2-1-32-06, RT III (2006) No. 20, 187 
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142 Robert Alexy, op.cit. note 122, 67. 
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providers. Had these initial provisions145 which I addressed earlier in this 
Chapter been adopted, electronic retail lenders would not have had so much 
uncertainty about the validity of the transactions with the APRC exceeding the 
legal limit. Also, the lenders would not have had such extensive burden of proof 
as they are having today. From the perspective of consumer protection I think 
that the initial draft of the amending act would have offered sufficient protection 
to consumers but it would not have had the same scope as the provisions which 
are effective today. In this respect I agree with the view of the Chancellor of 
Justice who states: “[…] At the same time, earlier regulation would not have 
offered the same extent of protection to the consumers as the effective 
regulation because the burden of proof was shared according to the earlier 
regulation but today it is only the lenders’ obligation. […].” 146 On the other 
hand, the APRC limit as it is effective today is relative in its nature and 
therefore less restrictive than any absolute limit would have been, if it had been 
considered147. According to the Chancellor of Justice, the Minister of Justice too 
has suggested that the switch in the burden of proof may result in remarkable 
extra burden for the parties of a legal relationship and must therefore be well 
justified but it certainly needn’t be justified at such high level as it would be in 
the case of setting an absolute and irrevocable limit.148 Thus, it can be 
concluded that the limit to the APRC, although more restrictive than its 
alternative solution, can be considered necessary for the achievement of the 
consumer protection objective in question to wider extent than the less 
restrictive alternative solution while it provides similar extent of consumer 
protection with less restriction to its subjects than would the potential absolute 
option. 
  
3.3.4.3. Proportionality of the Restriction 
3.3.4.3.1. The Conflict of Fundamental Rights and Weighing 
Art 10 of the Constitution stipulates that the rights, freedoms and obligations 
stated in the second chapter of the Constitution (Fundamental Rights, Freedoms 
and Obligations) do not set prejudice to any other rights, freedoms and 
                                                                          
145 Initially the draft contained no such provisions which would have assumed contradiction 
to good morals with the cost of credit rate exceeding 3 times the average of consumer credit 
statistics of the Bank of Estonia. However, resulting from the various discussions in the 
Parliament the draft was supplemented, establishing such limit to the APRC as is applicable 
today. 
146 See Õiguskantsleri märgukiri, op.cit. note 115, 14. The quote is my own unofficial 
translation of the text from Estonian into English. 
147 An absolute limit was never considered in Estonia but it is applicable in a few other EU 
countries. A good example of a system with absolute limit is Lithuania where the recent 
adoption of new Consumer Law set a limit of 250% to the APRC. A brief overview with 
other interesting aspects about the situation with limiting the cost of credit in the EU 
countries is provided below at the end of this Chapter. 
148 Õiguskantsleri märgukiri, op.cit. note 115, 3. 
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obligations which derive from the meaning of the Constitution or comply with it 
and meet the principles of human dignity, social state and democratic rule of 
law. This article contains the development clause for fundamental rights, 
keeping their catalogue open. Fundamental rights are such principles which 
form basis for all the other principles and rules of the Constitution.149 Funda-
mental obligations are such constitutional obligations which are addressed to 
the bearers of fundamental rights. Fundamental obligations restrict certain 
fundamental rights. The Constitution of Estonia contains a self-evident indi-
cation that there are collective (societal) benefits. Among others, fundamental 
obligations are also such obligations which derive from the individual rights of 
other persons. Since the correct limiting of individual legal spheres in a liberal 
state serves to promote public order as a whole, fundamental obligations in their 
broad sense are related to collective benefits.150  
Among the fundamental principles contained in the Constitution and 
expressed by the Supreme Court, there are the principles of social state and rule 
of law which are relevant in our case. Although the principle of social state is 
not defined in the Constitution, the ensuring of social justice through the 
elimination of social risks and the reducing of social and economic inequality is 
generally seen as the objective of social state.151 The fundamental principle of 
social state is that the state should take care of those citizens who cannot take 
care of themselves. Subjective and objective dimensions need to be 
differentiated in this case. First, there are the objective obligations of the state to 
ensure its social goals. The measures applied for social reasons usually contain 
the redistribution of benefits and the objective dimension of social state 
therefore serves as additional justification to the restrictions of ownership and 
so on.152 A state should not be “blind” as regards its existing and potential social 
problems153. When there is less economic balance in the society which would 
not enable efficient self-regulation, the social fundamental rights need to be 
redistributed. Such redistribution deriving from the principle of social state has 
2 forms. On one hand the state can organise redistribution of resources through 
its tax and support system. On the other hand, such redistribution can take place 
at micro-level from one person or group to another.154 The challenge related to 
the objective dimension is to define how far the respective obligation of the 
state should be stretched. This is a question of redistributing social risks. It is 
necessary to point out that the Constitution of Estonia states that the Republic of 
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Estonia is first and foremost founded on freedoms and therefore there is also a 
strong dimension of freedom next to the social dimension of the Constitution. 
The subjective dimension of social state represents the corresponding right of a 
citizen against the obligation of the state.155  
The principle of rule of law has a complex structure. One of its elements is 
the principle of legal certainty.156 The principle of legal certainty contains the 
principle of reliability protection which, among others, is based on the principle 
of legitimate expectations. The latter is expressed in massive case law of the 
Supreme Court of Estonia. According to this, anyone must have a possibility to 
design his/her activities in a reasonable belief that his/her rights and obligations 
deriving from legal order remain stable and do not significantly change to 
his/her disadvantage157. The principle of legitimate expectations protects the 
autonomy of a person to be able to plan and reasonably predict the results of 
his/her activities. However, this principle does not assume absolute continuation 
of certain legal situations because upon the change of circumstances it might be 
necessary to review legal relations and amend the existing regulations158. In 
order to evaluate the amendment, the balancing of principles (addressed and 
examined as “weighing” later in this Chapter) must be carried out. 
The conflict of fundamental rights in its broad sense means a conflict 
between constitutional rights and collective benefits.159 The task of social 
fundamental rights is to compensate the deficit of financial resources of 
individuals and market. We have seen that social fundamental rights usually 
mean redistribution. As opposed to strong arguments against social fundamental 
rights, there are considerate arguments for these rights. First, the argument of 
freedom which indicates that the free self-performance as a principle of 
democratic state also includes factual freedom. On the other hand, there are the 
arguments of suffering the lack of resources and being a weaker party. There are 
situations in which these arguments prevail in front of the argument of 
freedom.160 Consumer rights are not directly social fundamental rights but 
consumers certainly deserve more focused attention on behalf of the state 
because of being a weaker party in multilateral relations. In our analysis, the 
conflict of fundamental rights is an important issue: we could question whether 
the principle of social state would justify more protection for consumers as 
opposed to the fundamental right of entrepreneurship freedom? The question of 
whether the acknowledgement of the impact of fundamental rights on third 
persons could endanger private autonomy is generally the major problem of the 
conflict of fundamental rights. The problem of the conflict of fundamental 
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rights inevitably arises in a country which considers fundamental rights as 
values or the prevailing principles of legal order. For this reason there cannot be 
such legal areas which would exclude them. It does not mean that fundamental 
rights destroy private autonomy but their inclusion in all legal areas means that 
they must be considered in any act of weighing. As already mentioned, the 
fundamental norm contained in Art 19 (2) of the Constitution sets the centre of 
all constitutional legal relations at the universal obligation to respect and 
consider the rights of others.161  
In our case there is clearly a conflict between the principle of social state and 
the fundamental right of entrepreneurship freedom. The idea of a social state 
expresses the general obligation of a state to function socially and take care of 
social justice. In legal writing the idea is seen as an objective to which a state 
has to endeavour – a balancing factor to liberalism, individual liberal rights, free 
self-performance, and the freedom of contract, ownership and entrepreneurship. 
Since all the members of a society are not equal in ensuring their own 
fundamental rights, it is the state which needs to interrupt and make sure that 
some members of a society would not face significantly uneven situations due 
to circumstances which they cannot directly influence.162 We have seen that the 
principle of social state seeks to ensure redistribution of resources if there are 
sufficient social reasons. In respect of consumer protection in electronic retail 
lending I think a good argument is that the principle of social state would 
require ensuring that consumers as a socially weaker group would not 
excessively depend on high-rate credit and electronic lenders. This would 
decrease the social risks related to the consumers. From this perspective I 
believe that the principle of social state would well justify restrictions to another 
fundamental right such as the right of entrepreneurship freedom. On the other 
hand, the right of entrepreneurship freedom assumes constitutionally protected 
possibility of a person to carry out economically reasonable business activities. 
When the income level of electronic lenders is limited and the cost structure of 
their business is not taken into account, the economic rationale of their business 
is under pressure. I think this raises an important issue of whether such scope of 
the restriction which decreases economically reasonable exercise of entre-
preneurship freedom can be justified, regardless the principle of social state.  
Also, I think it would be interesting to consider another aspect which relates 
to the right of free self-performance as stipulated in Art. 19 (1) of the 
Constitution. Under this provision very different forms of activity are protected 
such as sporting, artistic, spiritual and economic activities, including the 
freedom to conclude contracts163. Although consumers are assumed to be a 
weaker and less informed party in electronic retail lending, many of them are 
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well aware of the particularities of SMS-loans and related risks. Hence, many of 
them would prefer good access, maximum flexibility and competitive market in 
this type of services. Restrictions to service providers which make the service 
economically less attractive would likely result in less competition and 
decreased flexibility. If this were the case, I believe that many consumers could 
not consume their preferred volume and type of SMS-lending services. Thus, 
another issue is whether the scope of the restriction which decreases 
economically reasonable exercise of entrepreneurship freedom and thereby 
limits the fundamental right of free self-performance, can be justified by the 
principle of social state. The conflict of these fundamental rights should be 
subject to weighing. 
Here I would like to point out two more aspects which I find similarly very 
important. First, it is difficult to justify why the restriction which is assumed to 
protect the interests of consumers as a whole would actually make only a part of 
(less-informed) consumers better off while the situation of another part of (well-
informed) consumers would likely deteriorate for the reasons explained above. 
Secondly, I agree that a state has to seek for social balance and protect those 
who cannot directly influence the proper ensuring of their fundamental rights. 
However, I do not agree that the principle of social state assumes that a state 
should bear significant amount of responsibility for the decisions of active 
private individuals in their commercial dealings when those individuals have 
active legal capacity, and they have been properly informed about the risks and 
particularities of their transactions. Consequently, I find it difficult to justify the 
redistribution of significant portion of risks deriving from decision-making of 
informed private individuals of active legal capacity and placing those risks on 
the shoulders of service providers on the basis of the principle of social state. I 
would rather suggest relying on the assumption of responsible borrowing linked 
to the idea that a reasonable person usually takes reasonable care of personal 
transactions and finance.  
In multilateral relations the protection of someone’s rights usually means the 
restriction to the rights of someone else. Therefore, legislators are expected to 
consider proportionality from the perspective of the protection of rights. Law is 
directed toward the social reality of a concrete moment in time and exists for 
this reality.164 Any conflict of fundamental rights can be solved in only 2 ways: 
either restricting both parties or sacrificing the interests of one party in favor of 
another party.165 Weighing leads us to the minimal model of social fundamental 
rights established in the Constitution166. Conflict of fundamental rights should 
be resolved by appeal to balancing which is the optimal form of legal reasoning 
in dealing with competitive principles167. According to Alexy168 a constitutive 
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rule for this kind of balancing of principles is as follows: the greater the degree 
of non-satisfaction of, or detriment to, one principle, the greater must be the 
importance of satisfying the other. From this we can see that the weight of 
principles is never absolute: it cannot be determined independently but we can 
only speak about the relative weight of principles. To illustrate the weighing of 
principles (without providing a definite decision-taking procedure), Alexy 
suggests an indifference curve model as is used in economics. It serves as a 
means of representing a relation of substitution between interests. Assume X is 
in favour of both entrepreneurship freedom and consumer protection and he is 
prepared to accept certain increase in entrepreneurship freedom for a certain 
loss in consumer protection (or vice versa). The importance of entrepreneurship 
freedom relative to consumer protection for X is expressed by the curve.169 The 
fact that consumer protection is more important to Y than that is to X is 
illustrated in Figure 1. In constitutional balancing it is not the question of how 
important a principle is to somebody but how important it really is. Therefore 
Alexy suggests designing a correct indifference curve which is illustrated in 
Figure 2. 
    
Figure 1.                Figure 2. 
 
Once X and Y accept that both principles are equally ranked, a smaller degree 
of satisfaction or a greater degree of infringement of entrepreneurship freedom 
is only permissible in favour of consumer protection when the relative degree of 
importance of consumer protection is high. Precisely the relative high impor-
tance of consumer protection has been the matter of disagreement between X 
and Y expressed in the first indifference curve. While the first curve simply 
illustrates different weighings, the correctness of these different weighings by 
the rule of balancing is represented in the second indifference curve.170 
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The weighing of restricted fundamental rights and the underlying justi-
fications assumes the examination of all positive and negative arguments and 
thereafter establishing a respective value judgement. If the justifying reasons do 
not outweigh the restricted fundamental right, the restriction is contrary to the 
Constitution and therefore forbidden. Most of the cases in relation to 
fundamental rights are solved through the weighing as the only process of 
rational value judgement.171 The rule for weighing in evaluating the 
proportionality of restrictions to constitutional freedom can be formulated as 
follows: the more intensive a restriction to fundamental rights is, the more 
serious need to be the justifications of such restriction. According to the rule for 
weighing, such evaluation needs to consist of 3 levels. At first level the 
intensiveness of the restriction needs to be determined. At the second level the 
importance of reasons justifying the restriction needs to be decided. Finally, the 
weighing in its narrow sense and actual meaning takes place. The most difficult 
cases of weighing are those in which either (i) the restriction and reasons for 
justifying the restriction are of similar significance or (ii) there is a fundamental 
discussion (e.g. of ideological or political nature) about the intensiveness of the 
restriction or the importance of its underlying justifications.172  
I think that placing our case of weighing the principle of social state against 
the right of entrepreneurship freedom into the broad frames of the above model 
is a difficult task. On one hand, the restriction to the right of entrepreneurship 
freedom can be seen as intensive because it limits the income level of service 
providers, thereby influencing the flexibility and other parameters of the service 
and increasing the potential for less consumer-friendly service. As indicated 
earlier, this would result in restricting the free self-performance of certain 
consumers. On the other hand, the reasons justifying the APRC limit derive 
from the societal need for greater consumer protection and this is undoubtedly 
an important reason for restricting the entrepreneurship freedom. Hence, both 
the consumer protection arguments as well as the arguments supporting 
entrepreneurship freedom present strong cases in the broad framework of 
weighing. From the narrower perspective, a key point for weighing is 
proportionality. One of the means for state intervention and the protection of 
individual rights is the principle of proportionality.173 A state must act in such a 
way as to ensure the liberties of individuals as the precondition for social state 
and simultaneously seek achieving social justice. Against this background, the 
role of the principle of proportionality serves as one of the criteria for weighing 
the public objectives and the respective restrictions of fundamental rights.174 
The principle of proportionality and assessing the compliance of the APRC 
limit to the Constitution on its basis will be addressed as follows. 
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3.3.4.3.2. The Principle of Proportionality and the APRC Limit 
The principle of proportionality is seen as one of the means for interpretation in 
the case of conflict between different fundamental rights. The uniformity of 
Constitution175 requires an optimal solution and therefore both rights need to be 
restricted for the benefit of the other party so as to find this optimum. In any 
case these restrictions must be proportionate, i.e. both rights can be restricted 
only so much as is necessary for achieving the conciliation of conflicting rights. 
Hence, proportionality is seen as a relation between different factors, aiming at 
suggesting the best way for optimizing both rights.176 The attribution of the role 
of a constitutional principle to the principle of proportionality as one of the 
elements of weighing is justified by the fact that fundamental rights restrict each 
other in order to be effective at all. Value-based argumentation facilitates 
emotions and existing politics to become part of legal interpretation. 
Simultaneously, the use of the principle of proportionality in the application of 
law assumes value judgement among others. Legal writing and case law have 
also used public interests and other similar considerations in defining 
proportionality.177 
The principle of proportionality in its narrow sense derives from its relation 
to the legally possible. If a constitutional rights norm as a principle competes 
with another principle, then the legal possibilities for realizing that norm depend 
on the competing principle.178 Since the effect of the principle of proportionality 
is not related to a concrete fundamental right but involves the whole range of 
fundamental freedoms, the principle aims at achieving suitable balance and 
promoting the principle of justice.179 The major differenece from public law in 
applying the principle of proportionality in private law is the conflict of 
interests in which both parties have fundamental rights which deserve protection 
and the state needs to find a reasonable solution for the conflict. Hence, the 
principle of proportionality in private law is expressed in fair balance between 
different fundamental rights.180  
In order to evaluate the proportionality of a measure, two aspects need to be 
considered: on one hand, it is necessary to examine the extent and intensiveness 
of the restriction of a constitutional right; on the other hand, the importance of 
the constitutional objective needs to be considered.181 A limitation of a 
constitutional right is only permissible if principles competing with the 
principle underlying the right have greater weight in the circumstances of the 
                                                                          
175 A principle which requires that a constitutional norm should be interpreted so that it 
would not conflict other constitutional norms. 
176 Martin Triipan, op.cit. note 151, at 307. 
177 Anneli Alekand, op.cit. note 121, 20. 
178 Robert Alexy, op.cit. note 122, 67. 
179 Martin Triipan, op.cit. note 151, at 306. 
180 Anneli Alekand, op.cit. note 121, 24–26. 
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case.182 A restriction is proportionate within its narrower meaning if its 
justification outweighs the restricted constitutional right. We have seen that the 
rule of thumb is that the more intensive restriction, the more serious justification 
is expected. This rule requires consideration between the restricted principle and 
the principles which justify the restriction. Thus, the consideration requires both 
argumentation and value judgement.183  
I have explained above that a constitutional right can be restricted by a legal 
act or a deed and the restriction may include normative obligations or pro-
hibitions. In our case, the freedom of business is limited for the purpose of con-
sumer protection. Affirming the need to ensure a good level of consumer 
protection, it is also important to ensure balance between the consumer protection 
measures and the commercial freedom of service providers. Therefore we need to 
evaluate whether the objective to protect retail borrowers by the application of the 
APRC limit and related measures stipulated in Art. 86 of the GPCCA outweighs 
the restriction of entrepreneurship freedom of electronic retail lenders.  
The Chancellor of Justice advises to analyse the issue from wider 
perspective, examining how the rights of electronic retail borrowers are 
protected in Estonia and to which extent these protection measures influence 
service providers. The wide approach is recommended because it allows to 
understand whether the consumer protection measures are utmost necessary and 
important or simply supplementary. Also, it enables to look at the restriction of 
commercial freedom of the participants on electronic retail lending market as a 
whole.184 The explanatory note to the amending act of the GPCCA and the LOA 
places the focus of the restriction on ensuring that those consumers who 
conclude unsecured loan transactions in small amounts and with short 
maturities via the means of distant communication would not have to bear 
excessive costs in relation to the loan transactions.185 There are also many legal 
requirements which aim at the protection of consumers in retail lending. In 
addition to the respective provisions of the GPCCA, a large share of the 
consumer protection rules are also stipulated in the LOA186. The core objective 
of these rules is to ensure the sufficient information of a consumer in order to 
make an adequate and well-informed decision regarding the conclusion and 
fulfillment of a loan agreement, including good understanding of his/her 
financial ability and appropriateness of the loan. When looking at all these 
provisions in their combination, it is clear that the position of retail borrowers 
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has been much strengthened due to significantly increased obligations of retail 
lenders. By complying with these obligations the lenders would contribute to 
more responsible and better informed lending. In return, the lenders who 
comply with their obligations can nevertheless not fully rely on the validity of 
their loan transactions.187 From this perspective it is clear that the uncertainty of 
lenders has increased. Here one should argue whether the increased uncertainty 
of service providers is proportionate in comparison to the advantages gained by 
the consumers through the APRC limit. My view is that such situation is 
disproportionate and therefore overly restrictive to the entrepreneurship freedom 
of service providers.  
The disproportionate nature of the restriction is expressed by the fact that 
even if electronic lenders provide consumers with the required information, 
follow all the rules for identification, advertising of SMS-loans and so on, they 
may nevertheless fail to prove in court that a transaction is not contrary to good 
morals. Providing evidence that a transaction was not concluded due to 
extraordinary circumstances and that all reasonable steps were taken to identify 
those circumstances upon the conclusion of the transaction is a challenging task. 
Moreover, the elements and extent of proof are much open to interpretation. 
Therefore there is a risk with every transaction exceeding the APRC limit that a 
lender is not sufficiently good at proving what is expected by the court, 
resulting in the voidance of the transaction and loss of expected business flow 
by the lender. Without any analysis of the market or particularities of this type 
of lending services, the law assumes that the nature of the lender’s business 
itself is contrary to good morals, regardless the law-obedient and proper 
behavior of the lender. Without giving any consideration to the generally high 
business cost and risk level of this type of lending, the self-standing restriction 
which looks at only one parameter decreases the certainty and business potential 
related to electronic retail lending. This means that the business ability as well 
as competitiveness of this sector is decreased, too. The decrease in 
competitiveness limits the alternatives for consumers and cannot be therefore 
considered a positive aspect from their perspective. Moreover, such deterio-
ration in the potential access and flexibility to conclude lending contracts may 
be seen as a limitation to the fundamental right of free self-performance of 
consumers. Thus, one can conclude that the promotion of increased uncertainty 
to the given extent as well as the negative impact on competitiveness are 
disproportionate in comparison to the improved consumer protection which has 
been anyhow regularly ensured by various other legal regulations. 
The Chancellor of Justice has similarly taken the view that the APRC limit 
disproportionately restricts the entrepreneurship freedom of service providers 
and contradicts the Constitution. The market of electronic retail loans is a 
competitive market with about 20 active market participants and respective 
price differences which much depend on the size and length of loan. Normally 
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the loans with shorter maturities are more expensive. In any case, the market of 
unsecured electronic retail lending has such business cost levels that the APRC 
of even the least expensive short term loan is much higher than the average rate 
of the Bank of Estonia as stipulated in Art. 86 of the GPCCA.188 As electronic 
retail loans are offered on free competitive market where service providers 
include the regular costs of their business as well as expected margins into the 
pricing of their products as in any other field of business, it is wrong to assume 
that a loan granted on such a market at a respective market rate is contrary to 
good morals. Electronic retail loans, similar to other products and services, have 
economic value. Market competition in this field would ensure the widest 
possible range of products and prices which reflect their economic value 
(market rate). If an electronic lender grants credit at the respective market rate 
and meets the legal obligations of honest and adequate information provision to 
a consumer, including information about the relative expensiveness of the 
offered credit, and the consumer nevertheless accepts the credit, it is the 
informed responsibility of the consumer. The rights of electronic retail lenders 
are overly restricted by the regulation which assumes voidance of such properly 
informed transactions and places significant burden of proof to the lender whose 
failure to meet the obligation of proof would result in the entitlement only to 
legal interest for the use of credit.189 
Last but not least, an important point in the note of the Chancellor of Justice 
coincides with my previous opinion that the market of electronic retail loans 
was not analysed in the course of imposing the APRC limit although it would 
have been necessary. In imposing the restriction no consideration was given to 
the fact that the above-average expensiveness of this type of services has the 
strong likelihood for economic reasons and it derives from the particularities of 
such loans (short maturities, high risk level, small loan amounts, etc). Without 
taking any of these aspects into account, the adopted rules assume the 
contradiction of a market-priced electronic retail loan to good morals, also 
placing a significant burden of proof to electronic lenders and imposing a threat 
of legal interest instead of contractually agreed rate.190 
The official stand of the Chancellor of Justice is a thorough analytical 
document which supports the conclusion of this thesis. There are 3 aspects in 
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which I have some criticism towards this document. First, the issue of contra-
diction between the principle of social state and the right of entrepreneurship 
freedom has not been analysed. Secondly, the document does not give considera-
tion to the impact of the APRC restriction through potential deterioration of the 
access and flexibility of SMS-lending services which could consequently, in 
parallel to restricting the right of entrepreneurship freedom, become a restriction 
to free self-performance (including the freedom of contract) of certain part of 
SMS-borrowers. These two are the issues which I have already addressed in this 
research. Last, the Chancellor of Justice does not unfortunately provide any 
comparative aspect to the situation and legal framework in other EU countries. 
To make this Chapter more comprehensive and put the discussion related to the 
APRC limit in Estonia into EU-wide perspective, I will conclude by providing a 
brief overview of the situation regarding limiting the cost of credit in other EU 
countries. The following comparative view is mostly based on the information 
gained from the study on interest rate restrictions in the EU191 which among 
others analyses the interest rate restrictions in all EU member states, provides 
details about which regulatory structures are in place as regards interest rate 
ceilings and discusses legal interest rate restrictions as interventions in the 
market with an effect on competition and welfare.  
The overall situation in the EU is such that the member states can be divided 
in 2 rather equally sized groups according to their framework and practices: 
those who have some interest rate restrictions in place (either absolute or 
relative) and those who do not have any restrictions. In those EU member states 
where there are no rates in place, the absence of such regulations is justified 
mainly with the fact that interest rate restrictions would reduce access to credit, 
especially for people with moderate financial means. In those EU states where 
there are interest rate restrictions in place, the major concern is to avoid the 
increased consumer insolvency and the disfunctioning of markets due to high-
rate credit. 15 member states have some form of interest rate restriction. In the 
majority of cases (11 countries, including Estonia192) it is a relative restriction 
and based on some reference rate or other variable. Such relative restrictions 
very much vary in different member states. For example, the restrictions can be 
related to average market rate and calculated as a multiple of that rate (e.g. 1/3 
of average market rate in France and Portugal, 1/5 average market rate in Italy, 
etc) or money market rate (e.g. 4 times money market rate in Poland). In 
Estonia and Germany the ceilings are de facto ceilings193. The restriction in all 
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these countries, except for Spain, is provided in the form of the APRC limit. In 
most countries with interest rate restrictions the concept of “usurious lending” 
or “unfair credit” is linked to the interest rate charged and taking advantage of 
the borrower. In the member states such as Italy, Malta and Denmark the 
concept is used more indirectly in the context of criminal lending. The concept 
may also be simply applied to high-priced loans (e.g. in Portugal, France, 
Belgium, Spain, Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Ireland, the 
UK and in German case law). 194 In 4 countries (Greece, Ireland, Malta and 
Italy) the interest rate restrictions are absolute with their application limited to 
specific types of credit provider or place significant limitations on their 
scope195. In the remaining 12 EU countries196 there are no restrictions that would 
limit the amount of contractual interest under a typical credit agreement.197 
When looking at the future perspective of those countries which currently do 
not have interest rate restrictions in place and asking whether any such 
restrictions would be likely introduced in the future, it certainly depends much 
on political will. There are political discussions especially topical in the UK 
where there have been a number of attempts by consumer advocates to 
introduce interest rate ceilings, including the submission of the respective 
amendments during the adoption of 2010 Financial Services Act. However, 
these amendments were not adopted and instead the Office of Fair Trading (the 
OFT)198 was commissioned to review the situation as part of a wider review of 
high-cost credit markets.199 In addition to political reasons, the potential for 
introducing interest rate restrictions also depends on the development of 
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consumer credit in a particular country. For example, since 2009 there has been 
a respective debate in Denmark which has historically not favoured setting 
restrictions to interest rates. The discussion in Denmark started due to the 
declaration of the Government’s opposition which announced that it would 
submit a bill to introduce an interest rate cap corresponding to the central bank 
base rate plus 15 percentage points. The bill was not submitted but the 
discussion was reopened in February 2010 by the Danish Consumer Council 
which expressed a wish to have interest rates legally restricted.200 
To conclude, it must be said that it is important to protect consumers but it is 
similarly important to protect the entrepreneurship freedom of service providers. 
As I stated also in the articles contained in this compilation I do not favour the 
overly restrictive situation where consumer protection much outweighs the 
freedom of service providers. I think that the APRC limit in its current legal 
form does respond to consumer protection needs but it does not contribute to a 
balanced solution. Most of the related problems I have addressed in this thesis 
and in its base articles. The solution was adopted without a proper ex-ante 
analysis201, including the lack of analysis on the availability of credit to different 
population groups. This is particularly important because analyses have shown 
that the lack of high-rate loans reduces credit access to those parts of the 
population which are considered to be high-risk and which demand small 
amounts of loan202. The lack of analytical basis is somewhat unusual for such a 
fundamental legal change. I fully support the rules against usurious practice for 
consumer protection purposes such as stipulated in Art 86 (2) of the GPCCA 
because there can always be cases where a consumer, although properly 
informed by the lender, is forced to take a loan (e.g. for the payment of medical 
fees, etc) and is therefore exposed to the influence on behalf of the lender. 
However, I think that Art 86 (3) of the GPCCA, and moreover so its adoption 
without a proper economic rationale, is stretching consumer protection too far 
on the account of entrepreneurship freedom of service providers and potentially 
also on the indirect account of contractual freedom of some other consumers. 
As I have suggested earlier in the articles contained in this compilation, I 
favour high information, disclosure and prudent marketing requirements for 
achieving regulatory balance instead of limiting the cost of lending through a 
legal limit. I consider well-informed decisions to be the core of electronic retail 
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lending business because with sufficient information consumers would be able 
to bear the responsibility for their decisions which the legislators have so far 
ruled out. I believe that much more focus should be put on the responsibility of 
consumers for their decisions as long as they have been properly informed. This 
would help balance the proportionality of consumer protection means in the 
light of ensuring sufficient entrepreneurship freedom for service providers. 
Naturally it would be easier to adopt and monitor the restrictions in the form of 
the APRC limit, but simply restricting without much focus on increasing the 
awareness of consumers would not change the general attitude of consumers 
whilst there will nevertheless be circumventions of rules by service providers 
due to heavy restrictions. The need for better information as one of the 
regulatory alternatives also derives from the lessons learned from the study 
which suggests that circumventions with the effect of high-price credit would 
occur irrespective of the existence of interest rate restrictions and therefore 
improved EU regulation on price disclosure including all price elements which 
burden the borrower would be of help in clarifying the impacts.203 
 
 
3.4. Other Relevant Issues 
We have seen that all the three articles compiled in this dissertation discuss the 
issues related to the innovation of financial services, combining it either with 
product specifics, consumer protection or the perspective of service providers. 
In addition to the major recent developments which I have addressed above, 
there are also a couple of smaller issues raised in the articles which have faced 
some developments and a couple of points which are just interesting to mention 
against the background of the articles. Accordingly, in this chapter I shall 
briefly look at four issues under the joint “umbrella”. I will start with the 
developments regarding the application of identification rules deriving from the 
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Prevention Act, examining a couple 
of court cases, the interpretations and views that Tallinn District Court has taken 
regarding the requirement of face to face identification. This will be followed 
by a brief introduction to a decision of the Supreme Court from the beginning of 
2010 which clearly identifies the boundaries between interest and penalties 
claims in relation to the due date of a loan. This court decision relates to the 
legal treatment of penalties covered in the second article of this compilation. 
Thereafter I shall address some pieces of administrative case law by the 
Supreme Court of Estonia which I came across in my follow-up research and 
which support the views presented in the third article of this dissertation with 
regard to the principle of effectiveness. Last but not least, I shall present a few 
interesting recent viewpoints of the Supreme Court as regards the interpretation 
of the scope of the burden of proof in relation to Art 86 of the GPCCA. 
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Developments regarding the application of identification rules 
Having earlier introduced the revised legal fabric of client identification rules I 
explained that from January 2008 all lenders became obliged to identify face to 
face all persons with whom they have had no earlier business relations204. Since 
most electronic retail lenders were used to doing their business, including 
identification, from distance at the time, they did not have proper identification 
systems in place. Also, the revised identification rules brought a discussion of 
whether these rules should be indeed applicable to small-scale lenders because 
within the meaning of the Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing 
Prevention Act the identification was first and foremost seen mandatory from 
the perspective of combating money laundering and terrorist financing. Against 
this background, some non-bank electronic lenders continued the practice of 
distant identification, claiming that the earlier face to face identification of their 
clients by a bank in the course of creating an electronic banking ID which the 
clients then used for obtaining an electronic loan from the non-bank lender 
without actually meeting the lender face to face would mean that the 
identification obligation has nevertheless been fulfilled. Some lenders, on the 
other hand, concluded identification contracts with courier service providers and 
postal offices which would identify their clients on their behalf face to face 
before entering into lending transaction. These contradicting practices were met 
by the Money Laundering Data Bureau with the issuing of precepts which in 
turn were contested by electronic retail lenders in courts. Following, I will 
address some administrative cases of Tallinn District Court to explain which 
positions have been taken in the interpretation of the identification rules and the 
practice of electronic retail lenders in Estonia.  
The case 3-08-1771205 is about defining the nature and scope of face to face 
identification obligation. The case concerns the second-level court decision 
regarding the appeal of Ferratum Estonia OÜ (hereinafter Ferratum) to annul 
the precept of the Money Laundering Data Bureau and a respective first-level 
court decision which requires the revision of the identification procedures of 
Ferratum and the conclusion of lending transactions only with those clients 
whose identification has been done properly. The proper identification 
procedure derives from Article 23 (1) and (2) of the Money Laundering and 
Terrorist Financing Prevention Act: the lender identifies the client on the basis 
of his/her identification document and makes a copy of the page with personal 
data of the identification document. Thus, the rules expect the presence of 
identifying person and the person to be identified in the same place. As the 
nature of identification obligation is regarded, Tallinn District Court has in its 
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earlier decision regarding administrative case 3-08-1220206 taken a view that the 
provisions of face to face identification obligation (i.e. Article 15 (1) of the 
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Prevention Act) are imperative and 
allow no deviation. Thus, lenders can not choose the ways of identification of 
their first-time clients and leave the identification to be done from distance. 
Tallinn District Court takes the similar position in the case of Ferratum. 
As the scope of identification obligation is regarded, the case of Ferratum 
concerns the possible retrospective application of the Money Laundering and 
Terrorist Financing Prevention Act. We have seen that until 28 January 2008 
the act did not consist of such provisions which would have required face to 
face identification of first-time clients. The earlier rules too provided for 
identification obligation upon the establishment of any business relation but 
there was no requirement for the presence of both the lender and the client in 
the same place during the identification. The precept of the Money Laundering 
Data Bureau required Ferratum to identify face to face all the clients to whom 
Ferratum provided electronic retail lending services, regardless the fact that 
Ferratum had identified these clients in the course of its earlier business before 
the face to face identification rules came into effect. The Money Laundering 
Data Bureau found that Ferratum had identified these clients earlier without the 
presence in the same place and therefore Ferratum should not continue with the 
provision of services unless repeating the identification according to face to face 
principle. Such requirement would mean that Ferratum should identify all 
existing clients again upon the granting of a new loan. The identification rules 
prior to 28 January 2008 did not include imperative obligation of face to face 
identification while the rules effective from 28 January 2008 contain imperative 
identification obligation with regard to the conclusion of first-time business 
relations. Thus, the new rules are not applicable and the precept and the 
respective first-level court decision with regard to the business of Ferratum 
don’t have legal grounds. The decision of Tallinn District Court, annulling the 
first-level court decision and respectively ruling for Ferratum, became effective 
on 31 December 2009. 
In its decision regarding administrative case 3-08-1220207 Tallinn District 
Court has among others evaluated the contradiction of face to face identification 
obligation to constitutional rights. The case concerns the second-level court 
decision regarding the appeal of the Money Laundering Data Bureau to annul 
the first-level court decision which ruled for Monetti AS (hereinafter Monetti) 
and annulled the precept of the Money Laundering Data Bureau. According to 
the precept Monetti had not identified its clients face to face upon the first-time 
business contact and made copies of their identification documents when 
granting electronic retail loans. Monetti, on the other hand, claimed that these 
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rules pose unreasonable obstacles to its normal business and are respectively in 
contradiction to constitutional rights, more precisely with the freedom of 
entrepreneurship stipulated in Article 31 of the Constitution. An electronic retail 
loan is a flexible but sufficiently expensive financing service. If Monetti were to 
outsource the face to face identification, it would significantly reduce the 
flexibility and respectively the demand for the service. Also, it would not be 
possible any longer to provide the service profitably. Another argument of 
Monetti was that the application of such identification obligation to electronic 
retail lenders is not in accordance with the objectives of this provision. These 
identification rules have been established to minimize the risk of money 
laundering and terrorist financing. Lending in small amounts to private 
individuals does not belong to the risk group of money laundering and it would 
not be reasonably possible to organize money laundering through such 
transactions. Also, such identification obligation is disproportionate because the 
gain of state authorities from the formal application of this requirement would 
not exceed the harm to the service provider deriving from the limitation of 
economic activity. 
In designing its position regarding the case of Monetti, Tallinn District Court 
asked for the opinion of the Ministry of Finance of Estonia who has developed 
the new identification rules. To summarise the major points of the Ministry of 
Finance in support of the court decision, they are related to the protection of the 
stability of financial sector and economy as a whole. First, the misuse of 
financial sector entities for the purposes of money laundering and terrorist 
financing would clearly endanger the functioning, stability and reputation of 
financial system. Thus, the need for the application of identification measures is 
not derived only from the need for fighting with criminal activities but also 
from the need for protecting the reliability of the economic environment as a 
whole. Secondly, the identification obligation stipulated in Article 15 (1) of the 
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Prevention Act has an imperative 
nature and the subjects of the obligation have to act accordingly. The third point 
of the Ministry of Finance explains that the purpose of such regulation is to 
avoid the higher risks entailed in the establishment of business relations via the 
means of communication. The providers of financial services must be able to be 
convinced that their services meet the actual needs of the client and the business 
relation to be established would not harm the reputation of the service provider 
or its other clients. In the establishment of a business relation via the means of 
communication it would not be possible to apply the principle of “know your 
customer”. Direct contact would enable obtaining information about the 
personal characteristics which wouldn’t be identifiable via the means of distant 
communication (e.g. appearance, manner of behaviour, etc). Also, direct contact 
would make it possible to compare the identification document with the 
person’s appearance, reducing the risk of anonymous or false identification. Last 
but not least, the Ministry of Finance pointed out that in its nature electronic retail 
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lending (SMS-lending) is the service of anonymity risk, enabling to obtain 
monetary resources on the basis of false identification rather easily. 
With its decision regarding the case of Monetti, Tallinn District Court did 
not rule for the appeal of Monetti but left the precept of the Money Laundering 
Data Bureau and the respective first-level court decision in effect. The district 
court found that the identification obligation is not in contradiction with the 
Constitution. The objective of the Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing 
Prevention Act is to prevent the channeling of funds derived from criminal 
activities to be used for terrorist or other criminal purposes. The system of 
preventative objectives has been created to protect the reliability of financial 
sector and economic sphere as a whole in Estonia. The requirements for 
sufficient care in identification are the central means for achieving the 
objectives of the law. The need for exercising sufficient care does not only 
derive from the need for preventing criminal activity but also from the need to 
protect the financial sector and the economic environment of Estonia.  
The purpose of applying the requirements for sufficient care in identification 
is to avoid the anonymity of transactions which has expanded rapidly together 
with globalization and more active use of communication means for the 
conclusion of transactions. The wide use of the means of information 
technology and the establishment of business relations without direct contact 
would create the risks of money laundering and terrorist financing. These are 
considered dangerous crimes and therefore the prevention of such crimes is seen 
as the dominant public interest which gives enough grounds for limiting the 
rights of persons, including basic constitutional rights. Due to higher risk profile 
of the activities of credit and financing institutions the law prescribes stricter 
identification obligations, aiming at reducing the risks which derive from the 
provision of financial services through the means of information technology. 
The establishment of business relations via the means of communication would 
not enable sufficient identification of client’s risk profile. Thus, the face to face 
identification rules decrease the possibilities for mistakes such as using false 
identity in the conclusion of transactions and ensure the reliability of the 
markets for financial services. The identification requirements are the same for 
all lenders and the denial for making an exception to Monetti as a non-bank 
electronic retail lender can not be seen as the disproportionate limitation of 
Monetti’s freedom of entrepreneurship.208 
 
Interest and penalty claims after the due date 
In the article “Legal Problems with Electronic Retail Loans: Balancing the 
Freedom of Contract and the Protection of Consumers – The Case of Estonia” I 
have explained the legal possibilities and positions which the Supreme Court 
has taken in relation to the claims for high interest rates and penalties. We have 
                                                                          
208  Tallinn District Court decision in administrative case 3-08-1220, op.cit. note 206. The 
decision became effective by the 25 June 2009 case 7-1-3-238-09 of the Supreme Court.  
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seen that different from interest rates, the usurious practice against good morals 
in relation to unreasonably high penalties can be solved through the request of 
decreasing penalties, thereby contradicting the claim for the payment of 
penalties in certain amount. In addition to contradicting the payment of 
penalties, it is possible to contradict the payment of interest. The above referred 
article explains that this relates to the situations where the due date of payment 
obligations has arrived. The Supreme Court has repeated such a view in its 
respective decision on 27 January 2010209 with reference to its similar earlier 
decision from 2007. Due to imperative restrictions of the LOA, the obligation to 
pay interest ends upon the denouncement of loan agreement. The Supreme 
Court states that it is not possible to claim interest as damage for the period on 
which the lender lost the possibility to gain profit through the interest. Starting 
from the claim under a loan agreement falling due, the calculation of interest 
loses its legal grounds and thereafter it is only possible to calculate penalties or 
damages for delaying with the repayment of loan amount.210 
 
The principle of effectiveness in Estonian case law 
When it comes to the principle of effectiveness, the article “Electronic Retail 
Lending in Estonia: Legal Limits on the Cost of Credit” takes guidance from the 
interpretations established by the ECJ. Although Estonian courts have not 
clearly applied the principle of effectiveness in civil cases, there are 2 
administrative cases in which Estonian Supreme Court applies respective EU 
case law and thereby addresses the principle of effectiveness. I came across 
these administrative cases in the follow-up research for this compilation and 
found them significant to support the views of the above referred article 
regarding the identification of the scope of burden of proof through the principle 
of effectiveness. 
In administrative case 3-3-1-79-08211 the Supreme Court of Estonia evaluates 
the compliance of Estonian environmental support rules with the principles of 
effectiveness and proportionality, seeking respective support from the case law 
of the ECJ. Respectively, the case law states that the sanctioning system 
established by a member state on the basis of EU law must comply both with 
the principles of effectiveness and proportionality. On several occasions the 
ECJ has highlighted that although according to the principle of procedural 
autonomy member states have to impose in their national laws the procedural 
rules for the protection of person’s rights deriving from the Community law, the 
national rules should not make the use of rights deriving from the Community 
                                                                          
209 See the Supreme Court 27 January 2010 decision in civil case 3-2-1-153-09, RT III 
(2010) No. 6, 42. 
210 The Supreme Court decision in civil case 3-2-1-153-09, op.cit. note 208, Sec. 25 and the 
Supreme Court decision in civil case 3-2-1-137-06, op.cit. note 48, Sec 17. 
211 The Supreme Court 11 February 2009 decision in administrative case 3-3-1-79-08, RT III 
(2009) No. 8, 52, Sec 14, 15 and 20. 
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law practically impossible or overly difficult. Thus, the realization of rights and 
the presentation of claims need to be possible in practical terms in order to 
comply with the principle of effectiveness. In its decision the Supreme Court 
links this statement of the principle of effectiveness to the ECJ decisions in 
cases C-430/93, C-431/93 and C-53/04. The principle of effectiveness is also 
briefly dealt with in administrative case 3-3-1-86-07212 whereby the Supreme 
Court of Estonia finds that such national publication of the provisions of 
Community law which provides less legal certainty than the publication of the 
provisions in the Official Journal contradicts the principle of effectiveness. In 
our context of identifying the scope of the lender’s burden of proof these 
interpretations support the suggestion provided in the above referred article: 
anything beyond normal and reasonable course of particular service provision 
would not be in compliance with the principle of effectiveness. Thus, at a 
minimum, the lender should prove the identification of a borrower profile and 
that necessary care has been exercised in such identification. 
 
Burden of proof in relation to Art 86 of the GPCCA 
In the third article contained in this compilation I have made suggestions for 
interpreting the extent of the lender’s burden of proof in case of loan 
agreements exceeding the legal APRC limit. As one of the solutions, I have 
suggested using the principles of reasonableness and effectiveness as the 
possible starting points for defining what should be proved as the measure of 
good morals. Using the principle of reasonableness as a borderline for 
transactions which comply with good morals has been also suggested in legal 
writing in Estonia. According to Kull, the sense of propriety of a just and fair 
person is seen as the measure of good morals. Hence, the interpretation of 
contractual provisions is done according to what a fair person would think is 
proper and reasonable in a particular situation.213 I have explained that due to 
switch in the burden of proof defining the scope of the burden of proof and the 
respective ideas for guiding the interpretation are a major issue in relation to 
applying the effective Art 86 (3) of the GPCCA.  
Very recently the Supreme Court has adopted a ruling with regard to Arts. 86 
(2) and (3) of the GPCCA, providing some guidance to courts in interpreting the 
scope and contents of the burden of proof214. As this ruling fits well into the 
analysis provided in this research, I will conclude this Chapter by introducing 
some of the key points made by the Supreme Court.  
According to the Supreme Court, courts are required to identify the 
assumptions for the application of Art 86 of the GPCCA. If the value of mutual 
                                                                          
212 The Supreme Court 7 May 2008 decision in administrative case 3-3-1-86-07, RT III 
(2008) No. 21, 147, Sec 49. 
213 Irene Kull, “Principle of Good Faith and Constitutional Values in Contract Law“, 
Juridica International No 7 (2002), 145. 
214 The Supreme Court 17 June 2011 ruling in civil case 3-2-1-49-11, op.cit. note 42.  
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obligations deriving from a transaction is out of balance to the extent which is 
contrary to good morals, the assumption on the basis of Art 86 (3) is that a party 
knew or had to know about the extraordinary need, dependence, inexperience or 
other such circumstances of the other party. Hence, in order to identify the 
invalidity of the transaction as contrary to good morals according to Art 86 (2) 2 
and (3) courts always need to give legal evaluation to 3 aspects as follows. 
 
1) Courts should identify whether the value of mutual performance deriving 
from a transaction is unbalanced to the extent which is contrary to good morals. 
The general rule is that the unbalanced value of mutual obligations to the 
extent which is contrary to good morals must be proved by the party whose 
claim is based on the invalidity of a transaction.215 In order to prove the 
difference between the values of mutual performance the party must show the 
difference between the objective values of comparable performance. This means 
that the party must show the usual equivalent of the transaction in question in 
regular business, not the subjective interest of one contractual party in the value 
of the transaction.  
According to Art 86 (3) the burden of proof is reversed in case of consumer 
credit agreements in favour of the party whose claim is based on the invalidity 
of a transaction, assuming contradiction to good morals if the APRC exceeds 3 
times the average cost of consumer credits as provided in the commercial 
banking statistics of the Bank of Estonia at the time of concluding the 
transaction in question. Here it is important to draw attention to 2 rules which 
the Supreme Court highlights regarding proof: 
(i) a party whose claim is based on the invalidity of a transaction may present 
the circumstances indicating that the value of the performance of parties is 
disproportionately unbalanced to extent which is contrary to good morals 
even if the APRC of the transaction is below the legal limit; 
(ii) in return, according to the principle of the freedom of contract the other 
party could prove that the difference between the values of performance 
was not important for contractual parties and therefore such APRC which 
exceeds the limit stipulated in Art 86 (3) of the GPCCA is not contrary to 
good morals.216 
 
These rules are basically the repetition of the basic principles which the 
Supreme Court has earlier used in interpreting the invalidity of transactions as 
contrary to good morals and which we have discussed in the articles contained 
in this compilation. In declaring a transaction void, the Supreme Court has 
continuously followed the interpretation rules of Art 29 of the LOA. Such 
                                                                          
215 According to Art 230 (1) of the Code of Civil Procedure a party whose claim is based on 
the invalidity of the transaction bears the burden of proof. See Tsiviilkohtumenetluse 
seadustik, signed 20 April 2005, Riigi Teataja (RT) I (2005) No. 26, 197; 21.04.2011, No. 17 
(in Estonian). 
216 The Supreme Court 17 June 2011 ruling in civil case 3-2-1-49-11, op.cit. note 42, Sec 8. 
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aspects as unfavourable contractual conditions (e.g. high interest rate), a 
difficult situation of one party upon the conclusion of the contract (e.g. 
involuntary situation where there are no choices available) and the usurious 
behaviour of one contractual party (e.g. taking advantage of the involuntary 
situation of the other party) may indicate the possibility of contradiction to good 
morals. These positions of the Supreme Court have maintained their topicality 
because the primary effect of the establishment of the APRC limit was the 
reversed burden of proof.217 Thus, the principles that any transaction should be 
looked at as a whole and the excessively high cost rate alone is not the sufficient 
reason for declaring any transaction contrary to good morals and therefore void 
are still valid in case law. 
  
2)  Courts should control whether a party concluded a transaction in involuntary 
situation and has proved at least one of the assumptions indicating his/her 
involuntary situation218 as stipulated in Art 86 (2). 
In addition to difference between the values of performance, the invalidity of 
a transaction according to Art 86 (2) and (3) presumes that one of the parties 
has concluded the transaction due to his/her extraordinary need, dependence, 
inexperience or other such situation. This indication of the Supreme Court 
regarding the need to check the proof of involuntary situation means that 
regardless the lender’s burden of proof the borrower is always expected to 
prove that he/she was in involuntary situation and entered into the transaction in 
question due to that. In this light it can be concluded that the ex officio 
application of the provisions of Art 86 towards the borrower is ruled out 
because courts should always control whether the borrower has proved his/her 
involuntary situation and therefore it is not possible to make a court decision 
without involving the borrower. From the borrower’s perspective the problem 
with such approach is mainly related to proving his/her inexperience, should the 
borrower base his/her objections on this aspect. In practical terms it is very 
difficult to provide proof of inexperience. However, without such proof it is not 
possible to identify the invalidity of the transaction. 
 
It is also important to point out that the Supreme Court suggests that: 
(i) the contradiction of a transaction to good morals should be denied if there 
was no involuntary situation of a party although the difference between the 
values of mutual performance was significant; the reasoning is that in such a 
                                                                          
217 Irene Kull et al, op.cit. note 87, at 563. 
218 The same ruling states that the more unbalanced the value of the mutual obligations ir or 
the more disadvantageous the conditions of a transaction are, the less reason there is to 
believe that a reasonable person would have concluded such a transaction without being in 
involuntary situation. However, this does not mean that a person whose claim is based on the 
invalidity of a transaction would be released from the obligation to prove his/her involuntary 
situation.  
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case it can be assumed that the value of the transaction was not important 
for the party; 
(ii) inexperience cannot be excluded only on the basis of proper education level 
or the purpose of a loan.219 
 
The first one of these rules again repeats the principles of earlier case law of the 
Supreme Court which provides that in determining the contradiction to good 
morals the circumstances such as extremely unfavourable conditions, 
dependence or taking advantage of the other party must be present.220 The 
second rule relates to the concept of inexperience which is a questionable 
category to prove. In the sample checklist provided in the article “Electronic 
Retail Lending in Estonia: Legal Limits on the Cost of Credit” such element as 
“earlier experience with loans” has been suggested to be asked from the 
borrower in order to be able to learn more about the ability of the borrower to 
understand the nature of loans and his/her potential inexperience. This should 
help lenders comply with the obligation of necessary care as the identification 
of experience of the borrower is regarded. 
 
3)  Courts should identify whether a gaining party knew about the extraordinary 
need, dependence, inexperience or other such situation of the other party.  
Here an important aspect is that this provision also includes such situations 
in which the gaining party does not actively promote the conclusion of a 
contract taking advantage of the involuntary situation of the other party but 
nevertheless does not pay attention to the situation of the other party in the 
conclusion of the contract. Again, as a general rule in the application of Art 86 
(2) a party whose claim is based on the invalidity of a transaction needs to prove 
that the other party knew or had to know about his/her involuntary situation. Art 
86 (3) reverses the burden of proof for the advantage of the party whose claim is 
based on the invalidity of a transaction as regards proving that a gaining party 
knew or had to know about the involuntary situation of the other party. Thus, 
the person interested in the validity of a transaction (i.e. the lender) must prove 
that he did not or could not know about any such situation. Here it is interesting 
to note that the Supreme Court highlights the expectation of higher care from 
those lenders who conduct lending transactions as their daily business, 
indicating that such measures as thoroughness of a credit questionnaire, answers 
provided by the borrower and individual conversations between parties could be 
used in determining the sufficient care of lenders in evaluating the potential 
involuntary situation of the borrower on ad hoc basis.221 
                                                                          
219 The Supreme Court 17 June 2011 ruling in civil case 3-2-1-49-11, op.cit. note 42, Sec 8-
9 
220  See the Supreme Court decision in civil case 3-2-1-80-02, op.cit. note 44, Sec 11 and the 
Supreme Court decision in civil case 3-2-1-108-02, op.cit. note 44, Sec 11. 
221 The Supreme Court 17 June 2011 ruling in civil case 3-2-1-49-11, op.cit. note 42, Sec 
10. 
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With reference to questionnaires and conversations between the parties the 
Supreme Court provides some guidance as to what type of measures and 
documents can be considered acceptable by courts in proving the exercise of 
necessary care on behalf of lenders. Naturally the list is indicative and serves as 
an example but in any case it provides some clarification to market participants 
as well as courts in respect of what is expected in terms of lenders’ burden of 






The research contained in this compilation of articles and analysis constituting 
this dissertation aim at proving that 1) consumer protection is maintained in the 
provision of loan-linked prepaid card services, 2) the requirements for client 
identification and limiting the annual percentage rate of charge (APRC) are the 
major bottlenecks in balancing the protection of consumers and entrepreneur-
ship freedom in the regulation of electronic retail lending in Estonia, 
3) respectively, the APRC limit disproportionately restricts the constitutional 
rights of service providers. In the course of this research I have come to the 
following conclusions. 
 
1. The provision of electronic retail lending services in combination with 
prepaid cards does not deteriorate the level of consumer protection because 
of public law restrictions applicable to the card issuers as supervised 
regulated entities. The issuer of a loan-linked card meets the criterion of e-
money, being subject to licensing, prudential rules and supervision also 
across borders. An issuer from a member state or an EEA country can 
provide services in Estonia based on the authorization of its home country, 
acting via a branch or cross-border services, or establish a separately 
licensed subsidiary. An issuer from a third non-EU/EEA country can provide 
services by establishing a branch or rendering cross-border services on the 
basis of a respective license from the Estonian Financial Supervision 
Authority, or establish a separately licensed subsidiary in Estonia.  
 
2. Existing requirements for customer identification in electronic retail lending 
(i.e. face to face identification of all first-time customers), effective from 
early 2008, is a good step towards more responsible electronic retail lending 
but it also makes the business less flexible for service providers. The initial 
conclusion drawn from the research was that the identification rules may 
somewhat hinder the freedom to provide electronic lending services. The 
major concern related to these rules was that they first and foremost aim at 
preventing money laundering. Respectively, the application of these 
identification rules to electronic retail lenders led to court actions which 
were initiated on behalf of some electronic retail lenders during the 
preparation of research. The court actions were mainly based on the 
justification that the rules pose unreasonable obstacles to the freedom to 
provide services and are disproportionate because small-scale retail loans 
contain no potential for money laundering or terrorist financing. The follow-
up analysis of the case law showed that the purpose of the identification 
rules is to avoid the anonymity of transactions which would facilitate the 
risks of money laundering and terrorist financing. The prevention of such 
dangerous crimes gives grounds for limiting the rights of persons regardless 
the nature of their business, including the rights of small-scale electronic 
79 
lenders. Respectively, this part of thesis statement cannot be verified and the 
identification rules in their existing form are justified.  
 
3. The APRC limit is a major bottleneck among other important consumer 
protection measures such as extended consumer information, marketing 
requirements, interest rate presentation and client identification requirements 
applied in the field of electronic retail lending. On 1st May 2009 the grounds 
for void transactions became wider and a relative upper limit was set to the 
APRC, accompanied by the shift in the burden of proof. In case of consumer 
credit, the unbalanced value of mutual obligations to the extent which is 
contrary to good morals is assumed if the APRC exceeds 3 times the average 
cost of consumer credits as provided in the commercial banking statistics of 
the Bank of Estonia at transaction date. The APRC limit is “soft” in its 
nature and a lender may choose to exceed it. In such a case the lender may 
face a situation where the borrower argues that the transaction is contrary to 
good morals and the lender is obliged to bear the burden of proof in 
determining that it is not. Different from earlier situation, courts can now 
evaluate the validity of a loan agreement without the request from a party. 
One of the starting points for identifying the scope of the lender’s burden of 
proof is basing the interpretation on the principles of reasonableness and 
effectiveness. The principle of reasonableness refers to the perception of a 
reasonable man. Respectively, the lender should ensure the understanding 
and willingness of the consumer with regard to the lending transaction, and 
be convinced about his/her repayment ability. The principle of effectiveness 
indicates that the fulfillment of the obligation of proof must not be overly 
difficult or impossible for a party. Respectively, the lender’s burden of proof 
should at a minimum include the proper identification of a borrower profile, 
including identification of the purpose of loan, the borrower’s earlier 
experience with loans, education, profession, income, assets, obligations, 
payment discipline and repayment sources. The undefined wide scope of the 
obligation of proof is what makes the APRC limit a bottleneck and facilitates 
the discussion of potential constitutional non-compliance of the APRC limit. 
 
4. The APRC limit in its current legal form does respond to consumer pro-
tection needs but it does not contribute to a balanced solution. The APRC 
limit disproportionately restricts the constitutionally protected right of entre-
preneurship freedom of service providers. In weighing the proportionality of 
the restriction, an important issue is the conflict between the principle of 
social state and the fundamental right of entrepreneurship freedom. The idea 
of a social state is based on the assumption that a state has to seek social 
balance and protect those who cannot directly influence the proper ensuring 
of their fundamental rights. Consumer rights are not directly social funda-
mental rights but consumers are a weaker party in electronic retail lending 
and therefore deserve attention on behalf of the state to avoid their excessive 
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dependence on high-rate credit and electronic lenders. However, regardless 
the principle of social state, the restriction in the form of existing APRC 
limit is overly restrictive and the following reasons outweigh the consumer 
protection purposes.  
First, the APRC limit is overly intensive because it limits the lawful 
income level of service providers, thereby decreasing economically 
reasonable exercise of entrepreneurship freedom. Even if electronic lenders 
provide consumers with the required information and follow all other legal 
rules, they may nevertheless fail to prove in court that a transaction is not 
contrary to good morals, resulting in the entitlement only to legal interest. 
Without any ex-ante analysis of the market or particularities of this type of 
lending services, including its above-average business cost level, the law 
assumes that the nature of the lender’s business itself is contrary to good 
morals, decreasing thereby the certainty and business potential related to 
electronic retail lending. Secondly, through limiting the exercise of entre-
preneurship freedom the APRC limit might influence competition on SMS-
lending market as well as the flexibility and other parameters of SMS 
lending service, increasing the potential for less consumer-friendly service. 
Decreased consumer-friendliness might deteriorate the position and limit the 
choices of those consumers who are responsible, informed and knowingly 
want to use this type of services. Thus, indirectly the APRC limit might 
restrict the contractual freedom of consumers which is a fundamental right of 
free self-performance.  
Finally, the idea of social balancing behind the principle of social state 
does not assume that a state should bear significant amount of responsibility 
for the decisions of private individuals in their commercial transactions and 
redistribute significant portion of risks deriving from these purely 
commercial decisions of private individuals to service providers when the 
individuals have active legal capacity and they have been properly informed 
about the risks and particularities of their transactions. The principle of 
social state cannot disregard the rationale that a reasonable person usually 
takes reasonable care of personal transactions and finance. In parallel to 
responsible lending, responsible borrowing and well-informed consumer 
decisions should be the core of electronic retail lending, enabling the 
sufficiently informed consumers to bear full responsibility for their decisions 
which the legislators have so far ruled out. Naturally, the cases of involun-
tary situation should continue to form material grounds for identifying a 
transaction as contrary to good morals and therefore void but this does not 
exclude the reasonable responsibility of borrowers for their borrowing 
decisions. 
 
5. Instead of limiting the cost of credit through setting a relative limit by law as 
it is the case today I much more favour high information, disclosure and 
prudent marketing requirements which go hand in hand with the idea of 
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responsible borrowing. Influencing the delivery process and channels is a 
more appropriate solution than excessively limiting the freedom of entre-
preneurship and contract by the means such as the APRC limit. Informed 
responsible consumers should not be restricted the access to flexible lending 
only because of inadequate decision-making of other less responsible 
consumers. The effective advertising rules for SMS lending serve as a well-
































Literature and Publications 
1. Aarnio, A. Õiguse tõlgendamise teooria (A Theory on Interpretation of Law), 
(Õigusteabe AS Juura, Tallinn, 1996), 188 (in Estonian); 
2. Alekand, A. Proportsionaalsuse printsiip põhiõiguste riive mõõdupuuna täitemenet-
luses. Doktoritöö (The principle of Proportionality as a Measure for Restrictions of 
Fundamental Rights in Enforcement Proceeding. Doctorate Thesis) (Tartu Ülikooli 
Kirjastus, Tartu, 2009) (in Estonian); 
3. Alexy, R. A Theory of Constitutional Rights (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2010); 
4. Alexy, R. “Kollisioon ja kaalumine kui põhiõiguste dogmaatika põhiprobleemid“ 
(Conflict and weighing in the doctrine of fundamental rights), Juridica No 1 (2001), 
5–13 (in Estonian); 
5. Alexy, R. “Põhiõigused Eesti põhiseaduses“ (Fundamental Rights in the Estonian 
Constitution), Juridica Special Edition (2001), 5–96 (in Estonian); 
6. Annus, T. Riigiõigus (State Law) (Kirjastus Juura, Tallinn, 2006) (in Estonian); 
7. Autio, M. et al, “The use of small instant loans among young adults – a gateway to a 
consumer insolvency?”, International Journal of Consumer Studies No 33 (2009), 
407–415. Available at http://www.responsible-credit.net/media.php?t=media&f= 
file&id=3475 (26.05.2011); 
8. Baker, A. “Should UK Banks be Subject to Corporate Social Responsibility 
Legislation?”, 26(7) Business Law Review (2005), 171–174; 
9. Batalla, E.J. “Electronic Commerce: Online Payments”, 7(4) Computer and Tele-
communications Law Review (2001), 80–84; 
10. Bollen, R. “A Review on the Legal Nature of International Payments (with Special 
Reference to Australian Law and Practice)”, 22(6) Journal of International Banking 
Law and Regulation (2007), 318–332; 
11. Buttigieg, E. “Consumer Interests and the Antitrust Approach to Abusive Practices 
by Dominant Firms”, 16(5) European Business Law Review (2005), 1191–1285;  
12. Dermine, J. “Banking in Europe: Past, Present and Future”. – European Central 
Bank, The Transformation of the European Financial System, Frankfurt am Main 
(2003), 32–77. 
13. Effross, W.A. “Putting the Cards Before the Purse? Distinctions, Differences, and 
Dilemmas in the Regulation of Stored Value Card Systems”, 65 UMKC Law Review 
(1997), 319–391. 
14. Eichhorn, K.H. & Ginter, C. Euroopa Liidu ja Eesti konkurentsiõigus (Competition 
Law of the European Union and Estonia) (Juura, Tallinn, 2007) (in Estonian); 
15. Elliott, D.W. Elliott and Phipson Manual of the Law of Evidence (Sweet & 
Maxwell, London, 1987); 
16. Kull, I. ”Eesti tsiviilõiguse allikatetugev ja nõrk kohustuslikkus” (Strong and Weak 
Binding Nature of Sources of Estonian Civil Law as a Basis for the System of 
Sources), Juridica No 7 (2010), 463–472 (in Estonian); 
                                                                          
222 Contains references of this compilation in full, including the references used in the 
articles. 
83 
17. Kull, I. “Principle of Good Faith and Constitutional Values in Contract Law“, 
Juridica International No 7 (2002), 142–149; 
18. Kull, I. et al, “Riigikohtu tsiviilkolleegiumi praktika seadusandja mõjutajana (The 
Influence of Decisions of the Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court on Legislation), 
Juridica No 8 (2009), 555–569 (in Estonian); 
19. Kuurberg, M. “Head kommetega vastuolus olevad tehingud kui tühised tehingud” 
(Transactions Contrary to Good Morals as Void Transactions), Juridica No 3 
(2005), 200–208 (in Estonian); 
20. Köhler, H. Tsiviilseadustik. Üldosa (Civil Code. General Part) (Juura, Tallinn, 
1998) (in Estonian); 
21. Lanskoy, S. “The Legal Nature of Electronic Money”, Banque de France Bulletin 
Digest No 73 (2000), 21–38. Available at http://www.banque-france.fr/gb/ 
publications/telechar/bulletin/73etud1.pdf (13.06.2011); 
22. Ligi, R. ”Teavitamiskohustus – tarbija huvide kaitse tagatis Euroopa Ühenduses” 
(Obligation to Provide Information – Guaranteeing the Interests of the Consumer in 
the European Community), Juridica No 8 (2006), 530–540 (in Estonian); 
23. Maggs, G.E. “New Payment Devices and General Principles of Payment Law”, 72 
Notre Dame Law Review (1997), 753–798; 
24. Martinek, M. “Unjust Enrichment Issues in Triangular Situations of Defective 
Cashless Payments: The German Approach in a Comparative Perspective”, Journal 
of South African Law No 1 (2003), 94–109; 
25. Maruste, R. Põhiseadus ja selle järelevalve (Constitution and Constitutional 
Supervision) (Juura Õigusteabe AS, Tallinn, 1997) (in Estonian); 
26. Merusk, K. et al, Õigusriigi printsiip ja normitehnika (The Principle of the Rule of 
Law and Normative Technique) (SA Eesti Õiguskeskus, Tartu, 1999) (in Estonian); 
27. Merusk, K. & Narits, R. Eesti konstitutsiooniõigusest (Constitutional Law of 
Estonia) (Juura Õigusteabe AS, Tallinn, 1998) (in Estonian); 
28. Moles, P. & Terry, N. The Handbook of International Financial Terms (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 1999); 
29. Oone, K. “Digitaalallkirja kasutamise õiguslikud probleemid avalike teenuste 
osutamisel” (Legal Problems of Using Digital Signatures in the Provision of Public 
Services), Juridica No 2 (2005), 114–122 (in Estonian); 
30. Ramsay, I. “Consumer Law, Regulatory Capitalism and the “New Learning” in 
Regulation”, 28 (1) Sydney Law Review (2006), 9–35; 
31. Runnel, T. “Elektroonilise maksevahendi abil omaja tahteta tehtud tehing” (A 
Transaction Carried Out by an Electronic Payment Instrument without the Owner’s 
Knowledge), Juridica No 6 (2005), 367–375 (in Estonian); 
32. Saare, K. et al, “Protection of Consumer Rights in SMS Loan Agreements”, 18(1) 
European Review of Private Law (2010), 129–142; 
33. Saare, K., Sein, K. & Simovart, M. “Laenusaaja õiguste kaitse SMS-laenu lepingute 
puhul” (Protection of Consumer Rights in SMS Loan Agreements), Juridica No 1 
(2010), 41–50 (in Estonian); 
34. Scheller, H.K. The European Central Bank: History, Role and Functions (European 
Central Bank, Frankfurt/Main, 2004); 
35. Schlechtriem, P. Võlaõigus. Üldosa (Law of Obligations. General Part) (Juura, 
Tallinn, 1999) (in Estonian); 
36. Storme, M.E. “Freedom of Contract: Mandatory and Non-mandatory Rules in 
European Contract Law”, Juridica International No 1 (2006), 34–44; 
37. Tapper, Outline of the Law of Evidence (Butterworths, London, 1986); 
84 
38. Triipan, M. “Proportsionaalsuse printsiip riigi- ja haldusõiguses” (The principle of 
proportionality), Juridica No 5 (2001), 305–313 (in Estonian); 
39. Truuväli E. et al. (Eds.), Eesti Vabariigi põhiseadus. Kommenteeritud väljaanne 
(The Constitution of the Republic of Estonia. Commented Edition) (Kirjastus Juura, 
Tallinn, 2002) (in Estonian); 
40. Ulst, I. “Rahapesu ja terrorismi finantseerimine: regulatiivsed aspektid ja finants-
süsteemi kaitsmine” (Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism: Regulatory 
Aspects and Protection of the Financial System), Juridica No 7 (2003), 501–508 (in 
Estonian); 
41. Ulst, I. & Raa, R. “Basel II and Lending to SMEs: What Lies Ahead?”, EBS Review 
No 16 (2003), 62–74; 
42. Varul, P. et al, Tsiviilseadustiku üldosa seadus. Kommenteeritud väljaanne (General 
Part of Civil Code Act. Commented Edition) (Kirjastus Juura, Tallinn, 2010) (in 
Estonian); 
43. Varul, P. et al, Võlaõigusseadus I. Kommenteeritud väljaanne (Law of Obligations 
Act I. Commented Edition) (Kirjastus Juura, Tallinn, 2006) (in Estonian); 
44. Varul, P. et al, Võlaõigusseadus II. Kommenteeritud väljaanne (Law of Obligations 
Act II. Commented Edition) (Kirjastus Juura, Tallinn, 2007) (in Estonian); 
45. Wilson, C.L. “Banking on the Net: Extending Bank Regulation to Electronic Money 
and Beyond”, 30 Creighton Law Review (1997), 671–724; 
46. Zucca, L. Constitutional Dilemmas: Conflicts of Fundamental Legal Rights in 
Europe and the USA (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007); 
 
 
Policy Documents and Studies 
47. Association of E-money Institutions in The Netherlands, Electronic Money and E-
Money Institutions. A Position Paper on Regulation, Definitions and the Market, 15 
November 2002. Available at http://www.11a2.nl/docs/empp1511.doc 
(13.06.2011); 
48. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Customer Due Diligence for Banks. A 
paper prepared by theWorking Group on Cross-border Banking, 2001, Basel. 
Available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs85.pdf (13.06.2011);  
49. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Management and Supervision of Cross-
border Electronic Banking Activities, July 2003. Available at 
http://www.bis.org/publ/ bcbs99.pdf (13.06.2011); 
50. Consumer Agency & Ombudsman, Recommendations and Good Practices for 
Business. A paper on Business & Basic Rules of SMS Loans, 2007, Helsinki. 
Available at http://www.kuluttajavirasto.fi/File/c1ee33a5-2beb-4246-b38f-
a4b6b8f53478/Basic+rules+ of+sms+loans.pdf (13.06.2011); 
51. Eesti Pank, E-raha – kas alternatiiv sularahale? (E-money – Alternative to Cash?). 
Available at http://www.eestipank.info/pub/et/yldine/pank/maksesysteem/ 
1ERaha.html? ok=1 (20.05.2011) (in Estonian); 
52. Eesti Vabariigi põhiseaduse ekspertiisikomisjoni lõpparuanne (The final report of 
the Constitutional Expert Commission), 1998. Available at http://www.just.ee/ 
10716 (02.05.2011) (in Estonian); 
53. European Commission, Directorate-General Health and Consumer Protection. 
Study on the Calculation of the Annual Percentage Rate of Charge for Consumer 
85 
Credit Agreements, Final Report 2009. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/ 
rights/fin_serv_en.htm (13.06.2011); 
54. Finantsinspektsioon, Eesti finantsteenuste turg seisuga 31.12.2010 (The market of 
financial services in Estonia at 31.12.2010). Available at http://www.fi.ee/failid/ 
Ylevaade _turg_seisuga_2010_12_eesti.pdf (12.06.2011) (in Estonian); 
55. Janson, N. The Development of Electronic Money: Towards the Emergence of 
Free-Banking? A paper presented at the Austrian Scholars Conference, 13–15 
March 2003, Auburn, Alabama. Available at http://www.mises.org/asc/2003/ 
asc9janson.pdf (13.06.2011); 
56. Makseasutuste ja e-raha asutuste seaduse eelnõu seletuskiri (Explanatory note to the 
Payment Institutions and E-Money Institutions Act, 610 SE, 26 October 2009. 
Available at http://www.riigikogu.ee/index.php?page=en_vaade&op=ems&eid= 
802133(13.06.2011) (in Estonian); 
57. Melamed, M. Tarbimislaenu klientide käitumise mõjutegurite uuring – 2. osa 
(Survey on the factors influencing the behaviour of retail loan customers – part 2), 
February-March 2009. Available at http://kiirlaen.info/blog/tarbimislaenu-klientide-
kaitumise-mojutegurite-uuring-2-osa (13.06.2011) (in Estonian); 
58. Rahandusministri määruse “Tarbijakrediidi kulukuse määra arvutamise kord” 
eelnõu seletuskiri (Explanatory note to the regulation of the Minister of Finance 
“Procedure for Calculation of the Rate of the Cost of Consumer Credit“), June 
2010. Available at http://eoigus.just.ee/?act=6&subact=1&OTSIDOC_ W=292658 
(01.06.2010) (in Estonian); 
59. Reifner, U. et al, Study on interest rate restrictions in the EU. Final Report for the 
EU Commission DG Internal Market and Services, Project No. 
ETD/2009/IM/H3/87, 2010. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/ 
finservices-retail/docs/credit/irr_report_ en.pdf (25.05.2011); 
60. Reifner, U. & Knobloch, M. Access to Credit for Poor People in Germany. Expert 
Opinion for DOOD, August 2009. Available at http://www.responsible-
credit.net/media.php?t=media&f=file&id=3837 (25.05.2011); 
61. The Bank of Estonia, Lending Review, November 2010. Available at 
www.eestipank.info/pub/en/dokumendid/publikatsioonid/seeriad/rahast_2010/_201
0_10/mra_1010.pdf (14.06.2011); 
62. The Study Group on a European Civil Code and the Research Group on EC Private 
Law (Acquis Group), Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private 
Law: Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR), 2009. Available at 
http://www.storme.be/2009_02_DCFR_OutlineEdition.pdf (15.05.2010);  
63. Tsiviilseadustiku üldosa seaduse ja võlaõigusseaduse muutmise seaduse eelnõu 
seletuskiri (Explanatory note to the amending act of the General Part of Civil Code 
Act and Law of Obligations Act), 365 SE, 14 October 2008. Available at 
http://www.riigikogu.ee/?page=en_vaade&op=ems&eid=420369 (13.06.2011) (in 
Estonian); 
64. UK Office of Fair Trading, Review of high-cost credit. Final report, June 2010. 
Available at http://www.responsible-credit.net/media.php?t=media&f=file&id= 
3819 (26.05.2011); 
65. Valkamaa, E. & Muttilainen, V. Payment Difficulties Associated with SMS Loans. 
National Research Institute of Legal Policy, Research Communication No.86 




66. Võlaõigusseaduse ja teiste seaduste muutmise seaduse eelnõu seletuskiri 
(Explanatory note to the amending act of the Law of Obligations Act and other 
acts), 761 SE, 17 May 2010. Available at http://www.riigikogu.ee/?page= 
en_vaade&op=ems&eid=1033413 (13.06.2011) (in Estonian); 
67. Õiguskantsleri märgukiri nr. 6-1/091076/1100273 justiitsministrile “Tsiviilseadus-
tiku üldosa seaduse § 86 põhiseaduspärasus” (The note No 6-1/091076/1100273 of 
the Chancellor of Justice to the Minister of Justice regarding the constitutional 
compliance of Art 86 of the General Part of Civil Code Act), 19 January 2011. 
Available at http://www.oiguskantsler.ee/public/resources/editor/File/ 
NORMIKONTROLLI_MENETLUSED/Margukirjad/2011/JuM_kiirlaenud_m_rgu
kiri.pdf (10.05.2011) (in Estonian); 
 
Legislation  
Legislation of the Republic of Estonia 
68. Eesti Vabariigi põhiseadus, signed 28 June 1992, RT I (1992) No.26, 349; 
27.04.2011 No. 1 (in Estonian); 
69. Krediidiasutuste seadus, signed 9 February 1999, RT I (1999) No.23, 349; 
24.03.2011, No. 1 (in Estonian); 
70. Digitaalallkirja seadus, signed 8 March 2000, RT I (2000) No. 26, 150; (2010) No. 
22, 108 (in Estonian); 
71. Finantsinspektsiooni seadus, signed 9 May 2001, RT I (2001) No. 48, 267; 
24.03.2011, No. 1 (in Estonian); 
72. Võlaõigusseadus, signed 26 September 2001, RT I (2001) No.81, 487; 04.04.2011, 
No. 1 (in Estonian); 
73. Väärtpaberituru seadus, signed 17 October 2001, RT I (2001) No.89, 532; 
24.03.2011 No.1 (in Estonian);  
74. Tsiviilseadustiku üldosa seadus, signed 27 March 2002, RT I (2002); No.35, 216; 
06.12.2010, No. 1 (in Estonian); 
75. Tarbijakaitseseadus, signed 11 February 2004, RT I (2004) No.13, 86; (2010) 
No.31, 158 (in Estonian); 
76. Investeerimisfondide seadus, signed 14 April 2004, RT I (2004) No.36, 251; 
24.03.2011, No. 1 (in Estonian); 
77. Kindlustustegevuse seadus, signed 8 December 2004, RT I (2004) No.90, 616; 
24.03.2011, No. 1 (in Estonian);  
78. Tsiviilkohtumenetluse seadustik, signed 20 April 2005, RT I (2005) No. 26, 197; 
21.04.2011, No. 17 (in Estonian); 
79. E-raha asutuste seadus, signed 19 October 2005, RT I (2005) No.61, 473; (2007) 
No.65, 405 (repealed) (in Estonian); 
80. Rahapesu ja terrorismi rahastamise tõkestamise seadus, signed 19 December 2007, 
RT I (2008) No. 3, 21; (2010) No. 26, 129 (in Estonian); 
81. Reklaamiseadus, signed 12 March 2008, RT I (2008) No.15, 108; 06.01.2011, No. 1 
(in Estonian); 
82. Makseasutuste ja e-raha asutuste seadus, signed 17 December 2009, RT I (2010) 
No.2, 3; (2010) No.34, 182 (in Estonian); 
83. Võlaõigusseaduse ja teiste seaduste muutmise seadus, signed 30 September 2010, 
RT I (2010) No. 77, 590; 04.02.2011 No. 2 (in Estonian);  
87 
84. Tarbijakrediidi kulukuse määra arvutamise kord, signed 7 August 2002, RTL (2002) 
No.92, 1420; (2004) No.64, 1060 (repealed) (in Estonian); 
85. Krediidiasutuste bilansi täiendav aruandlus, signed 13 July 2010, RT I (2010) No 
48, 304 (in Estonian); 
86. Tarbijakrediidi kulukuse määra arvutamise kord, signed 31 October 2010, RT I 
(2010) No. 76, 584 (in Estonian); 
 
Legislation of the Republic of Finland 
87. Laki varallisuusoikeudellisista oikeustoimista, signed 13 June 1929, Suomen 
säädöskokoelma (1929) No.228; (2004) No.128 (in Finnish, official translation into 
English); 
88. Kuluttajansuojalaki, signed 20 January 1978, Suomen säädöskokoelma (1978) 
No.38; (2005) No.29 (in Finnish, official translation into English); 
 
Legislation of the Republic of Latvia 
89. Likums par noziedzīgi iegūtu līdzekļu legalizācijas novēršanu, signed 30 May 
2006, Latvijas Vēstnesis (2006) No. 83, 3451 (in Latvian, official translation into 
English); 
90. Patērētāju tiesību aizsardzības likums, signed 9 July 2008, Latvijas Vēstnesis (2008) 
No. 104 (3888) (in Latvian, official translation into English); 
 
Legislation of the Republic of Lithuania 
91. Vartotojų teisių gynimo įstatymo pakeitimo įstatymas, signed 30 January 2007, 
Valstybes zinios (2007) No.12–488 (in Lithuanian, official translation into English); 
92. Pinigų plovimo ir teroristų finansavimo prevencijos įstatymas, signed 24 January 
2008, Valstybės žinios (2008) No. 10–335 (in Lithuanian, official translation into 
English); 
93. Civilinis Kodeksas, signed 30 December 2008, Valstybės žinios (2008) No.149–
5997 (in Lithuanian, official translation into English); 
 
International Legislation 
94. Council Directive 87/102/EEC of 22 December 1986 for the Approximation of the 
Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions of the Member States Concerning 
Consumer Credit, OJ L 42, (1987) (repealed); 
95. Directive 2000/31/EC (8 June 2000) on Certain Legal Aspects of Information 
Society Services, in particular Electronic Commerce, in the Internal Market, 
Official Journal (OJ) L 178 (2000), 1–16; 
96. Directive 2000/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 
September 2000 on the taking up, pursuit of and prudential supervision of the 
business of electronic money institutions, Official Journal (OJ) L 275 (2000), 39–
43; 
97. Directive 2002/65/EC (23 September 2002) Concerning the Distance Marketing of 
Consumer Financial Services and Amending Council Directive 90/619/EEC and 
Directives 97/7/EC and 98/27/EC, Official Journal (OJ) L 271 (2002), 16–24; 
88 
98. Directive 2004/39/EC (21 April 2004) on Markets in Financial Instruments 
amending Council Directives 85/611/EEC and 93/6/EEC and Directive 2000/12/EC 
(20 March 2000) repealing Council Directive 93/22/EEC, Official Journal (OJ) L 
145 (2004), 1–44; 
99. Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 
2005 concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal 
market and amending Council Directive 84/450/EEC, Directives 97/7/EC, 
98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament of and of the Council and 
Regulation (EC) No.2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council, 
Official Journal (OJ) L 149 (2005), 22–39; 
100. Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 
2005 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money 
laundering and terrorist financing, Official Journal (OJ) L309 (2005), 15–36; 
101. Directive 2007/64/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 
November 2007 on payment services in the internal market amending Directives 
97/7/EC, 2002/65/EC, 2005/60/EC and 2006/48/EC and repealing Directive 
97/5/EC, Official Journal (OJ) L 319 (2007), 0001 – 0036; 
102. Directive 2008/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 
2008 on credit agreements for consumers and repealing Council Directive 




Case Law of Estonian Courts 
103. The Supreme Court 30 September 1994 decision in case III-4/1-5/94, RT I (1994) 
No.80, 1159 (in Estonian); 
104. The Supreme Court 20 April 2000 decision in constitutional supervision case 3-4-
1-6-2000, RT III (2000) No. 12,125 (in Estonian); 
105. The Supreme Court 12 June 2002 decision in constitutional supervision case 3-4-
1-6-02, RT III (2002) No. 18, 202 (in Estonian); 
106. The Supreme Court 17 June 2002 decision in civil case 3-2-1-81-02, RT III (2002) 
No.20, 238 (in Estonian); 
107. The Supreme Court 16 October 2002 decision in civil case 3-2-1-80-02, RT III 
(2002) No. 27, 302 (in Estonian);  
108. The Supreme Court 22 October 2002 decision in civil case 3-2-1-108-02, RT III 
(2002) No. 27, 305 (in Estonian);  
109. The Supreme Court 30 April 2004 decision in constitutional supervision case 3-4-
1-3-04, RT III (2004) No. 13, 160 (in Estonian); 
110. The Supreme Court 2 December 2004 decision in constitutional supervision case 
3-4-1-20-04, RT III (2004) No. 35, 362 (in Estonian); 
111. The Supreme Court 26 September 2005 decisions in civil case 3-2-1-83-05, RT III 
(2005) No.30, 302 (in Estonian); 
112. The Supreme Court 24 April 2006 decision in civil case 3-2-1-21-06, RT III 
(2006) No. 16, 145 (in Estonian);  
113. The Supreme Court 8 May 2006 decision in civil case 3-2-1-32-06, RT III (2006) 
No. 20, 187 (in Estonian); 
89 
114. The Supreme Court 12 December 2006 decision in civil case 3-2-2-5-06, RT III 
(2006) No. 47, 399 (in Estonian); 
115. The Supreme Court 29 January 2007 decision in civil case 3-2-1-137-06, RT III 
(2007) No. 4, 33 (in Estonian); 
116. The Supreme Court 19 December 2007 decision in civil case 3-2-1-122-07, RT III 
(2008) No. 2, 15 (in Estonian); 
117. The Supreme Court 7 May 2008 decision in administrative case 3-3-1-86-07, RT 
III (2008) No. 21, 147 (in Estonian); 
118. The Supreme Court 21 November 2008 decision in civil case 3-2-1-111-08, RT III 
(2008) No. 47, 325 (in Estonian);  
119. The Supreme Court 11 February 2009 decision in administrative case 3-3-1-79-08, 
RT III (2009) No. 8, 52 (in Estonian); 
120. The Supreme Court 26 March 2009 decision in constitutional supervision case 3-
4-1-16-08, RT III (2009) No. 15, 109 (in Estonian); 
121. The Supreme Court 27 January 2010 decision in civil case 3-2-1-153-09, RT III 
(2010) No. 6, 42 (in Estonian); 
122. The Supreme Court 17 June 2011 ruling in civil case 3-2-1-49-11. Available at 
http://www.nc.ee/?id=11&tekst=RK/3-2-1-49-11 (28.06.2011) (in Estonian); 
123. Tallinn District Court 24 April 2009 decision in administrative case 3-08-1220. 
Available at http://kola.just.ee/ (10.10.2010) (in Estonian);  
124. Tallinn District Court 30 November 2009 decision in administrative case 3-08-
1771. Available at http://kola.just.ee/ (11.10.2010) (in Estonian); 
 
Case Law of the European Court of Justice 
125. Case 27/76 United Brands Continentaal BV vs. Commission of the European 
Communities, ECR (1978) 207; 
126. Case 106/77 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato vs. Simmenthal SpA, ECR 
(1978) 629;  
127. Case 199/82 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato vs. SpA San Giorgio 
[1983] ECR 3595; 
128. Case C-213/89 The Queen vs. Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte: 
Factortame Ltd and others, ECR (1990) I-2433; 
 
Other 
129. E-mail correspondence of 06 September 2010 with Ave Henberg, Adviser-Head of 












I would like to thank my supervisors dr.iur. Lasse Lehis and dr.iur. Karin Sein 
from the University of Tartu who have been very helpful and supportive 
regarding both procedural issues as well as advice on the research contents 
necessary for the preparation of this dissertation and completion of my studies. 
In particular, I am grateful to Karin Sein for sharing her knowledge on 
electronic retail loans, methodological aspects and critically reading the 
contents of my research to improve the quality of this dissertation.  
Also, the finalisation of the articles containted in this compilation would not 
have successfully taken place without the friendly assistance and constructive 
advice of the editorial teams of the Review of Central and East European Law 
and the Journal of Eurasian Law. Last but not least, I much appreciate the 
invaluable support and patience of my family during the studies and preparation 
of this dissertation. Without their understanding and encouragement my 






























SUMMARY IN ESTONIAN 
Tarbijate ja teenusepakkujate õiguste tasakaalustamine 
elektrooniliste tarbijalaenude pakkumisel Eestis 
Käesolevasse väitekirja koondatud varem avaldatud rahvusvahelistest publi-
katsioonidest ja täiendavast analüüsist koosnev uurimus käsitleb finantsteenuste 
innovatsiooni, tarbijakaitse ning ettevõtlusvabaduse tasakaalustamise peamisi 
kitsaskohti elektrooniliste tarbijalaenude valdkonnas. Käesoleva väitekirja kesk-
seks hüpoteesiks on, et elektrooniliste tarbijalaenude reguleerimisel Eestis 
tarbijate kaitsmiseks kohaldatavatest meetmetest on tarbijakaitse ja tehingu-
vabaduse tasakaalustamise aspektist peamisteks kitsaskohtadeks klientide 
tuvastamise nõuded ja krediidi kulukuse määrale ülempiiri seadmine, kusjuures 
viimane riivab ebaproportsionaalselt teenusepakkujate põhiseaduslikke õigusi. 
Väitekirja eesmärgiks on otsida kinnitust järgmistele alahüpoteesidele: 
1) elektrooniliste laenudega seotud ettemaksukaartide pakkumisel säilib tarbija-
kaitse tase, 2) elektrooniliste tarbijalaenude reguleerimisel Eestis on tarbija-
kaitse ja ettevõtlusvabaduse tasakaalustamise peamisteks kitsaskohtadeks 
klientide tuvastamise nõuded ja krediidi kulukuse määrale ülempiiri seadmine, 
3) krediidi kulukuse määra piiramine riivab ülemääraselt teenusepakkujate 
põhiseadusega kaitstud ettevõtlusvabadusõigust.  
Käesoleva väitekirja koostamisel on kasutatud võrdlevat, süstemaatilist ja 
teleoloogilist õigusteaduslikku meetodit, kusjuures põhirõhk on võrdleval ja 
teleoloogilisel uurimismeetodil. Võrdlev meetod on käesoleva uurimuse kesk-
seks töövahendiks olukorras, kus omakeelset originaalset õiguskirjandust eksis-
teerib mõnevõrra piiratud mahus. Lisaks võimaldab see meetod kaasa rääkida 
ka teisi riike hõlmavas õiguslikus debatis, arvestades asjaolu, et käesoleva 
väitekirja uurimisvaldkond on tähtis teistegi Euroopa Liidu (EL) riikide jaoks. 
Võrdleva metoodika kasutamisel on peaasjalikult kõrvutatud Eesti õigusakte 
mõnede teiste liikmesriikide ning EL õigusega. Lisaks EL direktiividele, Eesti 
ja liikmesriikide seadustele on käesoleva väitekirja koostamisel kasutatud ka 
erialakirjandusest ja akadeemilistest publikatsioonidest saadud teavet. Kasu-
tatud on ka rahvusvaheliste ja riiklike institutsioonide ning erialaühingute juhi-
seid ja töödokumente. Teleoloogilist lähenemist on uurimistöös kasutatud teatud 
uurimisaspektide, nt õigusaktide sätete, tähenduse tuvastamiseks nende kehtes-
tamise eesmärgi ja autorite kavatsuste selgitamise kaudu. Selles kontektsis on 
käesolevas väitekirjas oluliste uurimisallikatena kasutatud mitmeid seadus-
eelnõude seletuskirju. Valitud uurimisvaldkond võimaldab ühendada õiguslikud 
küsimused ja majanduslikud kaalutlused, selgitades õiguslikke probleeme 
elektrooniliste tarbijalaenude pakkumise igapäevases äritegevuses tõusetunud 
tegelike probleemide põhjal ning analüüsides Riigikohtu poolt võetud vastavaid 
seisukohti. Uurimuse praktilised aspektid tuginevad Eesti Riigikohtu lahendite 
ning erinevate teenusepakkujate ja pankade kodulehekülgedel esitatud statistika 
ning info analüüsile.  
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Valitud uurimisvaldkonda on seni uuritud piiratud mahus, sest tegemise on 
uudse ja kiiresti areneva valdkonnaga. Eestis on elektrooniliste tarbijalaenude 
spetsiifilist temaatikat uurinud vähesed autorid, peamisteks selle valdkonnaga 
tegelejateks on olnud Kalev Saare, Karin Sein ja Mari Ann Simovart. Nende 
hiljutiste publikatsioonide seas on ka rahvusvahelises väljaandes European 
Review of Private Law avaldatud ühisartikkel, mis käsitleb SMS-laenude ning 
tarbijakaitse küsimusi. Teiste riikide autorite kirjutatud artiklitest seoses 
elektrooniliste tarbijalaenudega käsitleb suurem osa liigkasuvõtjaliku praktika, 
vastutustundliku laenamise ja tarbijalaenude intressimäärade piiramise temaati-
kat, hõlmates sageli õigusliku külje kõrval ka majanduslikke aspekte. Kuigi 
sellised käsitlused (nt Reifner et al 2010, Reichner & Knobloch 2009, jne) ei ole 
puhtalt juriidilised, lisavad nad kindlasti väärtust selle valdkonna uurimistööle, 
sest elektrooniliste tarbijalaenude regulatsiooni eripäraks on õiguslike ja majan-
duslike kaalutluste tihe omavaheline seos. Rahvusvahelisi artikleid on avaldatud 
ka elektronkaubanduse ning ettemaksukaartide valdkonnas (nt Janson 2003, 
Lanskoy 2000, jne). Samas on laenamise ning elektrooniliste maksevahendite 
teemasid üldisemalt kajastanud mitmed artiklid nii Eesti kui rahvusvahelistes 
õigusajakirjades. Tehingute tühisuse ja liigkasuvõtjaliku praktika osas on Eesti 
õiguskirjanduses ilmunud piisavalt käsitlusi, sealhulgas annavad suuniseid võla-
õigusseaduse (VÕS) ja tsiviilseadustiku üldosa seaduse (TSÜS) kommen-
teeritud väljaanded.  
Akadeemilises plaanis on käesoleva uurimuse tulemused originaalsed, sest 
vaid mõningaid käsitletud uurimisküsimusi on teiste autorite poolt uuritud 
piiratud ulatuses. Õiguslike lahenduste ning tulevaste arengute mõistmine on 
oluline ka teiste distsipliinide jaoks, et hinnata teatud finantsteenuste atraktiiv-
sust ning turgude ja teenuste globaliseerumisega seotud riske.  
 
Käesoleva väitekirja tulemusel võib teha alljärgnevad järeldused. 
1. Elektrooniliste laenude muutmine veelgi innovaatilisemaks nende kombi-
neerimise kaudu ettemaksukaartidega ühtseks tootelahenduseks kätkeb endas 
täiendavaid riske, kuid kuna sellega kaasnevad ka täiendavad avalik-õigus-
likud piirangud kaardi väljastajatele kui reguleeritud ja järelevalvele allu-
vatele ettevõtjatele, siis tarbijakaitse tase ei halvene. Elektroonilise laenuga 
seotud ettemaksukaardi väljastamine vastab e-raha tingimustele, sest selline 
finantseerimislahendus ei ole seotud kaardi valdaja (laenusaaja) kontoga. 
Seega kohaldatakse selliste kaartide väljastajate suhtes kõiki e-raha asu-
tustele kehtivaid tegevusloa, kapitali- ja järelevalvenõudeid, sh ka piiriülese 
tegevuse puhul. Kaarte väljastav asutus, mis on EL või Euroopa Majandus-
piirkonna (EMP) liikmesriigi päritolu, võib Eestis teenuseid osutada oma 
päritoluriigi tegevusloa alusel, kui ta tegutseb filiaali kaudu või osutab piiri-
üleseid teenuseid, või asutada eraldi tegevusloaga tütarettevõtte. Kaarte 
väljastav asutus, mis ei ole pärit EL või EMP liikmesriigist, vaid pärineb 
mõnest kolmandast riigist, võib Eestis teenuseid osutada filiaali kaudu või 
piiriüleseid teenuseid osutades, kuid peab Finantsinspektsioonilt taotlema 
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tegevusloa mistahes tegevusvormi jaoks. Kolmanda riigi päritolu kaardi 
väljastaja võib ka Eestis asutada eraldi tütarettevõtte, taotledes sellele 
tegevusloa. 
2. Kliendi isiku tuvastamise nõuete osas on 2008. aasta algusest kehtiv kohus-
tus tuvastada esmakordselt ärisuhte loomisel kliendi isik viibides kliendiga 
samas kohas küll suur samm vastutustundliku elektronlaenutegevuse suunas, 
kuid samas vähendab see elektrooniliste tarbijalaenude paindlikkust. Uuri-
mistöö käigus kujunes esialgu arvamus, et selline tuvastamiskohustus võib 
mõnevõrra takistada elektronlaenude teenuste osutamise vabadust. Nende 
reeglitega seotud peamiseks õiguslikuks probleemiks oli see, et need on 
kehtestatud eeskätt rahapesu tõkestamise eesmärgil. Vastavalt vaidlustasid 
mõned elektrooniliste tarbijalaenude pakkujad näost-näkku tuvastamise 
kohustuse kohtus. Vaidlustamist põhjendati peamiselt sellega, et vahetu 
tuvastamise reeglid seavad ebamõistlikke takistusi teenuste pakkumise vaba-
dusele ning on ebaproportsionaalsed, kuna väikesemahulised tarbijalaenud ei 
ole rahapesu- või terrorismi rahastamise riskiga tehingud. Kohtupraktika 
jätkuanalüüs näitas aga, et vahetu tuvastamise reeglite eesmärgiks on muu-
hulgas vältida tehingute anonüümsust, mis tooks kaasa võimalikke rahapesu 
ja terrorismi rahastamise riske. Neid kuritegusid peetakse üldsusele väga 
ohtlikeks ning sellest lähtuvalt annab kaasnev suur avalik huvi kindla aluse 
äritegevuse iseloomust sõltumatult isikute õiguste piiramiseks, sh väikese-
mahuliste elektronlaenude pakkujate õiguste piiramiseks. Seega, kliendi 
isiku tuvastamise nõudeid käsitlev alahüpotees ei leidnud kinnitust. Vahetu 
isikutuvastamise nõude kohaldamine elektrooniliste laenude pakkujate 
suhtes on õigustatud ja seda ei saa pidada tarbijakaitse ja ettevõtlusvabaduse 
tasakaalustamise kitsaskohaks elektrooniliste tarbijalaenude valdkonnas. 
3. Elektrooniliste tarbijalaenude valdkonnas kohaldatavatest olulisematest 
tarbijakaitsemeetmetest nagu krediidi kulukuse piirang, tarbijate ulatuslikum 
teavitamiskohustus, reklaaminõuded, intresside esitamise vorm ja klientide 
vahetu tuvastamise nõue on krediidi kulukuse määra piiramine tarbijakaitse 
ja ettevõtlusvabaduse tasakaalustamise peamiseks kitsaskohaks. Alates 
1. maist 2009 laienesid tehingu tühisuse alused ja krediidi kulukuse määrale 
kehtestati suhteline ülempiir, millega kaasnes ka tõendamiskoormuse ümber-
pööramine. Kui poolte vastastikuste kohustuste väärtus on heade kommete 
vastaselt ebamõistlikult tasakaalust väljas, siis eeldatakse, et tehingust kasu 
saav pool teadis või pidi teadma teise poole raskest olukorrast. Tarbija-
krediidilepingute puhul eeldatakse, et vastastikuste kohustuste väärtus on 
heade kommete vastaselt tasakaalust väljas, kui krediidi kulukuse määr 
tehingu tegemise ajal ületab Eesti Panga viimati avaldatud keskmist krediidi-
asutuste poolt eraisikutele antud tarbimislaenude kulukuse määra enam kui 
kolm korda. Krediidi kulukuse määra ülempiir on oma iseloomult ”pehme”, 
mis tähendab seda, et laenuandja võib otsustada pakkuda laenu kõrgema 
krediidi kulukuse määraga kui etteantud ülempiir. Sellisel juhul peab ta aga 
arvestama tagajärgedega, mis tulenevad sellest, et laenusaaja võib tehingu 
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vaidlustada ning laenuandja peab kandma ümberpööratud tõendamis-
koormust ja tõendama, et tehing ei ole sõlmitud vastuolus heade kommetega 
ega seetõttu tühine.  
Üheks lähtekohaks laenuandja tõendamiskoormuse ulatuse määratlemisel 
võiks olla tõlgenduse tuginemine mõistlikkuse ning tõhususe põhimõtetele. 
Mõistlikkuse põhimõte tugineb mõistliku inimese arusaamale ja toimimisele 
tavapärases olukorras. Vastavalt võiks laenuandjalt mõistlikult oodata seda, 
et ta selgitaks välja tarbija arusaamise ja tahte laenutehingu tegemiseks ning 
veenduks tarbija maksevõimes. Tõhususe põhimõtte kohaselt ei tohi tõenda-
miskohustuse täitmine olla poolele ülemäära koormav ega võimatu. Vasta-
valt peaks laenuandja tõendamiskoormus sisaldama vähemalt laenusaaja 
profiili tuvastamist, rakendades selleks vajalikul määral hoolt, ja tuvastama 
peaks vähemalt laenu eesmärgi, laenusaaja varasema laenukogemuse, hari-
duse, töökogemuse, sissetuleku, varad, kohustused, maksedistsipliini ja 
tagasimakseallikad. Krediidi kulukuse määra piirang ongi kitsaskohaks ees-
kätt teenusepakkujale seatud ulatusliku, aga selgelt määratlemata tõendamis-
koormuse tõttu, mis põhjustab diskussiooni krediidi kulukuse piirangu 
võimalikust vastuolust põhiseadusega. 
4. Krediidi kulukuse määra piiramine oma praegusel õiguslikul kujul vastab 
küll tarbijakaitse vajadustele, kuid ei loo tasakaalustatud lahendust. Eestis on 
elektrooniliste tarbijalaenude osas tarbijate kaitseks kohaldatavad meetmed 
tarbijakaitse ja ettevõtlusvabaduse tasakaalustamise aspektist teenuse-
pakkujatele ülemääraselt koormavad, sest krediidi kulukuse määra piiramine 
riivab ebaproportsionaalselt teenusepakkujate põhiseadusega kaitstud ette-
võtlusvabadusõigust. Riive proportsionaalsuse kaalumisel on oluliseks 
aspektiks kollisioon sotsiaalriigi põhimõtte ja ettevõtlusvabaduse põhiõiguse 
vahel. Sotsiaalriigi idee lähtub eeldusest, et riigi eesmärgiks on sotsiaalse 
tasakaalu otsimine ning nende isikute kaitse tagamine, kes ise ei saa oma 
põhiõiguste kaitse tagamist vajalikul määral otseselt mõjutada. Tarbija-
õigused ei ole küll otseselt sotsiaalsed põhiõigused, kuid tarbijad on 
elektrooniliste tarbijalaenude tehingutes nõrgemaks pooleks ning väärivad 
riigi tähelepanu, et vältida nende ülemäärast sõltuvust kõrge intressimääraga 
krediidist ja elektrooniliste laenude pakkujatest. Siiski, vaatamata sotsiaal-
riigi põhimõttele, on laenupakkujate ettevõtlusvabadusõiguse riive krediidi 
kulukuse määra piiramise vormis oma praegusel kujul ülemäära piirav ning 
järgmisi põhjuseid võib pidada tarbijakaitse eesmärkidest kaalukamateks. 
Esiteks, krediidi kulukuse piirangut võib pidada ülemäära intensiivseks, 
sest see piirab teenusepakkujate legaalse sissetuleku taset, vähendades 
seeläbi ettevõtlusvabadusõiguse majanduslikult mõistliku teostamise võima-
lust. Isegi kui elektrooniliste tarbijalaenude pakkuja annab tarbijale piisavalt 
nõuetekohast informatsiooni ja järgib kõiki muid seaduse nõudeid (sh kliendi 
isiku tuvastamise nõudeid), võib tal siiski ebaõnnestuda tõendamine, et 
vastav laenutehing ei ole vastuolus heade kommetega ja seetõttu tühine, 
mille tulemuseks on õigus saada laenu kasutada andmise eest üksnes 
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seadusjärgset intressi laenulepingus kokku lepitud intressi asemel. Kuna läbi 
ei ole viidud mõjude analüüsi, siis riigil puudub tegelikult ülevaade sellise 
õigusliku meetme majanduslikust mõjust ja proportsionaalsusest. Ilma eelne-
valt turgu ja seda tüüpi laenutoodete eripärasid, sh selle sektori keskmisest 
kõrgemat tüüpilist ärikulude taset analüüsimata loob seadus eelduse, et 
teenusepakkuja äritegevuse iseloom kui selline on igal juhul vastuolus heade 
kommetega, vähendades seeläbi elektrooniliste tarbijalaenude pakkumise 
kindlust ning äripotentsiaali.  
Teiseks võib krediidi kulukuse piirang ettevõtlusvabadusõiguse teosta-
mise piiramise kaudu mõjutada nii konkurentsi SMS-laenude turul kui ka 
SMS-laenude teenuse paindlikkust ja muid parameetreid, suurendades 
potentsiaali vähem tarbijasõbraliku teenuse kujunemiseks. Vähenenud 
tarbijasõbralikkus võib piirata nende tarbijate valikuid, kes on teadlikud ja 
täiesti vastutustundlikult tahavad seda tüüpi teenust kasutada. Seega võib 
krediidi kulukuse piirang kaudselt piirata tarbijate lepinguvabadust, mis on 
vaba enesteostuse põhiõiguse üks vorme. 
Viimaseks, sotsiaalriigi põhimõtte aluseks olev sotsiaalse tasakaalustatuse 
idee ei eelda siiski seda, et riik peaks võtma märkimisväärse vastutuse 
eraisikute poolt nende majandustehingute käigus tehtavate otsuste eest ja 
jaotama suure osa sellistest puhtalt majandusliku iseloomuga otsustest tule-
nevatest eraisikute riskidest ümber teenusepakkujatele, kui need eraisikud on 
teovõimelised ja neid on tehinguga seotud riskidest ning eripäradest kohaselt 
teavitatud. Sotsiaalriigi põhimõtte juures ei saa täielikult kõrvale jätta ühte 
iga normaalse ühiskonna toimimise aluseks olevat asjaolu, et mõistlik 
inimene näitab tavaolukorras üles mõistlikku hoolt oma personaalsete tehin-
gute ja rahaasjade suhtes. Kui laenupakkuja annab laenu vastava turu-
määraga ning täidab kõiki seadusest tulenevaid teavitamiskohustusi, sh 
kohustust teavitada tarbijat pakutava laenu kulukusest, on tarbija poolt nõus-
olek laenutehingu tegemiseks tema teadvustatud vastutus. Vastutustundliku 
laenuandmise põhimõtte kõrval peaks elektrooniliste tarbijalaenude kesk-
seteks põhimõteteks olema ka vastutustundlik laenuvõtmine ja teadlikud 
tarbijaotsused, mis võimaldavad piisavalt informeeritud tarbijatel kanda täit 
vastutust oma otsuste eest, mille seadusandja on praegu krediidi kulukuse 
piiranguga välistanud. Loomulikult peavad tarbija (või mis tahes lepingu-
poole) sundolukorra juhtumid jätkuvalt jääma oluliseks põhjuseks, et tunnis-
tada tehing heade kommete vastaseks ja seega tühiseks, kuid see ei välista 
tarbijate mõistlikku vastutust oma laenuvõtmise otsuste eest. 
5. Selle asemel, et piirata krediidi kulukust seaduse alusel ülempiiri kehtesta-
misega, nagu seda on Eestis täna tehtud, võiks õigusliku tasakaalu saavuta-
miseks pigem pooldada kõrgeid tarbijate teavitamise, olulise info avalikusta-
mise ning vastutustundliku reklaami nõudeid, mis samas loovad eelduse 
vastutustundliku laenuvõtmise realiseerumiseks. Laenude turustamis-
protsessi ja -kanalite mõjutamine on sobivam lahendus kui ettevõtlus-ja 
lepinguvabaduse liigne piiramine selliste meetmete abil nagu krediidi 
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kulukuse määrale ülempiiri seadmine. Teadlike ja vastutustundlike tarbijate 
võimalust paindlike laenutoodete kasutamiseks ei tohiks piirata mõningate 
teiste vähem vastutustundlike tarbijate halbade tarbimisotsuste tõttu. Täna 
SMS-laenude reklaami suhtes kehtivaid nõudeid võib pidada mõistlikult 
tasakaalustatud lahenduseks vastutustundliku laenupakkumise tagamiseks 
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